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This thesis is written by a midwife and lawyer who strongly supported the 
establishment of the Health and Disability Commissioner. With the enactment of the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 ("HDCA") a new complaints jurisdiction 
was established. Midwives, like all other health providers became subject to the 
requirements of this Act. I was appointed to assist and defend employed and self 
employed midwives from all over New Zealand. These midwives worked in the 
community and in hospitals. My work also encompassed other jurisdictions, including 
the professional disciplinary bodies, the Coroners' Courts, the medical misadventure unit 
and Reviews, the High Court, and other Commissioners. 
My role provided a unique opportunity to follow the initial development of the 
Office of the Commissioner. I was often closely involved in the HDCA complaints 
process and saw all documentation, correspondence, and opinions generated between the 
Commissioner, her Office and the midwife for whom I acted. I was able to observe the 
internal processes of complaint, investigation and prosecution and to see firsthand the 
impact of these on the profession of midwifery and on individual midwives, often over a 
period of several years. Inadvertently I began to gather material as a participant/observer 
as the early midwifery HDCA cases were processed .. I soon observed with growing 
concern that many of the legal protections, usual to investigatory bodies, such as the 
Office of the Ombudsman or that of the Privacy Commissioner or the Nursing Council 
of New Zealand, had not been built into the HDCA processes. 
A further concern was a growing fear of the Commissioner amongst midwives. 
This fear did not arise because the midwife was worried that someone might lodge a 
complaint against her, as midwives recognised the right of consumers to make 
complaints. Instead this fear seemed grounded in a midwifery view that the 
Commissioner would not follow a fair process. As an original supporter of the HDCA, I 
felt increasingly worried that health professionals were losing confidence in the Office so 













In time I began to speak out and write about my concerns in the hope that this 
would lead to change·1 I also inadvertantly began to gather information and note where 
shortcomings in the processes of the Commissioner occurred. I knew that some 
procedures were established in the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 
("HDCA") but that others such as notice and disclosure were left largely to the discretion 
of the Commissioner. In other jurisdictions, fundamental protections, tested in the Courts, 
gave protections to health practitioners but in the Commissioner's jurisdiction these 
protections were not in place. I could only base my observations on my own midwifery 
clients, but I considered that in many cases fair procedures were not being followed. This 
caused great distress to my clients and increasing frustration to me as a lawyer. 
I began to research and read widely about natural justice, fair procedures and fair 
processes and identified the fundamental requirements of these concepts. I reviewed the 
history of the Commissioner and closely studied the legislation and case law to determine 
whether the Commissioner was bound to give effect to the principles of natural justice. I 
also closely analysed the HDCA and the midwifery cases to identify whether the 
procedures had been fair. I confined my research to the term of the first Commissioner. 
This thesis describes what I discovered. 
Pearse, J. "The Interface of Midwifery, the HDC Legislation and Disciplinary 
Procedures." Paper presented to the New Zealand Medical Law Conference, Wellington, 
(30 November and 1 December 1999). I also participated in the HDC Review calling for 
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The advent of a comprehensive accident insurance and compensation2 ("ACC") 
scheme in New Zealand in the early 1970's gave cover to anyone experiencing 'personal 
injury by accident'. This included patients who experienced harm through the negligence 
of registered health professionals. The original Act was eventually amended so that any 
person receiving cover under ACC, was statutorily barred from making a claim for 
compensatory damages against the registered health professionals involved in their care. 
The decisions of the ACC were not well publicised and practitioners who caused 
medical error were not named, and there was seldom any sanction against them. Any 
regulatory or disciplinary issues were dealt with internally by the professions, in meetings 
and hearings closed to the public and media. This meant that medical error or adverse 
disciplinary findings were not talked about nor publicized, as sometimes happens in other 
jurisdictions when matters are settled rather than litigated, and so unfortunately other 
practitioners seldom heard about and therefore could not learn from, the medical errors of 
their colleagues. The result was that similar mistakes continued to be repeated.3 
It was not until the late 1980s that the practice of health professionals came under 
increasing scrutiny. Consideration of the socio-political context of that time demonstrates 
a growing disquiet about the adequacy of medical self-regulation and a recognition among 
New Zealanders of their right to personal autonomy and self-determination in the area of 
health. As people became more educated they expected to take an active part in the 
decision-making about their own and about their family's health care. 
2 The first enactment granting rehabilitation and lump sum compensation for those suffering personal 
injury by accident was entitled the Accident Compensation Act 1972. The statutory bar to civil claims 
for damages was enacted in the Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, section 14. This 
Act also introduced a specific definition of medical misadventure, section 5. 
















An additional factor was that while there had been a general satisfaction with the 
level of compensation under the ACC scheme were a lump sum monetary payment could 
be given as compensation for personal injury, the view of people changed once such 
payments were abolished in 1992. When this occurred those who had experienced adverse 
outcomes of medical treatment, no longer felt adequately compensated for the harm they 
had suffered. They also no longer believed that errant practitioners were being held 
sufficiently accountable for that harm,4 and they wanted the right to complain about what 
had happened to them, to someone other than the professional bodies. Two frequently 
expressed motivations for an independent avenue of complaint was that people wanted 
practitioner's to learn from their mistake(s) and they wanted to stop similar harm from 
happening to anyone else. 
This thesis will consider how public concerns about medical accountability came to 
a head following revelations during a Commission of Inquiry into the treatment of women 
at one of New Zealand's foremost hospitals, ("the Cartwright Inquiry").5 One of the key 
recommendations from this Inquiry was the call for an independent Health Commissioner. 
The development of that office will be considered along with the establishment of New 
Zealand's first Health and Disability Commissioner ("HDC"). The first Commissioner 
was charged with drafting a Code of patient rights and setting up an office that would 
accept, mediate or investigate complaints on behalf of health consumers. 
The Commissioner was a statutory officer and like any such officer acts on 
delegated authority. This thesis will argue that both the Commissioner and the procedures 
she or he sets in place are subject to the legal principles of natural justice. While not 
strictly bio-ethical in nature, the principles of natural justice arguably epitomize the 
essence of many other ethical constructs, including the overarching need for all citizens 
4 
5 
Part of this dissatisfaction may have also derived from the paltry financial penalties awarded to 
successful complainants by the professional disciplinary bodies. Fines were capped at $1000 until 
1985. 
Cartwright, S.R. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into allegations concerning the 
treatment of cervical cancer at National Women's Hospital and into other related 















who are subject to the laws of this country to be treated justly and fairly. The critical 
importance of these principles to both law and medical ethics is why they have been 
selected to provide a theoretical framework for this work. 
In pursuing this matter I wanted to do three things. First, to review the principles of 
natural justice, including the relevant literature and case law, and to identify what these 
principles entailed in a jurisdiction such as that of the HDC. This would enable me to 
determine if the expectations that I had had for the processes under the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act 1994 ("HDCA") were unrealistic or unachievable. Secondly 
I wanted to consider the processes and procedures that come into play following receipt of 
a complaint under the HDCA and whether the Commissioner was bound to give effect to 
the principles of natural justice. Finally I wanted to analyze past midwifery cases where 
there had been a concern that these principles had not been followed. Where apparent 
shortcomings were identified, I planned to measure these concerns against the 
Commissioner's own governing statute and the expectations of a fair process, to determine 
whether these shortcomings were significant. 
A further factor that prompted this thesis was the realization that, although 
improvements in process have eventually been made (particularly under the helm of the 
second Commissioner) the governing modus operendi of the Office would always be 
largely dependant on the beliefs and views held by the incumbent Commissioner. It 
therefore seemed even more important to review the early years of the Office to see what 
could be learnt from them. This work is limited to consideration of the first five years of 
the office of the Commissioner and of the experience of members of the midwifery 
profession. It is acknowledged that there have been many positive changes in the Office 














CHAPTER ONE- METHODOLOGY6 
When I was appointed as a defence lawyer to midwives in 1995, one of the 
jurisdictions with which I became familiar was the Health and Disability Commissioner. I 
was in a unique position to observe first hand the growth of the jurisdiction and the 
development of its processes and procedures. I was often closely involved in the HDCA 
complaints process and saw all documentation, correspondence, and opinions generated 
between the Commissioner, her Office and the midwife for whom I acted. I was able to 
observe the internal processes of complaint, investigation and prosecution and to see the 
impact of these on the profession of midwifery and on individual midwives, often over a 
period of several years. Inadvertently I began to gather material as a participant/observer 
about the early midwifery HDCA cases being processed. At that stage I was not 
intending a research project but I came to realize that the difficulties that midwives were 
experiencing were not isolated incidents or oversights, but the result of significant 
procedural shortcomings. I developed the tentative hypothesis that fair processes were not 
being established or adhered to. After some years, I decided to formally undertake some 
post-graduate research to explore this hypothesis further. 
I wanted the research to have an applied focus as it arose in response to a specific 
problem and I hoped that it would have a practical application, by highlighting past issues 
and preventing similar problems occurring in the Office of the Commissioner in the 
future.7 I planned to begin by undertaking an extensive review of the relevant literature, a 
statutory and experiential identification of the procedural steps set out within the HDCA 
and then to carefully analyse the cases and experiences of several midwives who were 
subjected to an HDCA investigation. The key questions that I posed was whether these 
6 
7 
It is unusual to place the methodology section so early in a thesis but this is where it best informs the 
reader and it will not break the flow of the review and discussion. 













midwives had been treated in accordance with the principles of natural justice and if not, 
whether they should they have been. 
It was difficult to find a theoretical approach that sufficiently informs methodology 
to enable me to fulfil the wide-ranging aims of this thesis. I found the analysis that I 
wanted to complete did not easily fit bio-ethical theories, although it sat squarely within 
the area of traditional health law. Initially it seemed possible to adopt a 'case based' or 
casuistry approach. Casuists attempt to answer questions by appealing to maxims 
grounded in experiences and tradition as well as by reason in analogous cases. 8 They 
recommend immersion in the particulars of a specific case or cases, in order to draw moral 
principles and reasoning.9 The casuist identifies the particular features of the 'paradigm' 
case and considers these against other cases and precedents. In this thesis I wanted to 
consider actual midwifery cases and consider these against the precedents and case law of 
similar jurisdictions, to determine if some rule of moral judgement or relevance emerged 
to link the concepts. 
The study of individual cases, enables the casuist to move from specific to 
increasingly complex fact situations and to then, through case analysis develop a wider 
theory to systematize and to explain the elements which have emerged. 10 It also enables 
us to examine practices and policies and determine whether these align with commonly 
held ethical standards and will inform us how to act according to those standards. 
Casuistry is often closely linked, although not invariably, to narrative, although in 
narrative ethics several 'stories' may arise from the study of the same case. In casuistry 
each case is considered and the details are debated. The case becomes the narrative which 
provides a matrix for consideration of theoretical concepts such as the principles of 
10 
Notes taken in a lecture for Issues in Law, Ethics and Medicine (BIT<;: 403) 1999. Centre ofBioethics, 
School of Medicine, Otago University. Lecturer Neil Pickering . 
Murray, T. "What do we mean by narrative ethics?" Medical Humanities Review, 11(2) (1997): 44-57. 
Beauchamp, T. and Childress, J. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4th ed.) (New York, Oxford: Oxford 













natural justice. Blaxter writes that the case study is the method of choice when the 
phenomena under study is not readily distinguishable from its context. 11 He describes the 
context as related to the background of existing research, knowledge and understanding 
that informs new and existing research projects. 12 The difficulty with the context that I 
was dealing with was that the HDCA was a new jurisdiction about which very little had 
been written. I could agree that the midwifery cases were certainly intrinsically mixed 
with the changing context of widened consumer rights and greater professional 
accountability but I needed to understand how these interrelated with traditional legal 
notions of fair process and the expectation that persons subject to statutory law, will be 
accorded the fundamental protections of the principles of natural justice. I was aware that 
study of each of these aspects would help me to develop insights, reveal new ways of 
seeing, 13 and hopefully by case illustration, contribute to changing practice. 14 
The primary difficulty that I had with the Casuistry approach was that while it 
focuses on practical decision making in particular cases, 15 it suggests that moral reasoning 
in decision making, is often hampered by the inflexibility of overriding principles used to 
inform or justify those decisions.16 I wanted to take the opposite view. Cases often do not 
inform moral judgement purely by their facts alone and some rule of moral relevance must 
connect the cases that are being considered. I considered that a purely casuist approach 
would not be appropriate because consideration of overriding principles such as those of 
natural justice, in the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, were critical to the development of 
my thesis. Procedural certainty and fair treatment could only occur if the principles of 







Blaxter, L., Hughes, C. and Tight, M. How to research (2nd ed). (Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 2001): 71. 
Blaxter, et al., (2001): 38. 
Edwards, A, and Talbot, R. The Hard Pressed Researcher (2nd ed). (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd, 
1999): 131. 
Blaxter, et al., (2001): 73. 
Jonson, A. In Principles of Biomedical Ethics (41h ed.) edited by Beauchamp, T and Childress, J. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 92. 




















better decisions and more just outcomes for all involved in the HDCA processes. This 
would increase confidence in the work of the Commissioner. 
There is also a danger with casuistry of the researcher starting with a bias or 
proposition and imposing his or her own personal filter on the cases to ensure that the 
interpretation fits with the researcher's own hypothesis. Nussbaum17 argues that this can 
be avoided by the researcher being open to other explanations and being ready to be 
surprised by the conclusions discovered. Although partially rejecting the theory of 
casuistry to underpin this work, I was aware that analysis of cases could serve to illustrate 
principles more easily than a dry dissertation or a formal literature review - particularly 
when much of that literature was case law and statute. I agreed with Blaxter's argument 
that the insights gained from studying cases can contribute to changing practice because 
the data is close to people's experience and thus more persuasive and accessible. 18 I also 
realized that case studies would be helpful to demonstrate the principles and concerns that 
underpin this work. I therefore could not reject this theory completely, so while part of 
this work is loosely casuist, I decided to concentrate on the theoretical framework 
provided by the principles of natural justice. These principles can be utilized to inform 
many aspects of bio-ethics such as where there is distribution of scarce resources, areas of 
rule utilitarianism, and where there are considerations regards the ethics of process in 
decision making. 
The method that I used was inductive. Trochim describes inductive reasoning as that 
which moves from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories. 
17 
18 
[The researcher takes these] specific observations and measurements begins 
detecting patterns and regularities, formulates some tentative hypotheses 
that you can explore, and finally ends up developing some general 
Nussbaum, M. "Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical Theory" Chapter in Love's 
Knowledge, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Blaxter et al., (2001): 73. 
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conclusions or theories. 19 
Inductive research is generally a process of reference from the particular to the 
general. Edwards writes that it is frequently used where typical cases are given as 
illustrative of wider principles?0 I then began to look at 'inductive' models to inform my 
research methodology. The models of methodology that I primarily utilized were a 
combination of participant/observer observation, grounded theory, and close textual 
analysis . 
The concept of grounded theory arose from the work of Glasser and Strauss?1 They 
consider that theories arise "from the ground up". A key object is that a researcher goes 
"into the field to observe the phenomena in its natural state" or in situ and the theories that 
emerge are grounded in what is observed?2 This is sometimes referred to as the concept of 
emergence. Y ee writes that with grounded theory, the researcher starts with no pre-
conceptions, and that the research problem, the sample, the concepts, the relevant 
literature and finally a theory, emerges during the process of the study itself.23 Certainly 
the research problem for this thesis arose from my observations of practice and HDCA 
processes. The sample emerged from the group of midwives I was closely working with. 
My role as legal advisor enabled me to study what Yee describes as the lived experience of 
these participants as they became subjected to the HDCA complaints process. I saw their 







Trochim, William. The Research Methods Knowledge Base. (2nd ed.) (Cincinnati: Atomic Dog 
Publishers, 2001): 17. 
Edwards, A. and Talbot, R. (1999): 131. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research. 
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1967). The two theorists parted company and went on to develop two 
very different aspects of the theory. Yee writes that Glaser became interested in studying core processes 
based on the concerns of the people in the study and this interpretation was helpful in completing this 
research. Yee, B. ( 2003, ch 2). 
Trochim, W. (2001):160, Strauss, A.L. and Corbin, J. 1990 Basics of qualitative research: Grounded 
theory procedures and techniques. London: Sage Publications, cited in Barnes, D.B.; Taylor-Brown, S. 
and Wiener, L. "I Didn't LeaveY' All on Purpose": HIV-Infected Mothers' Videotaped Legacies for 
Their Children. Qualitative Sociology, Vol20, No. 1, 1997, p.7. 
Yee, Bevan, Enhancing Security: A Grounded Theory of Chinese Survival in New Zealand, (Online 



















Grounded theory is developed inductively from the content analysis of 
records of phenomena that occur in a natural setting and that the theories or 
frameworks produced can provide new ways of seeing these phenomena?4 
While it might seem unusual to view the Office of the Commissioner as a 'natural 
setting', for the purposes of research, the midwives and I were involved day to day in the 
usual processes and procedures of that Office. The correspondence and findings were 
very typical of that jurisdiction, at that time and therefore arguably 'natural' in terms of the 
usual way the Office operated. 
Having identified the research sample, the researcher gathers data and takes 
extensive field notes and begins to generate questions, analyze themes and identify core 
concepts.25 This is followed by a stage that Yee describes as conceptualisation, where a 
researcher has to step back from the data and write memos and notes to develop tentative 
hypotheses?6 In this research, the early data collection was partly inadvertent. I began to 
accumulate information and keep notes on themes that were arising. I am uncertain if I 
ever consciously stepped back to develop a hypothesis. I do recall recognising a pattern of 
concerns, and analysing the differences between other jurisdictions and the way that the 
Commissioner conducted her investigations. I developed the tentative hypothesis that the 
processes were not always fair, but it was not until I began to closely study the principles 
of natural justice and place these alongside the HDCA processes and the midwifery cases, 
that the extent of the problem began to emerge. The process that I followed was in accord 
with the final stage of grounded theory research, noted by Y ee. He calls this the 
assessment phase, where the analyst assesses whether the data, fits the emergent theory?7 
This stage confirmed my hypothesis that in some midwifery cases the fundamental 
protections ofthe principles of natural justice were not being accorded to midwives. 
24 Edwards, A.and Talbot, R. (1999): 185. 



























In grounded theory the literature review or textual analysis is not a distinct portion 
of the research but is incorporated into the thesis itself?8 This was the method that I found 
best informed the subject matter of the thesis. I used a variety of methods to collect data 
including on-line searches, informal discussions, observations, case reviews, examination 
of documents, and close textual analysis of the case law and literature. My predominant 
and method was manual library searches of texts, case law, newspapers, journals and 
periodicals. This was time consuming but the inefficiencies with this method, were 
bala.r1ced by the breadth of information that I accessed. Fortunately from the inception of 
the Commissioner, I had had an avid interest in the Office and so by the time I commenced 
my formal research, I had accumulated a large amount of data, conference notes and 
journal and media clippings. 29 
The initial literature review was comprised of five parts: the first was a comparative 
analysis of the history and operation ofthe Health Commissioner ofthe United Kingdom. I 
undertook this study in order to develop the history of an Health Commissioner in at least 
one other similar jurisdiction although when it came to writing up the thesis I omitted this 
section as not relevant to the New Zealand context. The second part was a review of the 
literature related to bio-ethics in order to develop my methodology and a theoretical 
framework for the thesis. Unfortunately after initially considering various models such as 
the four principles approach, Rawls theory of justice, utilitarian theory and casuistry, I 
found that none of these approaches really enabled me to develop and analyze the 
hypothesis that I had proposed and I turned to the theory ofnaturaljustice.30 
The third area of textual analysis related to the development of the Office of the 




Yee, (2001) ch2: 10. 
One difficulty I experienced was that although I had copies of newspaper clippings sent to me by people 
who knew of my interest in the jurisdiction, these were often not referenced. It has been difficult to 
track down exact references while compiling this thesis. 
Looking back from the end of this work, I now recognise that it is possible that due to my legal training, 
















the parliamentary response to the recommendations arising from the "Cartwright Inquiry" 
through to the advent of the first Health and Disability Commissioner. This entailed a 
review of the Parliamentary debates, the various Health Commissioner Bills, 
commissioned reports such as the "V ennell" Paper31 , Standing Order Papers and Select 
Committee data in order to follow the changing emphases within the legislation. 
Once the HDCA was enacted, the Commissioner spent her first year travelling 
nationally and internationally, and consulting with key stake holders in order to establish a 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights ("the Code"). There was a 
considerable amount of literature generated over that time and many health professionals 
were involved in the consultation process, including the New Zealand College of 
Midwives. After the first year the Commissioner began to implement the Act and 
concentrated on the establishment of systems to cope with an unexpectedly high number of 
complaints. I reviewed much of this early literature, the consultation documents, the 
Commissioner's educational literature, press and media releases, articles and conference 
papers from this period. 
The fourth area of textual analysis was required to articulate the 'principles of 
natural justice'. This phrase has become almost trite in law and while it is frequently 
bandied around by defence lawyers, there is not always a clear knowledge of what these 
principles entail in a complaints or investigatory setting. I needed to read extensively on 
how these were formulated and expressed in both the literature and in the common law. 
This reading included a comprehensive review of legal texts, journal articles, case law and 
legal jurisprudence to enable me to identify the principles of natural justice and then to 
develop these as a helpful way of both identifying fundamental legal and ethical 
expectations of the HDCA processes and of illustrating when departures from these 
standards occurred. 
31 
The final area of textual analysis arose from the complaints and midwives themselves. 
Vennell, M.A. A Review of the Health Commissioner Bill and the Proposed Medical Practitioners Bill, 















Having completed a review of both legal and ethical sources, I began a close reading and 
review of the files of midwives who had been subject to HDCA investigations. I wanted 
to consider the 'pro forma' documentation from the Commissioner such as letters of 
notification, requests for information and disclosure, both from the midwife and the 
Commissioner, and to read the provisional and final opinions along with the evidence. (An 
edited version of many of the cases became available on the HDC website). This was a 
surprisingly difficult aspect of data collection. While analyzing the cases and deciding 
which to include, I frequently had to put them aside to regain my objectivity. I was aware 
ofthe words of Edwards who warned that: 
researchers who are too close to or part of a case being examined can be 
blinkered and fail to see an alternative interpretation of events. [They] need to 
achieve the balance between valuable inside knowledge and the fresh insights 
that might be offered by a theoretical framing of the events they're studying. 32 
I frequently worried that my analysis of the Commissioner was too critical, 
particularly when I found myself recalling the circumstances of individual midwives in 
particular cases and I bore in mind Weinberg's warning of the "subtle equilibrium between 
detachment and participation "33 One technique from grounded theory that helped me 
greatly was the concept of triangulation. Edwards describes triangulation as: 
... a three point perspective on an event or phenomenon that uses several 
methods to get purchase on a case. 34 
The object in this technique is to gather information from more than one source, or 
to cross reference facts or inferences, in order to ensure the validity or reliability of your 
conclusions. I found this particularly helpful in ensuring that the conclusions and 
generalizations that I was making were objective. I spent a great deal of time reading a 
32 Edwards, A. and Talbot, R. (1999): 131. 
33 Weinberg, Darin. Qualitative Research Methods, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2002): 58. 























wide variety of documents and cross referencing these to verify the statements that I was 
formulating. 
The Case Samples 
The sample was self-selecting in many ways or in the words of Yee - emergent. I 
began by reviewing approximately forty files where complaints had been laid against 
midwives. I then concentrated on complaints that had occurred during the years 1996 to 
1999. I deliberately confined my analysis to cases in the era of the first Health and 
Disability Commissioner because almost immediate and quite wide-ranging changes to 
processes and procedures occurred as soon as the second Commissioner took office. 
Initially I began to closely analyze every midwifery case but this proved to be an unwieldy 
task and I instead concentrated on developing themes that arose from these cases. This 
provided a pragmatic solution to an unexpected difficulty that emerged. I had expected to 
go back and discuss my perceptions with the midwives as I reviewed their files. When I 
began to do this, I found that some midwives had moved away or had left midwifery 
practice. Others became upset at the prospect of revisiting a period in their lives that had 
been painful and difficult. This raised a dilemma and I felt unable to develop some of the 
cases in depth while the midwives were still feeling this way. I decided to restrict most of 
the discussion to the Commissioner's opinions or published information in these cases. 
Fortunately I had often discussed the procedural difficulties with midwives while 
their cases were ongoing. Midwives would identify shortcomings in the processes and ask 
me why they were not allowed to know the name of the expert giving an opinion on their 
case; or why they did not see key evidence until after the final opinion; or why there was 
not disclosure in a timely way or at all. These were questions that I was also asking and we 
made frequent requests and letters to the Commissioner about these matters. I also kept 
notes of the issues that we were facing. When I discussed the possibility of researching the 
jurisdiction, it was these midwives who urged me to try to effect change, so that future 



















Data Analysis and Discussion 
Data analysis proved the most difficult part of the thesis, and like many beginning 
researchers, I had collected a huge amount of interesting but tangential material. A key 
aspect of grounded theory research is the analytic strategy of coding, which Trochim 
describes as a process for 'categorizing qualitative data and describing the implication and 
details of these categories '35 and memoing which he defines as a process for recording 
thoughts and ideas as they evolve through the study.36 I endeavored to use both ofthese 
techniques, although I did far too much memoing and it took some time before the data 
was sufficiently grouped to allow the emergence of the key themes, concepts and 
categories of information. 
Research Issues - Process 
I found that the most logical way to proceed was to formulate the subject headings 
into chapters and write each quite discretely. This worked for the consideration of the UK 
Health Commissioner, the socio-historical and legislative review and the early 
development of the Office. When I came to analyze the principles of natural justice, I 
became bogged down and was not certain how to apply these to so many cases. I decided 
to use a form of coding and summarized key points from the documentation of each 
midwifery case, and identified any concerns that either I or the midwife had had during its 
consideration by the Commissioner. I placed these summaries on separate data sheets and 
noted at which stage of the Commissioner's process that the concerns had arisen. I then 
identified each principle of natural justice as identified in common law and then analysed 
these alongside the Commissioner's documentation and the relevant sections of the 
HDCA. As I did this I considered what minimal requirements of natural justice could or 
should be imported into the implementation of these sections. 
An example is where the HDCA requires the health provider to be notified that a 
complaint has been received about the service that they have provided to the consumer. 






















The provider is then asked to formulate a response. The most obvious principle of natural 
justice related to this provision is audi alteram parte which may be translated as 'hear the 
other side'. The reason for this 'rule' is that the provider has the right to know the nature 
of the allegations being made about his or her care. Additionally the provider has the right 
to know who is making the complaint and should be entitled to see the complaint letter if 
it exists. When coding I would state the principle and then discuss the requirements of the 
statute to which the Commissioner was required to give effect, and finally illustrate by use 
of cases whether this principle had been breached. Often there were several cases where a 
difficulty had a arisen, and so I would just use a single case that was generally illustrative 
of the problem. I was aware that corroboration was important and so triangulation was 
applied where-ever possible, using the Commissioner's statements, interviews, or other 
documentary evidence. I would then move on to consider the next section of the Act, 
apply the relevant principles of natural justice, and again give illustrations of difficulties by 
reference back to actual cases. 
Confidentiality 
New Zealand is a very small country and I was constantly aware of the need to 
maintain anonymity and protect the identity and confidentiality of those involved. This 
was equally true for complainants as well as for midwives. In order to achieve this both 
midwives and complainants have been given an initial of the alphabet as an unique 
identifier. This initial bears no resemblance to their actual name. Even where the 
Commissioner has named one midwife, or where parent complainants have "spoken out" 
in the media, I have refrained from naming these persons in order not to subject them to 
further scrutiny. I have tried to avoid naming regions or locations to further protect 
people's privacy . 
As the thesis was drafted, it was necessary to cull out a great deal of information 
that while helpful to my arguments, may have breached the privacy of individuals or led to 
their identification. This was a frustrating aspect of the research as after months of close 
study of all the documentation in the cases, there was a great deal of additional material 
that supported my hypothesis, but it was not appropriate, or at times it was simply too 

















opinions and concentrated on cases that were in the public domain or where there was a 
lot of publicity and debate, or which were illustrative of serious concerns about process. I 
used non-identifying data at all times. 
One other aspect of confidentiality concerned me when I decided to use a lap top 
computer to take with me to the various libraries. I could not borrow or use a work 
computer, and as much of the early information I was gathering was confidential, I was 
worried that subsequent users might access this. I therefore entered a hire arrangement 
with a specific contract term that the hard drive would be completely wiped of all data 
immediately at the end of the hiring period. I was also very protective of my "field notes", 
floppy discs and case summaries. I gave the cases, identifying numbers and removed any 


























CHAPTER TWO:- THE CALL FORA NEW ZEALAND 
HEALTH COMMISSIONER. 
The "Unfortunate Experiment"- A key pre-cursor to the HDCA"37 
It is impossible to consider the development of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner ("HDC") in New Zealand without looking at the social, political and 
clinical seedbed from whence it came. A growing dissatisfaction with professional self 
governance, the inadequacy of sanctions for errant practitioners, a lack of redress for 
consumers, the international human rights movements and increased education of 
consumers have all been cited as factors leading to a call for greater professional 
accountability. Although these were all an important part of the context, arguably the 
primary pre-cursor for the development of the Office was the "Cartwright Report". 38 That 
report recommended that an Office of an Health Commissioner be set up in New Zealand. 
The "unfortunate experiment" is well documented and it is not proposed to consider 
the events leading up to the Enquiry in any detail. To summarize briefly, two health 
activists Sandra Coney and Phillida Bunkie had become aware, through health and 
women's networks, that there was a concern about the way staff at National Women's 
Hospital ("NWH") in Auckland were treating women who had carcinoma in situ of the 
uterine cervix. The treatment appeared completely contrary to both international treatment 
regimes and the body of research on the optimal way to treat this potentially fatal 
condition. Coney and Bunkie began to compile evidence and stories from women 
undergoing "treatment" and initially tried to get answers to their concerns and inquiries 
from the hospital and its medical staff. 
37 
38 
Although this phrase was incorporated into the title of the Metro article, Rosier states that it seems that 
the first person to term the research "the unfortunate experiment" was Professor David Skegg in a 
medical journal. Rosier, Pat. "It wasn't my fault." Broadsheet, 154 (1987): 5-7. 
Cartwright, S.R. The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into allegations concerning the treatment of 
cervical cancer at National Women's Hospital and into other related matters. (Auckland: Government 






















They recalled their frustration at that time: 
[We] were met with closed ranks from doctors and initial disinterest from 
the media. Doctors said to leave it alone, it was in the past and no good 
would be served by revelations in the lay media. It was seen as a matter for 
the medical profession, not the public. 39 
The treatment was based on an isolated and unproven hypothesis of the [then] 
Medical Superintendent Herbert Green, that CIS was not a precursor to invasive cervical 
cancer. He commenced an experiment to prove this and between the years 1956 and 1982 
entered women into his "study" by flipping a coin and then telling them what 'treatment'' 
they would get for CIS.40 While other New Zealand centres were treating this condition 
with cone biopsy, radiation or hysterectomy, Green's 'treatment' appeared to consist 
mainly of endless examinations and cervical smears, and passive monitoring to watch the 
progress of the condition. Some ofthese women went on to develop full-blown carcinoma 
and eight women died. Despite the overwhelming international evidence that non 
interference did not work, the experiment appears to have continued for over 20 years, with 
the apparent collusion of many staff and hospital management. 
It should be stated that not all health professionals were comfortable about what 
was happening. A small group, Doctors Mcindoe, McLean, Warren and Jones tried in a 
variety of ways to challenge Dr Green and his team. These collegial challenges ranged 
from private discussions with Green about their concerns, through their seeking advice 
from a world authority in gynaecological oncology treatment in order to discuss their 
concerns about Dr Green's treatment methods. When they continued to be ignored, they 
raised safety issues with the Hospital Medical Committee. This also failed to affect change 
and so the doctors published their concerns in medical journals in 1984 and again in 1986 . 
Despite these concerted efforts to stop the research, the Medical Research Committee and 
the Area Health 
39 Rankine, Jenny. "Experimenting on Women." Broadsheet, 151 (1987): 9. 


























Board took no steps to investigate the concerns of the dissenting clinicians and nor did they 
ensure that patients were not being put at risk.41 
Coney and Bunkie, alerted in part by these medical articles, continued their 
investigations. In June 1987 they published an article in Metro magazine.42 The authors 
told of the long running experimental program and that (except for one woman) those 
being treated did not know that they were in a research program nor that alternative forms 
1 43 of treatment were used e sewhere. 
The "Cartwright Enquiry" 
The governmental response to the "Metro Article" was almost instantaneous. On 
10 June 1987 a Committee of Enquiry was appointed to inquire into the treatment of CIS at 
National Women's Hospital and Judge Sylvia Cartwright (as she was then) was appointed 
Commissioner. The Commissioner wrote to 1000 women who had been treated at NWH to 
offer them the opportunity of viewing their records and giving evidence.44 As the Terms 
of the Inquiry were established, concerns about other practices at NWH surfaced and the 
Inquiry was broadened to cover additional allegations that included the routine cervical 
swabbing of all newborn baby girls without parental consent, the study of the histology of 
the cervixes of aborted female foetuses and stillborn infants, and the vaginal examination 
of women under anaesthetic by various students without consent.45 
During this Inquiry the general public got a glimpse, perhaps for the first time, of 
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but from managers, nurses, midwives, and social workers as well. Although many doctors 
did not question the research, and closed ranks and claimed that no one had the right to 
interfere with the clinical freedom of their medical colleagues, other health professionals 
had also been silent about the research programme. The fundamental question to all of 
these staff was "Why did you not protect them?" 
When "The Cartwright Report" was released in July 1998. It contained a number 
of comprehensive recommendations including the need for informed consent procedures, 
peer review, the establishment of ethics committees and the employment of an independent 
:ftlll- time patient advocate at National Women's Hospital. For the purposes of this thesis 
it is proposed to simply summarize the recommendations which led to the establishment of 
the Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner. Judge Cartwright wrote: 
In the absence of a Bill of Rights, and in a jurisdiction where the financial 
accountability of the medical profession has been distorted by no-fault 
Accident Compensation legislation, there needs to be a procedure which 
patients or their relations can follow if they want more information about 
their health problems; or if they want some form of sanction to be 
considered. 46 
In view of the inadequate response of the hospital, its staff, the Area Health Board 
and professional disciplinary bodies, Judge Cartwright saw the need to appoint a 
completely independent and impartial health arbitrator. She referred to the United 
Kingdom Health Services Ombudsman ("HSO") and recognized similar issues between the 
complaints that the HSO had investigated and those which had arisen during the Inquiry. 
She recommended that the New Zealand Government appoint an Health Commissioner 
who would be tasked with accepting complaints about incompetent or negligent 
practitioners , and who would negotiate or mediate solutions to disputes between them and 
patients. The relevant recommendations stated: 






















(iv) The Human Rights Commission Act 1977 should be amended to 
provide for a statement of patients' rights and to provide for the 





negotiation and mediation of complaints and grievances by 
patients; 
heightening the professionals' understanding of patients' rights; 
the entitlement to seek a ruling or sanctions from the Equal Opportunity 
Tribunal on behalf of a patient or class of patients. 
The Commissioner should have the power to accept complaints from, or refer 
complaints to, the patient advocate or the Board and was additionally to have access to the 
disciplinary procedures pursuant to the Medical Practitioners Act 1968. Adequate 
resources to service the increased work of the Human Rights Commission were to be 
provided.47 Judge Cartwright wrote that what the professions, patients and public have in 
common, is a need for: 
I) The [health] professions to be properly regulated and controlled; and 
2) An adequate and rational system of compensation for patient suffering and 
injury; and 
3) Effective means of investigating medical accidents; and 
4) Provision for [practitioners] to be given comprehensive guidance in those areas 
of practice of moral and ethical sensitivity. 48 
When the "Cartwright Report" was published, many New Zealanders were shocked 
to learn that "leading" medical specialists had been able to continue unethical clinical 
experimentation over so many years. The public looked to the Government for a response. 




























CHAPTER THREE- THE LEGISLATIVE PATHWAY OF THE 
HDCA 
A key recommendation of Judge Cartwright was that a position of Health 
Commissioner be established. The Health Commissioner was to have an important role in 
educating both patients and practitioners and would be able to develop procedures for 
negotiation and mediation should patients be dissatisfied with their care. Where these low 
level solutions failed, the Commissioner would have the ability to access the disciplinary 
bodies on behalf of complainants. It was hoped that the formation of an independent 
complaints body would encourage practitioners to listen more actively and sympathetically 
to patient grievances; and that they would develop a greater understanding of patients' 
rights and gain insight into the effect of behaviour and poor practice on both patients and 
their families. Optimally this would lead to improved accountability and an overall 
improvement in patient care. 
The Legislative Timeframe 
The Health Commissioner Bill- First Reading- 4 September 1990 
It might be expected, after the happenings at NWH and the publication of the 
Commission of Inquiry Report, that the Government and professions would take swift 
action to reassure the public and ensure that the recommendations of Judge Cartwright 
were promptly fulfilled. In reality the Parliamentary response was anything but swift. 
Although the Labour Government adopted the recommendation for a Health 
Commissioner, it was two years before the legislation to establish the office was brought 
before parliament. The Health Commissioner Bill was introduced by the Minister of 
Health, the Hon. Helen Clark [as she was then] on 4 September 1990, but the passage of 
that Bill proved to be very protracted. At introduction it was one of 15 Bills set down for 
consideration in a single day of sitting prior to the Government going into pre-election 
recess. The Bill made provision for the appointment of a Health Commissioner who would 
develop a Code of patient rights. The Commissioner was to be easily accessible to the 




















approach to complaints; have the power to require remedial action to be taken by health 
professionals should the complaint be upheld; provide a voice for all patients; have the 
primary role of promoting and supporting patient interests; adopt a bicultural approach; and 
educate the public and health professionals about the Health Commissioner role.49 
Judge Cartwright had also called for advocates who could provide information for 
people in emotional cultural and social need so there was to be both a Commissioner and 
an advocacy service. The proposal was that the health consumers' advocacy service would 
take up complaints close to source and advocates would work with patients and 
practitioners to resolve complaints, whereever possible by agreement. 5° 






The establishment of the Office, its role and functions. 
The preparation ofthe Code ofRights 
Establishment of the Advocacy Service 
Investigation of Complaints 
Miscellaneous provisions 
The Health Commissioner Bill was referred to the Social Services Select 
Committee but there it stalled. The elections of 1990 ousted Labour and returned a 
National Government to power. Under National the Bill was also given a low priority 
while the Government embarked on a series of major health system reforms. Although the 
Bill was not given priority, many argued that the health restructuring which accompanied 
the reforms, the lack of local accountability, the continual shortages of staff and resources, 
increased the vulnerability of patients and made the need for a Commissioner who could 
mediate between them and practitioners even greater. 
As the Bill languished in the parliamentary processes, consumer groups became 
increasingly frustrated with the lengthy delays. In August 1992 Sandra Coney presented a 
49 Clark, H. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 510 (4 September 1990): 4215 -4217. 

















paper entitled "Why are we waiting? - The Fate of the Health Commissioner". 51 She 
considered that patient's rights and consumer interests were being seen as expendable and 
she called for urgent implementation of the Bill. 
In 1992 Margaret Vennell, an Associate Professor of Law at Auckland University, 
was asked to review both the Health Commissioner Bill and the Medical Practitioners Bill 
and report to the Social Services Select Committee. The "Venn ell Report", 52 as it became 
known, made a series of recommendations. The following points are a summary of the 





That every effort be made to redress the imbalance of power between health 
professionals and clients and thus prevent situations of conflict arising. 
If there was conflict, early conciliation and resolution should be attempted. 
Complaints should be resolved at the lowest possible level . 
There should be a clearer distinction between advocacy which can prevent 
disputes and disagreements, and mediation and conciliation, which is a 
means of resolving a dispute once it has arisen. 53 
• Three possible complaints avenues for the same complaint - ACC, medical 
discipline and Health Commissioner - would be cumbersome, costly and 
unwieldy. 
• There should be a national, independent, and independently funded, 
advocacy service, available at the point of entry into health service. 
• This service should address the imbalance in power and information 





Where there is a dispute, the advocacy service should endeavor to obtain 
resolution in a non-confrontational way . 
Coney, Sandra. Why are we waiting? The Fate of the Office of the Health Commissioner. National 
Medico Legal Conference, Auckland, (19 August 1992). 
Vennell, M. A. A Review of the Health Commissioner Bill and the Proposed Medical Practitioners 




















There should be an independent Health Commissioner, separate to other 
Commissioners, who would develop a Code of Patient Rights and be able to 
investigate complaints about all health services . 
The Code should be enforceable, possibly through regulation, be an integral 
part of standard setting for health professionals and should take into 
account the needs of the 'tangata whenua'. 
The Health Commissioner should be the single entry point for all 
complaints and would receive, investigate, seek expert advice, conciliate 
and refer to the appropriate professional authorities. 
The Commissioner must be seen by the provider and health client to be an 
impartial conciliator. 
The Commissioner may refer the complaint to the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Corporation (ACC) or prosecute the 
complaint before the disciplinary bodies where appropriate. 
• There should be a National Health Care Ethics Committee. 
• There should be a single professional Tribunal funded by a health provider 
levy, which would deal with all complaints. 
• The Tribunal should have the powers to make suspension orders, require 
payment of fines, reparation and damages awards, and orders for costs. 
• 
;;r 
The Tribunal should act in accordance with the principles of administrative 









• There should be a right of appeal to the High Court. 54 
Professor V ennell recognized that it would not be sufficient for a Commissioner to focus 
solely on issues of negligence, as many of the adverse events that occur during health care 
are systems problems, or arise from communication difficulties. She considered that the 
Commissioner should attempt to eliminate adverse events of all kinds, including 
identifying and improving practice by drawing attention to the factors through which they 
occur. 















Supplementary Order Paper 247 -3 August 1993 
On 3 August 1993 when the Minister of Health the Right Honorable W.F. Birch [as 
he was then] moved that a Supplementary Order Paper ("SOP") 247 relating to the Health 
Commissioner Bill be referred to the Social Services Committee for consideration. The 
SOP recommended that the powers of the Commissioner be widened to include voluntary 
and disability services. Although the SOP purported to extend and improve the proposed 
complaints processes and enhance the accountability of providers, the Government argued 
that the Bill needed to fit the new environment of the health reforms and to this end the 
SOP ensured that the Health Commissioner Bill was consistent with the Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993.55 
The SOP was based largely on the Vennell recommendations 56 including the view 
that the original Bill had been flawed in that it required the Commissioner be both mediator 
and investigator. Birch warned that "it was inappropriate for a Commissioner who was 
expected to act as an independent mediator in a dispute, to employ advisors on one side of 
the dispute. 57 The SOP reflected acceptance of the view that in order for the Commissioner 
to be accepted by health professionals and consumers, she or he needed to be both neutral 
and impartial. The separation of the investigatory and advocacy roles was seen as critical in 
achieving this impartiality. The SOP proposed that four major sections be established 








the Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
the Code of Consumer's Rights 
the Consumer Advocacy Service 
the Proceedings Commissioner. 
Sowry, R. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 540 (16 June 199): 1804. 
Health Commissioner Bill and Supplementary Order Paper 247, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 
540 ~16 June 1994): 1804 















The rationales for the changes proposed by the SOP changes were not widely 
discussed in the parliamentary session, although the debates reveal concern about the 
mechanics of the Office and note possible solutions. The Bill and SOP were then referred 
back to the Social Services Select Committee and there was a call for public submissions. 
The submissions process was extensive as there was considerable opposition to the 
SOP both inside and outside parliament.58 Key sticking points were the suggestions that 
the requirement for informed consent be removed; that advocacy services would be located 
within the Ministry of Health; and that upon receiving a complaint, the Commissioner 
would confer with professional bodies in order to negotiate an agreement. Consumer 
groups strongly opposed these recommendations and a large number of submissions were 
made calling for changes.59 After going through several permutations the Bill ended up, 
pretty much back where it started. 
Select Committee Report -16 June 1994 
The Select Committee reported back almost four years after the Bill had been first 
introduced.60 The Bill had jettisoned any reference to the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi61 despite the recommendations and stated concerns of Judge Cartwright that these 
were important. It also narrowly missed discarding the principle of informed consent. 
The role of the Commissioner was to be expanded to include jurisdiction over disability 
services and the Commissioner was to be the principal investigator and assessor of all 
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rights. The roles of mediation and advocacy were to be split because it was accepted that 
the Commissioner needed to be seen as acting impartially. The Commissioner would have 
differing methods of intervention available to deal with complaints - first attempting 
resolution, advocacy and mediation, and if these attempts failed or the matter was serious, 
an investigation and possible disciplinary action could follow. A Proceedings 
Commissioner was to be appointed to prosecute cases, and a consultation process would be 
established between the Office of the Commissioner and the professional bodies to 
consider whether following a finding of a breach of the Code, professional disciplinary 
action was warranted. 
The task of forming a Code of Rights and creating an office which would fairly and 
expeditiously serve both patients and health professionals would be a considerable 
challenge. The importance of getting the right person for this new role of Commissioner 
was highlighted by the Honorable Bill English, who by his own admission had initially 
approached the Bill with a great deal of scepticism: 
I think it is necessary to remember that the operation of a Health 
Commissioner and the success of that operation will depend a lot on its 
credibility, not so much on the legal powers of the Commissioner although 
it does have a number of significant legal powers but on its credibility with 
the different parties to the dispute. The Commissioner has to be credible 
with the least articulate health consumer as it is often those people who 
most need the services of an advocate and the Commissioner, as well as the 
most powerful medical specialists and the most active health consumer 
groups. 62 
This view was echoed by other politicians who considered it important that any complaints service 
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The Second Reading- 27 September 1994 
The Bill returned to the House for its Second Reading on 27 September 1994. The 
purpose of the Bill was encapsulated in Clause 5A which stated: 
The purpose of this Act is to promote and protect the rights of health 
consumers and disability services consumers, and, to that end to facilitate 
the fair, simple, speedy, and efficient resolution of those complaints relating 
to infringements of those righti4 
Much of the debate accompanying the Second Reading focused on the role of the 
Commissioner and the importance of an independent advocacy service within the Office of 
the Commissioner. An entire thesis could be written on the tasks which faced the 
Commissioner and in particular the enormous amount of work and consultation required to 
formulate the Code of Rights. That discussion is outside this brief. It is however helpful to 
summarize the expectations Parliament had of the Commissioner. These were to: 
• develop the Code ofRights 
• promote the Code through education 
• protect Consumers 
• publish reports 
• prompt, low level resolution 
• receive and investigate complaints 
• prepare guidelines for advocacy service 
• advise the minister on consumer rights 
Where there was an allegation of breach of the Code, there were to be five possible 
levels to try to resolve the issues. Briefly these were: 

























Level One: Consumers were to act for themselves to get resolution by talking with 
the health professional and/or by requesting an apology and a change to the 
offending practice 
Level Two: Consumers would access independent advocacy, concerns would be 
documented and there would be a formal written complaint. The expectation was 
that the majority of complaints would be resolved between the parties. 
Level Three: If there was no resolution, the matter would be referred to the 
Commissioner who would institute an independent investigation and determine if 
there had been a breach of the proposed Code. 
Level Four: The Commissioner could recommend dispute resolution or a mediation 
conference to enable parties to meet in a supported environment and try to mediate 
the issues and a solution. 
Level Five: If this was not possible or the issues were serious then the 
Commissioner could refer the matter to the Proceedings Commissioner who could 
determine if charges should be laid before the disciplinary bodies or the 
Complaints Review Tribunal ("CRT''). CRT remedies ranged from the issue of a 
simple apology to an award of financial compensation. 65 
Much of the debate during this reading recounted reasons for the long delays in the 
passage of the Bill, but Parliament also focussed on the need to redress the power 
imbalance between patients and health practitioners. Overall bipartisan differences were 
minor and there was a general recognition that although it had taken far too long to enact 
the Bill, it represented a major step forward for patient's rights. Many of the speakers 
recalled the reason why the legislation was so critically needed. The comment by the 
Leanne Dalziel is typical: 
65 The description of these levels comes from a distillation of various sources but the five levels were 
specifically discussed by M.P. Roger Sowry, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 543 (27 























This Bill is an indictment on those people who thought they had an absolute 
right to conduct an experiment on women without telling them about it, 
without asking their permission and without their knowledge in any sense of 
the word. Indeed it is an indictment on any people who think they can use 
knowledge and power and ignore the human rights of those who must rely on 
their knowledge and power. 66 
One Minister Diane Yates, was concerned about the general vulnerability of people 
in the medical system and that people could no longer talk to their elected representatives 
on Area Health Boards. Ms Yates echoing the earlier concern of Helen Clark, stated that 
the fundamental requirement of the legislation was that aggrieved consumers needed 
someone to appeal to and who would help practitioners to be accountable.67 
During this reading the name of the Bill was changed to the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Bill to reflect the widened jurisdiction of the Commissioner to include 
investigating and receiving complaints from persons with disabilities. The Bill was then 
read a second time. 
Third Reading- 13 October 1994 
The Bill received its third reading on 13 October 1994, along with a raft of other 
professional Bills including the Medical Practitioner's Bill. The much-debated informed 
consent provisions had been retained, due largely to the lobbying of consumers 
representatives such as Sandra Coney, Phillida Bunkie and Judi Strid, of Womens' Health 
Action. There was support across party lines for the Bill, although there was no 
contribution to the debate from the Alliance party. Remaining concerns included the lack of 
a national advocacy service and the omission of any reference to the principles of the Treaty 
ofWaitangi and ethics committees, in the legislation. 
66 Dalziel, L. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 543 ( 27 September 1994): 3739. 













During this final debate, tributes were paid to the numerous women 'treated' at 
National Women's Hospital, the consumer groups and activists involved throughout, the 
various staff and members of parliament who progressed the Bill and the seminal work of 
Judge Cartwright in calling for the establishment of an independent advocate for health 
consumers. 
Parliament also had concern for the person who would take on the role of New 
Zealand's first Health and Disability Commissioner. Bill English stated: 
68 
We had to keep in mind that whatever we wish the Health and Disability 
Commissioner to be ... it is such a complex area that the processes of the 
legislation must be robust. Because the matters the Commissioner will be 
dealing with on occasions, will be very serious. The checks and balances in 
there and the different roles that have been defined for the various statutory 
officers are very important because there will come a time when they will 
come under great pressure. The Officers who have these jobs will need the 
protection that Parliament would certainly want them to have when carrying 
out what will, at times, be a very difficult job. 68 



























CHAPTER FOUR- THE FIRST HEALTH & DISABILITY 
COMMISSIONER OF NEW ZEALAND 
The first New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner ("HDC") Mrs Robyn 
Stent, was appointed in 1994. Her first major task, was to prepare a Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Rights, ("the Code").69 Although some New Zealand 
hospitals such as National Women's Hospital had adopted voluntary, written statements of 
patients rights, these rights were not substantive and did not have the weight of law. In 
practice such statements were often ignored by clinicians as there was no compliance 
monitoring of their use and no sanction should they be breached. The Commissioner 
embarked on extensive national and international consultation and research in order to first 
prepare a draft Code. Once this was written, submissions were called for and further 
consultation occurred before the Code was formally adopted into law. The Code is a 
highlight of the first Commissioner's term and continues to be a useful and effective 
statement of Rights . 
The Commissioner then began to establish a team and develop procedures for the 
processing of complaints. This required the employment and training of further staff, 
contracting and maintaining an · advocacy network, establishing mediation services, 
formulating documentation and data systems, and setting up investigation teams. 
Additionally during this period the Commissioner was in considerable demand as a speaker, 
particularly for health professional groups who were trying to grasp their new 
responsibilities under the HDCA. 
The Health and Disability Commencement Order - 1996 
The Health and Disability Commencement Order was made on 29 April 1996 and 
the schedule that contains the Code came into force on 1 July 1996. The legislation is 
unique because it codified patients', (now referred to as consumers) rights, and it covered 
69 The Code was contained in the Schedule to the Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of 
Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 1996 (made in exercise of a 
















all health professionals and additionally anyone providing a health care or disability 
service. 
The Code lists the rights of consumers and concomitant duties of providers. The 
headings for each of the ten Rights are as follows: 
• Right to be treated with respect 
• Right to freedom, coercion, harassment, and exploitation 
• Right to dignity and independence 
• Right to services of an appropriate standard 
• 
• 
Right to effective communication 
Right to be fully informed 
• Right to make an informed choice and give informed choice 
• Right to support 
• Right in respect of teaching or research 
• Right to complain 
The Years 1996-1998 
For first 18 months as Health and Disability Commissioner Mrs Stent and her staff 
were almost fully occupied in the formulation of the Code and the establishment of the 
Office. In the February 1998 issue of the journal "New Zealand GP" Mrs Stent reflected on 
her first year as Commissioner.70 Even at that stage, the Commissioner was aware of the 
political and media pressure exerted in health issues and wrote that she was concerned about 
the "use of health as political ammunition". Mrs Stent felt that these tactics were not good 
for consumers and she called for an objective multi-political party Health and Disability 
Accord to "reduce the endless source of emotionally charged and often frightening medical 
stories" .71 In this article the Commissioner responded to politicians who had criticized the 
70 
71 
Stent, Robyn. "The First Year in Retrospect". New Zealand General Practitioner, (11 February 1998): 
9. 
Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner Te Toihau Hauora Hauatanga for the Year ended 
30 June 1997, presented to the House ofRepresentatives pursuant to section 16 of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
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Office for not delivering expected outcomes and for its failure to prosecute health 
professionals more vigorously. She had also come under pressure from the media who 
assumed that she would discuss individual complaints and she firmly stated that her office 
was impartial and did not function as a regular source of stories for the media.72 Ms Stent 
stated: 
This [impartial manner akin to the model of the Ombudsman] is partly out of 
a need to effect fair, simple, speedy and efficient resolution of complaints, 
which is best achieved out of the media limelight. Additionally section 67 of 
the Act prevents the Commissioner from making any statement that is 
adverse to any person unless that person has had a chance to provide a 
written response to the criticism. 73 
This statement was very reassuring to the health professionals involved in complaints 
and is akin to the protection provided in the Coroners Act 1988. 
During its first year, the Office received 1000 complaints involving 1451 providers. 
The Commissioner closed a little over half of these complaints, 581 to be precise. Of those, 
25 resulted in a finding of breach of the Code. Two of the breaches (one by a dentist and 
one by a podiatrist) were referred to the Director of Proceedings for further action. The 
Director was an independent statutory officer, who would assess any findings of breach of 
the Code and determine whether the matter should be taken further. The options open to 
the Director, who would take on the role ofprosecutor on behalfofthe aggrieved consumer, 
were to lay a charge before the professional disciplinary body of errant practitioner and/or to 
seek damages from the Complaints Review Tribunal[ as it was then]. 
Mrs Stent reported that in the ensuing months there had been seven further breach 
findings, three involving general medical practitioners, and that of the 1000 complaints, 42 
had been resolved by the parties, 53 had been withdrawn, a further 27, approximately 5% 
72 Ibid: 5-6. 

















were resolved with the assistance of advocates. Five mediations took place resulting in 
binding confidential agreements. 153 complaints were carried forward from the 1996 17 
year.74 
1997-1998 
In the years 1997- 1998 a priority for the Commissioner's office continued to be 
consumer and health professional education. Additionally the Commissioner had the task of 
refining processes so that complaints could be dealt with in a manner that fulfilled the 
statutory mandate of a ''fair, simple, speedy and efficient resolution of complaints for both 
parties". In this second year the Commissioner reported closing 743 complaints but the 
number of unresolved complaints was escalating and by 30 June 1998, 778 complaints 
remained open. Of the complaints that had been closed, 92 had not been considered as they 
were outside the Commissioner's jurisdiction, 181 had been resolved, 96 had been referred 
(it is uncertain from the Report to where the referrals were made) and 39 were withdrawn. 
No action was taken in 131 cases and no breach found in 136. 68 of the 7 43 complaints 
resulted in a finding of breach of the Code and of those 68, proceedings were being 
considered by the Director of Proceedings in 14 cases.75 
The statistics reflect the growing use (an almost five fold increase) of advocacy as a 
means of resolving complaints. This was in line with the Vennell recommendations and the 
Parliamentary intent that prompt resolution or mediation be utilized at the lowest appropriate 
level, close to the source of the complaint. Despite this trend and the apparent effectiveness 
of advocacy the Commissioner was reconsidering the Office's priorities. In the Annual Report 
for the period concluding on 30 June 1998, Mrs Stent stated that advocacy spending, which 
74 
75 
Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner Te Toihau Hauora Hauatanga for the Year ended 
30 June 1997, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 16 of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act 1994: 28. 
Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner Te Toihau Hauora Hauatanga for the 
Year ended 30 June 1998, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 16 of the 




















had represented 43 per cent of the total budget, was to be cut so as to permit greater focus on · 
other areas; one of which would be the appointment of a full time Director of Proceedings. 76 
The growing numbers of both new and " historical" open files and the delays in 
achieving closure, were becoming a concern for consumers and providers. The 
Commissioner attributed the backlog to the growing complexity of complaints, the legal 
challenges of providers, and investigations by the Privacy Commissioner and Ombudsman 
into the HDC Office.77 What the Commissioner did not mention was the effect of a major 
diversion of the personnel and financial resources of the Office into an extensive 
investigation into Christchurch Public Hospital.78 
Canterbury Health Investigation 
The Commissioner's enquiry into issues at Christchurch Public Hospital, arose after 
senior doctors at Canterbury Health became concerned about a number of deaths which in 
their view were preventable. The Christchurch Hospital's Medical Staff Association 
(CHMSA) released a Report in December 1996 called "Systems Failures Threatening 
Patient Safety at Christchurch Hospital". 79 Most of the deaths mentioned in that Report 
had been notified to the Coroner but despite growing concerns and a prima facie public 
interest, an Inquest had not at that time been held.80 When the 'Patients are Dying' report 
was issued on 24 December 1996 it alleged serious issues about the quality of patient care in 
Christchurch Hospital. Not surprisingly there was a flurry of media coverage and a great 






A full-time Director had not been appointed prior to this, due to budgetry constraints and possibly an 
insufficient workload. A barrister was acting in that position for ten hours a week . 
Stent (1998 Annual Report): 5. 
Stent (1998 Annual Report):41, states that the costs of that investigation was $1.51m and this funding 
was pruned from other areas of the Office's work. See also McLoughlin, David. "Face to Face-
Robyn Stent", North & South, (February 2000): 99 where Mrs Stent said she had three senior 
people, (at a time when staffing levels were not high and staff were still relatively inexperienced) in 
Christchurch for 6 -7 months and she herself frequently went down to Christchurch. 
The Report is sometimes referred to as the "Patients are Dying" Report 
The Coroner later stated that relevant information in some cases was omitted and that had such 
information been available, this may have impacted upon his decision whether to hold an Inquest. 
See McElrea, Richard. "Hospital Deaths in New Zealand- A Coroner's Perspective," Australian 













The Minister of Health, Bill English announced on 1 February 1997 that a 
Commission of Enquiry would be established to consider these deaths. The Health and 
Disability Commissioner had been on leave. After reputedly reading the media reports she 
announced on 3 February that she also would be setting up an Enquiry into events at 
Canterbury Health to determine whether the Code had been breachedY The 
Commissioner's decision to undertake an inquiry independent of the Crown, was initially 
heavily criticized as it was seen by some as an unnecessary duplication and waste of 
resources. A judicial review of the Commissioner's decision was lodged by Professor 
Nicholls, a representative of the Christchurch Hospital's Medical Staff Association, and 
Mrs Brown, a widow of one of the deceased patients. 82 
This was the first major legal challenge to the Commissioner's jurisdiction. The 
application for judicial review was brought, largely on the premise that the Commissioner's 
decision to proceed with her own Inquiry was unlawful, as many of the events in question 
had occurred before 1 July 1996, the date upon which the Code came into force. Further 
grounds of the Review were that the Commissioner's investigations would be very limited 
as she could only consider alleged breaches of the Code, and that the decision of the 
Coroner, and the management practices and decisions that may have contributed to the 
outcomes, would be outside her jurisdiction. The plaintiffs were also concerned that a 
second investigation would be costly and would unnecessarily disrupt the Commission of 




Mrs Stent had relied on section 35 of the Act to justify her decision to commence an 
Stent, Robyn. "Justice Tipping's Judgement- The First Major Test of the Health and Disability 
Act." Paper presented to the Health and Disability Commissioner's Issues 98 Conference. (23 March 
1998): 3. 
A reading of the Parliamentary debates accompanying the Third Reading of the HDCA shows that 
parliament did not intend the Commissioner to be fettered in investigating particular areas of concern. 
The Ron. Katherine O'Regan flagged the possibility of such inquiries when she stated "Perhaps in 
the future the Commissioner may wish to instigate a wider inquiry into why complaints are coming 
from one particular area [or service] and he or she may be able to investigate. " The New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates, 543 (13 October 1994): 4299. 








investigation on her own initiative, into two of the deaths at the hospital and the 'generic 
systems errors' which had occurred. When her decision became the subject of a judicial 
review, the legal focus for the proceedings became the interpretation of this section. It 
reads: 
35. Investigation of breaches of Code-
(I) It shall be a function of the Commissioner to investigate any action of any 
health care provider or any disability services provider where that action is, 
or appears to the Commissioner to be, in breach of the Code. 
(2) The Commissioner may commence an investigation under subsection 
(I) of this section either on complaint made to the Commissioner or on the 
Commissioner's own initiative. 
The plaintiffs lodging the judicial review claimed that "own initiative" investigations 
of a Commissioner were limited by law to investigating any action of a health provider 
which breaches or appears to breach the specific rights of an individual consumer and could 
not be extended to generic systems errors. They alleged that the Commissioner acted for an 
improper or collateral purpose in her desire to hold an inquiry and that she intended to pre-
empt the ministerial inquiry and thus stake a prior claim to the proposed area of 
investigation. They considered that her decision was simply an attempt by the 
Commissioner to "keep the minister off her turf". Tipping J could not find on the evidence 
that this was the case and in his judgment stated that "the fact that [the Commissioner's] 
decision had this effect does not establish that this was the Commissioner's intention and 
motivation in making her own decision". 84 He felt the Commissioner could not be criticized 
for deciding to exercise the powers of inquiry which Parliament had so recently given her. He 
wrote: 
84 
To the extent that circumstances or events have occurred before I July I996 
are relevant to whether there has been a breach of the Code they may be 














considered, although not in themselves amounting to any such Breach. It is 
for the Commissioner to determine whether such earlier events or 
circumstances have the necessary relevance. 85 
Tipping J ruled held that the Commissioner could also consider generic systems 
errors and incidents occurring before this date.86 He stated that provided the issues the 
Commissioner intends to investigate are fairly capable of being conceptually linked to an 
apparent breach of the Code, there could be no suggestion that the Commissioner was 
acting outside her powers.87 He concluded that not only was the Commissioner entitled to 
investigate any action which appeared to be in breach of the Code, but that the 
Commissioner may in fact be required by the Health and Disability Commissioners Act 
1994 to undertake such an investigation . 
The Nicholls decision was welcomed by the Commissioner and since that time it has 
opened the way for a number of significant HDCA Enquiries. 88 A remaining difficulty for 
subsequent Commissioners is that these continue to be funded out of the wider budget. 
Given the expensive and resource-consuming nature of these Enquiries, this is 
unsatisfactory. It would be more logical and more cost effective, particularly when 
considering the growing expertise of the Office, for the Commissioner to conduct all health 
related Inquiries and for these to be separately funded by government. 
After the Nicholls decision, it was inevitable that Mrs Stent, having achieved 






Judge Tipping recognized that the statutory framework left open the possibility of concurrent HDC 
and Ministerial inquiries but he put aside the issue as to whether it was reasonable for both to occur . 
Nicholls v. Health and Disability Commissioner [1997] NZAR, 351: 364. 
Ibid: 361. 
There are a number of reports from such Inquiries but two of the most comprehensive are "Gisborne 
Hospital 1999-2000" A Report by the Health and Disability Commissioner,[Ron Paterson], Auckland, 
(March 2001) and "Southland District Health Board Mental Health Services Report" A Report by the 
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investigation a priority in the Office's work. The problem was that the numbers of staff 
were few, the number of complaints were escalating and the investigations were already 
backlogged. The Canterbury Health investigation took fifteen89 months to complete. 
Although the core work of the Commissioner was not suspended, in the view of involved 
parties, it certainly slowed to a crawl. 
The Commissioner's comprehensive 300 page report on Canterbury Health Ltd90 
was released a week after the report of the Ministerial Enquiry. While the Minister of 
Health, Mr English reported being reassured by improvements that had been made at the 
Christchurch Hospital Emergency Department, Mrs Stent's report identified a "litany of 
failures". The Commissioner's investigation uncovered four breaches ofthe Code and 
management was implicated at almost every level within the institution in these breaches. 
Her criticisms extended to the Minister of Health, the Crown Health Authority, the Regional 
Health Authority, the Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit and continued down to 
individual providers. The Commissioner made 112 recommendations to improve the care 
provided at Christchurch Hospital. 
Although the growing back log of cases and the long delays were a concern to all 
involved in the HDC processes, another more serious concern was developing: apparent 
breaches of natural justice, at least in midwifery cases. The next section will consider the 
relationship between the Commissioner and the profession of midwifery and begin to 
analyse some of the midwifery cases. It will commence a discussion of the principles of 
natural justice and why they are important for any person undergoing investigation. These 
basic principles will be considered along with the processes of the Commissioner as set out 
in the statute or developed "in house". It is then proposed to follow the progress of cases 
through the processes outlined in the Health and Disability Commissioner Act or adopted 
by the Office, and to consider whether, at each point, fair procedure was followed. The 
thesis will only consider the experience of one professional group, subject to the complaints 
process, namely the profession of midwifery. 
89 
90 
The literature sometimes states 18 months . 



















CHAPTER FIVE- THE RESPONSE OF THE 
MIDWIFERY PROFESSION TO THE HEALTH AND 
DISABILITY COMMISSIONER 
The early midwifery decisions are useful in identifying concerns about the way the 
protective mechanisms in the Health and Disability Commissioner Act were being 
implemented and interpreted. Before considering some ofthese in detail, it may be helpful to 
briefly background the reaction of the profession of midwifery to the establishment of the 
Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner. 
The Midwifery Experience 1993 - 1999 
The profession of midwifery had been supportive of the establishment of a patient 
advocacy service, even before the Health Commissioner was first mooted during the 
Cartwright Enquiry. As a profession New Zealand midwives had become subsumed within 
nursing to the point where they had lost their unique professional identity. They could 
identify with the powerlessness of women generally, in health institutions and clinics. 
Throughout the 1980's there was a proliferation of consumer groups such as Parent's Centre, 
Women's Health Action, the Home Birth Association, and the La Leche League, all of which 
were lobbying for choice in childbirth. An offshoot ofthis concerted political action was that 
these groups supported domiciliary midwives because women wanted to regain and retain 
some control over how and where they birthed. Growing numbers of women saw strong and 
autonomous midwives who would care for them in hospital or at home, as essential to 
achieving those aims. The relationship was symbiotic, and consumers and midwives worked 
hard to reestablish midwives as different from nurses and as practitioners who were capable 
of managing all aspects of normal birthing. It was this partnership of consumers and 
midwives that enabled midwives to embrace the philosophy of informed choice and the 
empowerment of women's rights in all areas of life. The establishment of a Health and 
Disability Commissioner ("HDC") was therefore welcomed by the majority of midwives as a 
hard won legislative recognition and confirmation of the right of women to h.ave choice and 









The New Zealand College of Midwives (''NZCOM") was established in 1989, a year 
after the Cartwright report was released. It is a somewhat unique professional body as its 
members consist of midwives and consumers and both groups are an essential and integral 
part of the College at all levels. NZCOM produced a voluntary professional Code of Ethics 
and established the Midwifery Standards for Practice both of which were published in 1993. 
The first drafts of the Health Commissioner Bill had placed a heavy emphasis on low level 
resolution and mediation and flagged a requirement that the professions would need to 
establish resolution mechanisms. These mechanisms were to be a means whereby consumers 
and professionals could meet in a supportive environment to try to resolve problems, enable 
apologies to be made, and to identify where practices needed to be changed or improved. 
NZCOM could see the benefit of such early resolution and mediation in the area of birth care 
and so, instead of waiting until the Bill was passed, NZCOM responded to the intent of the 
Bill and embarked on the establishment of Regional Complaints Resolutions Committees. 
Each Committee was to consist of a nominated midwifery and consumer representative who 
could receive complaints from dissatisfied consumers and, if required, facilitate a meeting 
between the complainant and midwife. The process, which was only initiated if requested by 
the complainant, was voluntary. If the complainant remained unhappy or dissatisfied with 
the outcome of the various responses or meetings, she still had the option of taking her 
complaint to the Nursing Council.91 
The enactment of the HDCA and the formulation of the Code gave consumers a right to 
make complaints about providers. Consumers quickly realized that traditional barriers to 
complaining had been removed. There was no longer a requirement that complaints be 
written in a particular form or that they be substantiated by others. Complainants did not 
91 When the Resolutions Committees were first established, the HDCA had not been enacted and the 
Nursing Council ofNew Zealand was the only body receiving complaints about the practice of nurses 
and midwives. When the HDCA was eventually enacted, considerable changes had been made to the 
earlier Bills. There was no longer a requirement for professions to maintain low level resolution 
mechanisms such as the Resolutions Committees, although NZCOM continued offering these to 
women. Although initially supportive of the Resolutions Committees, the first Commissioner did not 
utilize the Committees, preferring instead for matters to remain within the HDC processes. 
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need to incur the costs of legal assistance and there was now a free, readily accessible person 
to whom they could complain. Anyone could simply pick up the phone, "toll free", and lodge 
a complaint.92 Complainants did not even need to be present when the care complained of 
was given or when the alleged incident occurred. With such ease of access to the 
Commissioner, it was inevitable that numbers of complaints would escalate once the role and 
function of the HDC Office became more widely known. Another less acknowledged reason 
for the rapid increase in the number of complaints, was that health professionals were 
fulfilling their responsibilities under the Code by informing consumers that they had the right 
to complain if they were dissatisfied with their care. 
This was a requirement that midwives took particularly seriously. When the HDCA 
was first enacted, extensive programmes, study days and seminars were offered throughout 
the country, to educate midwives about their responsibilities under the Code of Rights. 
NZCOM also helped educate women about their rights under the new Code, including the 
right to complain if they were unhappy with the care that they had received. This right 
became a professional expectation and a part of the annual audit of midwifery care in the 
following way. As a re-emerging profession, midwives were very aware of the allegations 
that had been levelled, mainly at the medical profession, that health professionals were 
incapable of transparent self-regulation.93 To counter any future similar criticism of the 
profession of midwifery, NZCOM instituted a system of voluntary peer-review. Such review 
was seen as a means of educating midwives about practice, and identifying the practitioners 
who needed to upskill or improve their service delivery, with an ultimate aim of improving 
the overall level of care provided by midwives. The profession recognized that for such 
reviews to be successful for midwives, and also beneficial to women, they needed to be 
educative and practical. In the words of Mcintyre and Popper: 
92 
93 
Access for complainants was improved when the Office set up a toll-free 0800 number to assist 
complainants. It was marketed as 0800COMPLAIN. 
Beauchamp and Childress write that pursuit of professional norms may do more to protect the 
profession's interests than to introduce an impartial and comprehensive moral viewpoint. Beauchamp, 

















[Peer review] must be linked to the improvement of all [practitioners] and 
not just to the punishment of those who err, as only with such an ethos can we 
establish a new type of confidence: that mutual criticism is not personal and 
pejorative but that it springs from a mutual respect and desire to improve the 
l if 
. 94 at o pat1ents. 
The review mechanism developed was the annual Midwifery Standards Review 
("MSC"). In line with its partnership philosophy, each Review Committee incorporated both 
midwifery and consumer members.95 One of the key areas of Review was whether midwives 
provided women with information about the Code of Rights and if this was not provided, the 
midwife was reminded that giving such information was a legal as well as a professional 
obligation. These educative attempts were very successful and in both the 1997 and 1998 
Annual Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner, midwives had the highest 
awareness of the Code among all health professionals.96 
In the first year to eighteen months of her term, the Commissioner had minimal 
involvement with the profession of midwifery. NZCOM was not given any feedback about 




Mcintyre KR and Popper WN "The Critical Attitude in Medicine: the need for a new ethic": British 
Medical Journal, 287 ( 24-31 December 1992): 1919-1923. 
To undergo a MSR a midwife would pay a fee and voluntarily submit her statistics and outcomes for 
evaluation by a Review Committee. Each midwife was required to send her client an evaluation form 
at the end of the episode of care and the women were able to complete this form and send it back, 
anonymously if they wished, and those forms would form part of the annual MSR. The midwife 
gained feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of her practice, whether she was meeting the 
Standards of Practice, and areas were identified where she needed to improve or up-skill. Most 
importantly the women she cared for had an opportunity to give critical feedback on how they had 
found the midwife's care. 
In a provider awareness survey about the Code noted in the Report of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Te Toihau Hauora Hauatanga for the Year ended 30 June 1998, presented to the 
House of Representatives pursuant to section 16 of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 
1994, 71% of midwives knew of the Code and HDC in 1996, and 100% in 1997. This can be 
compared with a 40% knowledge of medical specialists in 1996, which dropped to 39% in 1997. 






midwifery complaints only started becoming available when the Commissioner's web-site 
was established. Ten of the midwifery case notes were placed on the web-site for 1997.97 It 
was while assisting many of these midwives that I became concerned about procedural 
problems with the processes being put in place. It seemed that the principles of natural 
justice were not well understood by those implementing the HDCA. Others shared my view 
and initially those acting for health professionals were prepared to view the procedural 
shortcomings as teething problems. Hence for a time there was tolerance, and a hope that 
once the Office was fully operational and better resourced (in terms of staff and experienced 
legal advisors), these issues would be identified and sorted out. Unfortunately this was not to 
occur. While some processes became more defined, there were some cases, where the 
investigation and decision making procedures were simply not fair. 
97 Not all these midwifery cases refer to midwives that I represented. The lawyers employed by the New 
























CHAPTER SIX -PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS OR THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE98 
Jeremy Bentham (1748- 1832) considered that fair procedures are essential to accurate 
outcomes. Professor D.J. Galligan, a Professor of Law at the University of Oxford, 
summarizes Bentham's theory as saying that procedures are there to produce accurate 
outcomes or 'rectitude' and that such outcomes are valuable as they uphold social values and 
produce stability.99 Procedures and outcomes are thus inexorably linked. 
The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 ("HDCA") outlines the statutory 
procedures that the Commissioner is obliged to follow and it also grants the Commissioner 
wide discretion. This discretion relates to the areas of evidence, investigation, disclosure, 
and publication. Any discretion in the hands of an official must be carefully exercised as its 
application can be utilized for inappropriate objects such as political point-scoring, publicity 
or personal expediency. It is therefore critical that where a discretionary power can be 
exercised, the decision maker is bound by some legal or normative standards against which 
they can justify their decision and thus validate their actions. Commitment to these standards 
should also be demonstrable in the way the procedures and processes established within the 
statutory framework, are applied. 
The set of standards that this thesis will consider in analyzing the procedures of the 
Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner are loosely termed the 'principles of 
natural justice. ' These principles have been well established in law. Although they may be 
98 
99 
Megarry VC used the term 'fairness' stating that ']ustice" is far from being a natural concept as the 
closer one goes to a state of nature the less justice does one find. Mcinnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 
1520: 1530. In Forbes, JRS. Disciplinary Tribunals. (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1990): 60 
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described in slightly different terms, the basic concepts are constantly adopted and reinforced 
in the courts. Before commencing an analysis of the HDCA procedures, it will be helpful to 
consider some formulations of the principles of natural justice and, after that consideration, 
determine whether these principles relate to the Office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner. 
Natural justice has been described in many and various ways but is frequently 
. d ''fi . [ . . "100 "b fi . . l d . d" . ll " 101 Th summarize as wr p ay zn actwn or ut wrness wnt arge an ;u lCla y . ~ e 
principles have ethical as well as judicial implications. Professor Galligan reminds readers : 
If justice is the first virtue of law and politics, then procedural justice is an 
essential element in its attainment. For no matter how good and how just the 
laws and the political principles supporting them may be, without suitable 
procedures they would fail in their purposes. 102 
He continues that once we are concerned about how people are treated, we are 
concerned with questions of fairness, both substantive and procedural. 103 
When the Health and Disability Commissioner was appointed, she was to provide a 
voice and avenue of redress for consumers who were unhappy about the health and disability 
services that they had received. The ultimate aim of the HDCA was to enable a fair, simple, 
speedy, and efficient resolution of complaints for providers and consumers so that neither 
100 Furnell v. Whangarei High School's Board [1973] A. C. 660: 679 per Lord Morris. 
101 Ridge v. Baldwin. [1963] 1 Q.B. 539: 578 per Harman LJ. 
102 Galligan D.J. (1996): Xvii . 












party was subjected to an extended and emotionally distressing complaints process. The 
Commissioner was to adjudicate and settle disputes about the quality of care provided by 
ruling whether the Code of Rights had been breached. A subsidiary goal was that people 
would learn from the complaints. Health practitioners would learn what standard of practice 
was required of them in order to provide a reasonable service and thus avoid complaints. 
Consumers would learn what standard of care they were entitled to expect. As a result it was 
hoped that the overall quality of health care in New Zealand might be improved. 
In most areas of adjudication, well-established procedures are already in place to 
enable rational and effective decision making. When a novel jurisdiction is established, 
particularly a jurisdiction that relies on delegated authority, there is a need to design new 
procedures to achieve the statutory ends. When the Office of the Commissioner was set up, 
it did not have the benefit of precedent. It had no established body of case law and no 
criteria upon which base its standards. The procedures of the Office were originally very 
unclear and appeared to develop only as parties with conflicting interests and values 
participated in the investigations and, through their experience, became able to identify 
shortcomings. 
Developing Fair Procedures 
The concern that people whose rights may be affected by a decision should be treated 
fairly is inherent in the principles of natural justice. It will be argued that this is a 
fundamental requirement for any person exercising a statutory power. However before this is 
argued, it is important to consider what these principles actually entail. In the English case 
Byrne v. Kinematograph Renter's Society, Harman J stated: 
First I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation 
made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and 




bias, arbitrariness, irrationality and unreasonableness}. 104 
The primary limb of the principle of natural justice, or (as it is sometimes known) the 
concept of procedural fairness, is this right to know and be heard about the case against 
one.105 It can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly there is a right to be heard and to be given an opportunity to show why 
adverse action should not be taken. This rule is sometimes referred to as audi 
alteram partem or hear the other side. 106 
Another useful formulation of the rule can be found in the case of McCarthy v. 
Grant, where Gresson J. stated that: 
The rule is that no one is to be condemned, punished or deprived of his 
property in any judicial proceedings unless he has had an opportunity of 
being heard- audi alteram partem - is an ancient principle of the common 
law and anything done contrary to that principle is contrary to natural justice. 
It is a rule of universal application based on the plainest principles of 
. . 107 ;ust1ce. 
D. E. Paterson, a New Zealand legal scholar who specialized in Administrative Law, 





Byrne v. Kinematograph Renter's Society [1958] 2 AllER 579: 599 per Harman J. 
Various texts state other limbs such as; that a man must not be judge in his own cause; no party must be 
condemned unheard; and that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision. See Hewitt, D.J. 
Natural Justice. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1972): 9-10. This thesis will primarily consider the latter two 
limbs. 
Paterson D.E. An Introduction to Administrative Law. (Wellington: Sweet & Maxwell (N.Z.) Ltd, 1967): 
125. 












constitutes an adequate opportunity to be heard.108 Several basic principles can be 
extrapolated from his writings and the first of these is that the person affected cannot be 
heard unless given reasonable notice that action is to be taken. Paterson writes: 
[T]he official should indicate with reasonable clarity not only the time and 
place at which he intends to consider taking action, but also what action it is 
that he is contemplating taking so that the person concerned can know to what 
extent and in what manner he should make representations with regard to the 
action. 109 
Notice should always be given to the person who is likely to be affected by the 
actions of any decision maker, able to affect that person's rights and freedoms, of the case or 
allegations against them. Such notice should be timely, in order to give that person an 
adequate opportunity to mount a reply or defense. The nature of the notice also requires the 
official to make reasonable disclosure of the material that she or he is taking into account in 
determining what action will be taken, so that the affected person can respond or make 
representations. Normally this disclosure of relevant material would precede the right to 
make representations, but if it does not then it should occur before the official takes any 
action. 110 
Adequate disclosure as a critical component of natural justice was also considered in 





Paterson D.E. (1967: 128) 
Ibid: 129 
Paterson D.E. (1967: 132, 139) 
R v. Architects' Registration Tribunal, Ex parte Jaggar [1945] 2 AllER 131. These principles have been 
adopted and affirmed in the courts of New Zealand. Staite v. Psychologists Board 11 PRNZ, 4. Duncan 
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appeal against a decision of the 'quasi-judicial' Architects' Registration Tribunal. Mr 
Jaggar's original application for registration was made to the Architects' Admissions 
Committee. When this Committee declined to recommend registration, Mr Jaggar appealed 
to the Architects' Registration Tribunal. The Tribunal was entitled to make its own 
regulations and establish its own procedures. During the Appeal this Tribunal considered 
letters about Mr Jaggar, but not only was he ignorant of their contents, he was completely 
unaware that such letters even existed. The Tribunal dismissed his Appeal and Mr Jaggar 
successfully sought an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal. One of his 
grounds related to issues of natural justice, namely the adequacy of disclosure and notice of 
evidence. In finding for Mr Jaggar, Lewis J. stated: 
The Tribunal had before them, and used, documents which should have been 
disclosed, or documents which the applicant was entitled to see if they were 
going to be used by the Tribunal .. .[The Tribunal] did not do what the [legal] 
authorities say they should have done, which was to give a real and effective 
opportunity to the litigant to deal with or meet, any relevant allegations made 
in these documents. 112 
Lewis J. continued: 
112 
113 
When [disclosure] is not done, as it was not in this case, and the Tribunal 
have before it correspondence of this nature which is not disclosed, and the 
Tribunal look at that correspondence, and base what they call relevant 
questions upon that correspondence, it seems to me, ... that that it is not doing 
what this Tribunal in its position should have done, namely that, if they looked 
at the letters at all, to inform the litigant what they contained and the source 









This decision illustrates the requirement that decision-making bodies must disclose 
any relevant evidence that it is intending to rely upon when coming to a decision. An 
Australian case considering the adequacy of disclosure of key documents was Macksville & 
District Hospital v. Mayze. 114 This was an appeal by a visiting obstetrician against 
termination of his appointment by the hospital board. The hospital had been concerned at the 
doctor's 40.6 per cent incidence of third degree perineal tears (for which he charged a higher 
fee to repair) in women undergoing childbirth. Experts put the usual incidence of such tears 
as 2-5 per cent. The doctor alleged breaches of natural justice in the way the investigation 
and termination of his access to the hospital was carried out. He lodged an appeal that came 
before the Equity Division of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Of note for our 
purposes was the finding that a series of 'serious procedural defects' in the Board's 
procedures were found. These included: 
• the doctor did not hear evidence of key witnesses including his partners. 
• he was not provided with a copy of an adverse expert report until very late in the 
proceedings. 
• he was not given an opportunity to cross examine the expert on the views expressed, 
nor to answer his views. 
• he was not permitted to be present during the testimony of key witnesses. 
As will be shown, many similar shortcomings in disclosure of evidence and witness 
reports, were apparent in the early years of the office of the Commissioner. 
While not finding that a medical practitioner was entitled to any higher standards of 
fairness than other persons in the community, the Court in Macksville, acknowledged that the 
interests of doctor at stake were substantial. Both through the "by-laws and the Common 
Law" there was a prima facie obligation that he be afforded natural justice and a "due 
hearing" neither of which he was found to have received.115 Kirby J. wrote 
114 Macksville v District Hospital v Mayze, (1987) 10 NSWLR 708. 





I record these defective procedures to ensure compliance with the 
requirements which natural justice dictated, ultimately by the obligation to 
conduct such proceedings fairly and in such a way that the manifest fairness 
of what occurs is demonstrable not only to the person accused but to 
reasonable observers among the public. II 6 
One of the first cases to consider the application of natural justice to non-judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies who exercise monopolistic powers and whose "decisions may ruin a 
b h . _J • " B K' h R ' S . Ill H man y t ezr recommenuatwns was yrne v. znematograp enters oczety. annan 
J. held that if such bodies set up an investigation committee about those over whom they 
claim to exercise jurisdiction, then that committee must give an assurance that the 
proceedings will be fair. 118 
The extension of the principles of natural justice to quasi-official bodies and officials 
was also accepted in New Zealand law. In Re: Erebus Royal Commission (No 2)II9 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal, while recognizing there is no right of appeal against reports of 






Nevertheless they may greatly influence public and government opinion and 
have a devastating effect on personal reputations and in our judgment these 
are the major reasons why in appropriate proceedings the courts must be 
Ibid. 
Byrne v. Kinematograph Renter's Society Ltd [1958]2 AllER 579. 
Ibid: 598. 
Re: Erebus Royal Commission (No 2) [1981] 1 NZLR 618: 653. 
See Pearlberg v. Varty [1972] 1 WLR 534: 547 where Lord Pearson held that while a presumption of 
compliance with the principles of natural justice is not always required from those making 










ready if necessary, in relation to Commissions of Inquiry just as to other 
public bodies and officials [my emphasis] to ensure that they keep within 
their lawful powers and comply with any applicable rules of natural justice. 
The New Zealand case of Phipps v. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons121 
demonstrated the willingness of the courts to require a professional college exercising a 
'statutory power' act according to the principles of natural justice. The Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons ("RAC'') were asked to investigate the clinical practice of Dr Phipps 
and make a determination on his competency to practice surgery. The resultant report 
contained adverse findings. Dr Phipps objected to the report and sought to have it set aside 
on the basis of procedural unfairness and unreasonableness. The appeal was heard in the 
High Court. Chisholm J. found that Dr Phipps had inadequate access to the files of patients 
whose care was part of the review, and that he was not informed who was being interviewed. 
An additional shortcoming was that allegations about the complaints were not put to him 
during the investigation or interviews. Chisholm J. held that it has been accepted in principle 
that the requirements of fairness will, in appropriate circumstances, be imposed on private 
bodies exercising administrative discretion (as opposed to judicial or quasi-judicial 
discretion), if the interests of justice make it apparent that fairness is to required in the 
exercise of the particular administrative functions. 122 He set aside the report. The RAC 
appealed. 
In considering the Appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that a negative 
competency report would have major significance for the subject doctor's reputation, 
employment and professional future. It also held that the competency report was "exactly the 
type of situation in which high standards of procedural fairness are expected'' .123 The RAC 
was required to follow a fair procedure, and in particular to make Dr Phipps aware of all 
---
121 Phipps v. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons [1997] 2 NZLR 598 
122 Ibid: 608 
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significant issues that might have given rise to an adverse finding against him. 124 It set out 
four factors required for reviewers to follow in order to ensure a fair procedure. These were 
that the party under review: 
• be given an adequate opportunity to know the allegations made against him; 
• know the evidence in support of those allegations; 
• be able to bring evidence; 
• be allowed to make submissions to counter the allegations and evidence.125 
Although the Court of Appeal confirmed that there had been significant procedural 
errors, it held that they did not taint the whole of the report. It made a declaration that parts 
of the report be set aside, but the remainder and the recommendations were allowed to stand. 
Dr Phipps appealed this decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which also 
confirmed that procedural errors had occurred, and set aside the recommendations, but the 
A 1 h . d" . d 126 ppea was ot erwtse tsmtsse . 
The principles of natural justice impose a requirement that parties will be treated 
fairly and that adjudicators will act justly. The basis for this requirement is that such 
decisions can cause serious harm to the reputation and future prospects of parties and can 
severely affect their rights, and interests. In an earlier Privy Council decision Durayappah v. 
Fernando127 the Judicial Committee considered the circumstances in which natural justice 
would be required of a decision maker. It held that this would depend on three things. These 
were the nature of the right affected by the decision, the width of the decision-maker's 
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This decision had led to a 'threshold test' that was developed further in the Australian 
case of Kioa v. West. This case involved the potential deportation of two Tongan citizens 
from Australia as prohibited immigrants. Mason J wrote: 
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a 
common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, 
in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and 
legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary 
statutory intention. 129 
The Commonwealth cases outlined above show that protections accorded to parties 
are not confined only to those involved in criminal and civil proceedings, but are also 
implicit in administrative inquiries. The term 'natural justice' has become a principle 
confined by no frontier, 130 one that expresses the critical and fundamental protections 
extended to any person who is subject to criminal, civil or disciplinary investigations. 
Decisions such as Macksville and Phipps have extended the requirement of natural justice to 
investigatory bodies which may or may not be involved in the ultimate decision.m A denial 
of natural justice is now held to be an error oflaw .132 





The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, unlike sections 77-78 of the New 
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550: 584 discussed in Aronson, M. and Dyer, B. (2000): 310-311. 
Wade H.W.R. and Forsyth, C.F. Administrative Law (81h ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000): 491. 
R v. Ealing Magistrates Court Ex parte Fannerman. [1996] 8 Admin. L.R. 351: 356 where Staughton 
LJ warned against the destruction of a dog without hearing the owner. He stated "Down that slippery 
slope lies the way to dictatorship." 






















Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, does not contain express natural justice 
provisions, although the preamble of the HDCA cites the aim of a 'fair' resolution of 
complaints. The Commissioner is however an adjudicator whose decision, statutory or 
discretionary, might have a 'devastating' effect on the professional reputation, employment 
and future of any person. Given that power, it is therefore possible to extrapolate from the 
above cases, that in the absence of a clear parliamentary exclusion, the Commissioner must 
adhere to the principles of natural justice and ensure that a practitioner is subject to a fair and 
just process. Aronson and Dyer suggest that a silence of the legislature on such a matter is 
likely to indicate a parliamentary intention that common law principles determine which 
procedures are appropriate. 133 It is the argument of this thesis that the HDC is implicitly 
bound to observe the principles of natural justice in both the investigative and decision 
making stage of the complaints processeso 
Apart from the common law, these principles can also be imported into the HDCA 
through the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (''NZBORA"). Section 3 of that Act 
requires any person or body in the performance of any public function, power or duty 
conferred on, or imposed on that person by or pursuant to law, to give effect to certain rights 
and freedoms of citizens. The Health and Disability Commissioner is just such a person. 
Section 27 of the NZBORA reads: 
133 
27 Right to Justice- (1) Every person has the right to the observance of the 
principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which 
has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
Aronson, M. & Dyer, Bruce. (2000): 310-314. See also Pearlberg v. Varty [1972] 1 WLR 534: 547 
per Lord Pearson, who stated "A tribunal to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is 
held to be required to apply those principles [i.e. the rules of natural justice] in performing those 


























obligations, or interests protected or recognized by law. 134 
Although these refer primarily to criminal rights and court proceedings cannot be 
equated to a disciplinary hearing, it has been held that these rights are a guide which should 
not be discounted when setting out minimal fair procedure in other jurisdictions. This was 
confirmed by the High Court of New Zealand in Staite. 135 This was a professional 
disciplinary case where Ellis J. considered the subject of disclosure. He wrote: 
In addition to deriving assistance from the common law requirements for 
disclosure by the prosecution for criminal cases, it could be said that those 
same requirements are imported into the procedure of the [Psychologist's] 
Council by virtue of the obligations to observe the rules of natural justice. 136 
While the HDCA process is a more informal process than either a criminal or 
professional disciplinary hearing, the eventual Final Opinion of the Commissioner can 
become the basis for professional misconduct charges and proceedings before the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal. The Final Opinion therefore has potentially far-reaching 
implications for a practitioner's reputation and livelihood and so it is crucial that all 




There are also minimal criminal rights which can be briefly summarized from section 25 of 
NZBORA. These include the: 
a) Right to a fair, public and impartial hearing 
b) Right to be tried without undue delay 
c) Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law 
d) Right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt 
e) Right to be present at a trial and to present a defense 
f) Right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain attendance and examination of 
witnesses for the defense under the same conditions as the prosecution 
g) Right if convicted of an offense in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the 
commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty. 
InStaite v. Psychologists Board 11 PRNZ 4 Ellis J cited Duncan v. Medical Practitioners 
Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513 (CA) regarding the need for disciplinary bodies 
to disclose reports and for practitioner's to be given an opportunity to comment on these. 
Duncan [1986] :548 per Cooke P. Also in Gurusinghe v. Medical Council of New Zealand 
[1989] 1 NZLR 139: 155 the High Court held that disciplinary proceedings are sufficiently 












Under the HDCA the Commissioner is free to regulate his or her own procedure. 
This is common to many Tribunals, Councils and quasi-judicial bodies. 137 While an Act may 
stipulate some general requirements such as forms of application, appeals and payment of 
officers. The development of the detailed rules and operational procedures are left largely to 
the discretion of the Commissioner. 138 Although these should be sufficiently flexible to 
enable the tasks and objectives of the Office to be carried out, the most important 
consideration, is whether such processes and procedures are fair and are perceived as fair. 139 
Having considered some of the fundamental aspects of the principles of natural 
justice, and accepting that both statute and common law require the Commissioner to adopt 
fair procedures, I will now consider whether such fairness was always evident in the 
management of some 'midwifery' cases. The following chapters track the usual process of a 
complaint from receipt by the Commissioner, through possible investigation, multi-stage 
decision making, to the Commissioner's final opinion as to whether the Code has been 
breached, and any recommendations or further action that follows this decision. Each stage 
of the usual HDCA process will be reviewed to consider if the minimum standards of 
procedural fairness were extended to the midwife in these cases. 
137 
139 
For an overview of such bodies see Administrative Tribunals Handbook (2nd ed) Compiled by the 
Wellington District Law Society Tribunals Committee (Wellington: Butterworths, 1996). Also Orr, 
G.S. Report on Administrative Justice in New Zealand, (Wellington : R.E. Owen, Government Printer, 
1964): 69. 
Orr, G.S. (1964: 70) Jackson, P. Natural Justice, (2nd ed.) London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1979: 84 
discusses the well formulated requirement that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. 











CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PROCESS OF AN HEALTH AND 
DISABILITY COMPLAINT 
This chapter works through the procedures outlined in the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994 and discusses their application in midwifery cases. The 
comprehensive nature of the subsections of the Act, means that this chapter is necessarily 
quite extensive. 
Section 59 of the HDCA enables the Commissioner to regulate his or her own 
procedures, to hear or obtain any information, and make such inquiries as the Commissioner 
sees fit. The Commissioner may request and receive any evidence from any person, apart 
from those subject to privilege. Such a wide discretion must be exercised with caution. 
Anyone who obstructs, hinders or resists the requests of the Commissioner commits an 
offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $3000. 
Reception of Complaints 
Section 31 of the HDCA states that any person may make a complaint to an advocate or 
to the Commissioner alleging that an action of any health care provider or disability services 
provider is, or appears to be, in breach ofthe Code. The receiving of a complaint from 'any 
person' be they friends, family members or other health practitioners is an extremely broad 
catchment and it is not uncommon for complaints to be received from people who were not 
present at the time of the incident. 
The Act allows a complaint to be oral or written, although advocates are available to 
help consumers clarify their complaint and reduce it to writing. The acceptance of oral 






Commissioners have required official complaints to be written down. The traditional purpose 
for requiring a written complaint was to succinctly set out the allegations and the grounds 
which a respondent must answer. This enables a clear identification and particularization of 
the issues for all concerned. From a legal perspective there are evidential risks associated 
with receiving oral complaints. One such risk is that any later rendition of the complaint to 
writing by another person, becomes a translation of what the hearer believes has been said. 
A further difficulty is that a complaint may come from a phone call to an office staff member 
and that person is hearing only one side of events and inevitably filters and summarizes the 
points they consider important. Even when such summaries are later reflected back to the 
original complainant, there is still a risk that key information will not be requested or will be 
missed or omitted. Another difficulty with oral complaints is that they enable a complaint to 
be made without the complainant taking a responsibility for actually setting down the 
primary areas of grievance. With oral complaints, those areas frequently shift over time. 
This can make it difficult for respondents to answer complaints. 
The acceptance of oral complaints is, however, in keeping with both the 
recommendations of the "Cartwright Report" and consumer calls that barriers to making a 
complaint, such as language difficulties or illiteracy, should be removed. In a multi-cultural 
society such as New Zealand, where a growing number of our citizens have English as a 
second language or have literacy problems, the acceptance of oral complaints is one way of 
providing better access to investigation and possible redress for the less fortunate and most 
vulnerable in our society. 
S 36 Action on receipt of complaint 
Upon receipt of a complaint the Commissioner has several available options. 140 She 
or he can investigate; screen the complaint out as trivial; refer it to an advocate for resolution 
(if not already attempted); or decide to take no action. The Commissioner is to inform the 






complainant and health care provider "as soon as is practicable" about the complaint and 
which procedure the Commissioner proposes to adopt. There is a fundamental requirement 
in the HDCA that the Commissioner attempt mediation and resolution as a primary step. In 
part this was to achieve the statutory imperative of fair, simple, speedy and efficient 
resolution of complaints, envisaged by Parliament. Such resolution and reconciliation can 
provide early satisfaction to complainants, and almost immediate change of practice from 
providers. It also acts as a means of settling disputes, and of enabling closure for both 
complainants and respondents. Despite this resolution imperative very few midwifery 
complaints were referred for mediation or resolved during the term of the first 
Commissioner. This was not the case for other providers as the Commissioner recorded that 
74 cases in 1997; 181 for 1998; and 195 in 1999 had been referred for resolution and 
mediation. 141 
Section 35 Investigation ofbreaches of Code 
If a complaint is first made to an advocate and the advocate cannot achieve 
resolution, the complaint is to be referred to the Commissioner to decide whether further 
action is required. The Commissioner may commence an investigation where the action is, 
or appears to be, in breach of the Code. The Commissioner can also undertake investigations 
h. h . . . . 142 on 1s or er own 1mtmt1ve. 
No Action. 
Section 37 of the Act enables the Commissioner to take no action or no further action 
in certain situations. These include where there was a considerable length oftime since the 
141 
142 
Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner Te Toihau Hauora Hauatanga for the Year ended 
30 June 1999, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 16 of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act. On several occasions where midwives requested mediation, there was 
no response to their request. 












incident, where the subject matter was trivial or the complaint frivolous, vexatious, or not 
made in good faith. Other factors to be taken into account were whether the complainant 
desired the action to be taken or continued, and whether alternative remedies were available. 
I am unaware of any midwifery cases under the first Commissioner that were screened out as 
trivial. 
Investigation 
Once the Commissioner rejects the option of mediation or resolution, the next step is 
to commence an investigation. Often there is a gap in time between the receipt of the 
complaint, the decision to investigate, and the notification to the provider. In some ways 
this is inevitable as there needs to be an opportunity for the Commissioner to determine 
whether there are grounds for further action. The only requirements are that the decision to 
investigate must be bona fide, made on reasonable grounds, and not be arbitrary or for some 
ulterior purpose. 
On about five occasions of which I am aware, the Commissioner commenced an 
investigation regardless of whether or not the consumer who received the care, was 
supportive of the complaint. A concern for some midwives, was the pressure put on some 
complainants to lay a complaint, particularly in home birth situations. This pressure 
frequently came from other practitioners who opposed home birth. Midwives described 
women being told that they had to support the complaint or "other women could suffer" or 
"babies might die". One midwife told me of a young woman who apologised to her and 
said that she felt she had no option but to join the complaint or she would be seen as a bad 
mother. Young women were particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure and yet 
frequently these reluctant complainants would become pregnant again while the investigation 






























Proceedings of the Commissioner 
Section 41 requires that before proceeding to investigate, the Commissioner inform 
both the complainant and provider to whom or to which the investigation relates, and any 
person alleged to be aggrieved (if not the complainant), of the Commissioner's intention to 
make the investigation. The Commissioner must also inform the provider of: 
i) the details of the complaint (if any) or, as the case may be, the subject 
matter of the investigation; and 
ii) the right of that person to submit to the Commissioner within a 
reasonable time, a written response in relation to the complaint or, as the 
case may be, the subject matter of the investigation. 143 
Once the decision is made to commence an investigation, the Commissioner must 
apply the principles of natural justice. At one time it was thought that preliminary decisions 
which could not affect rights, without some further action or decision being taken, would not 
attract a duty to observe natural justice. That approach has since been rejected.144 Galligan 
argues that while at first sight investigations and inquiries are just preliminary to some later 






It is not hard to see that the very process of the inquiry affects interests and 
values, of which privacy and confidentiality are the most notable, while the 
ensuing report and recommendations might themselves have a detrimental 
effect upon the person under investigation, not least to reputation but also in 
other ways. 146 
Section 41 of the HDCA 
Aronson and Dyer (2000): 364. 










As has been shown both the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness 
require that a person knows who is bringing a complaint, the nature of the complaint, the 
reasons for why it is being brought and sufficient detail of the questions to be decided, in 
order to make a defense. Flick writes that while notice need not in all cases quote chapter and 
verse, particularly in the early stages of an investigation, it must be formulated with sufficient 
precision to inform the ordinary reasonable man as to what is being complained of and what 
he is required to do. It will be deficient if a party is left guessing as to what the charge 
actually is or if he only knows one out of many charges. 147 As Lord Morris stated in the 
English case Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation "What would be the point of giving someone 
a right to be heard, while denying him any knowledge as to what he is to be heard about? "148 
Reasons for notice can be extrapolated from many sources but in summary notice is 
also needed to: 





provide detail of the subject matter of the inquiry, the legal and factual 
issues to be canvassed; 
give notice of the rule allegedly breached; 
identify the consequences of an adverse adjudication so as enable case 
. 149 preparatiOn. 
Well particularized allegations enable the respondent to make a full and robust 
defense but also assist the decision-maker to see clearly what is being alleged, so that he or 
147 Flick (1978): 35. Sloan v. General Medical Council [1970] 1 WLR 1130. 
148 Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578: 1588 per Lord Morris. In Forbes (1990): 73. 
149 Extrapolated from Flick, G.A. Natural Justice- Principles and Practical Application, (Sydney: 






























she is in a better position to consider the evidence, and apply accurate tests of relevance. 
This is arguably more conducive to a fair hearing, free from side issues and prejudicial 
'surprise' and will result in accurate judgements and outcomes.150 
Let us consider the type of particulars given to midwives by the Commissioner. The 
notice given to midwives when the Office was still in its infancy was frequently vague and 
allegations of a breach of the Code were not well specified. In some cases the allegations 
were so non-specific that the midwife would not know what she was required to answer and 
so would request the original complaint letter to see if this could enlighten her. Forbes writes 
that where the substance of a document cannot be conveyed without producing it for 
inspection, then inspection should be allowed. 151 Unfortunately this was not the practice of 
the Commissioner. Even if a complaint letter existed, in the first year to eighteen months 
after the Code was enacted, it would routinely be withheld. 152 
The Commissioner began to summarize aspects of the complaint and these would be 
included, usually in quote or bullet point form, as part of the Notification Letter to the 
practitioner. These summaries were frequently a mixture of statements of fact and allegation. 
Often there was no date, time nor location given with respect to the incident complained of, 
and a midwife could be left completely unaware of what she was supposed to have done, and 
thus be unable to formulate an answer. An example of this type of allegation is where the 




Ibid. See also Forbes (1990): 73-75. Galligan (1996): 256-257,349-350. 
Forbes (1990): 108. 
This withholding of key information and the lack of fundamental discovery of relevant documents, was 
to be a constant source of frustration and a major concern for those involved. It was also a policy that 
was very out of step with the practice ofthe Privacy Commissioner and the professional disciplinary 
bodies. They had moved to greater and more open disclosure. Galligan states that disclosure is closely 
related to notice and that parties should be given information and materials upon which the authority 







On x date your husband had to point out to hospital staff that your drip had 
nearly finished. 153 
Clearly the Commissioner or one of her staff was reflecting back a conversation with 
the complainant, but this phrase was contained in the midst of other allegations against the 
midwife. The above example is useful as it illustrates a common problem with the early 
complaints letters - namely a lack of specificity or particularization. The above example 
gives rise to the following questions given that there are three shifts of staff in most hospitals. 
What time did this incident occur? Was anyone else present? Who was the staff member that 
the husband talked to? Was that person the one responsible for care? At what time did this 
conversation occur? Was the infusion attached to a pump (because if it was then shut-down 
as the fluid level decreased might have been automatic)? What is meant by 'nearly finished'? 
Did the staff member do anything as a result? 
All of these questions could have been asked by the Commissioner when formulating 
the particulars of the complaint. Ultimately it turned out that the above incident had nothing 
to do with the midwife who received this particular as part of the complaint. Her client was 
in hospital under secondary care and the midwife was not present nor responsible for the care 
.d d d . h . 154 prov1 e unng t at t1me. 
There were many other procedural shortcomings in the communication of complaints 
to midwives. A midwife would often not know who had lodged the complaint against her, 




The next bullet point in the same Notification Letter was equally puzzling and referred to a visit that the 
complainant had with a doctor where she was concerned about shortcomings in his communication. 
This was also 'put' to the midwife who had not been present during the doctor's visit- a matter that 













complaint had been oral or written. 155 Complaints were often largely based on hearsay and 
second hand information such as the complaint, against the wishes of the consumer and her 
partner, by a paediatrician who had no part in the actual birth or resuscitation.156 Another was 
the complaint of the friend of a woman who birthed precipitously before her midwife could 
arrive. 157 
Eventually, after numerous requests for better particularization of complaints by 
health practitioners and their lawyers, the Commissioner began to attach a copy of the 
complaint letter where it was available. This would identify the grievances of the 
complainant. However it was only on rare occasions, such as where an effective advocate 
had helped formulate the letter of complaint, that the midwife would receive some indication 
on which part of the Code she was alleged to have breached. 
The Commissioner's letter of notification set out other information that was useful to 
the practitioner. This included the aim of the legislation, that certain cases would be dealt 
with by advocacy, agreement, resolution, or the calling of a mediation conference. She 
would advise that a complaint had been received and whether she intended to investigate so 
as to enable an opinion to be formed as to whether the Code had been breached. The 
provider would be reminded that the Code imposed duties upon providers and that an opinion 
would not be formed until the midwife had been given an opportunity to comment. Where a 
breach was found, the Commissioner stated that she could make a report with or without 
recommendations, and in appropriate cases refer the matter to the Director of Proceedings 
who would decide whether action before the Human Rights Review Tribunal or a 






The wording of the early Notification Letters presented the two forums as alternatives which mislead 
some people into believing they would face either HRRT (then Complaints Review Tribunal) or a 
disciplinary hearing but not both. The legislation clearly sets out the possibility of prosecution before 














In the Notification Letter the Commissioner would request certain information from 
the midwife and ask her to forward to the Commissioner a written reply, giving her 
employment status (as employers can be liable under the Code) and all clinical notes and 
supporting documentation. The Commissioner would then provide the provider with the 
name and contact details of the investigator assigned to the file. 159 
Section 41 (1 )(b )(ii) of the HDCA gives the provider a right to submit a written 
response in relation to the complaint (or as the case may be the subject matter of the 
investigation) to the Commissioner within a reasonable time. In practice two different rights 
of reply were afforded. The first was the right to reply to the brief bullet points in the 
notification letter, or to the complaint letter and the second was to the Commissioner's 
Provisional Opinion. Often the midwife did not know what the complaint was actually about 
until she received the Provisional Opinion. When the Commissioner failed to provide 
adequate particulars and the midwife remained uncertain about the specifics ofthe complaint, 
she would usually just provide a broad statement of her involvement with the complainant, 
over the pregnancy, birth and postnatal period. 
When the second Commissioner was appointed he was immediately concerned to find 
that providers often did not know why they were being investigated. He was interviewed by 
the media and the following account was reported: 
!59 
Some providers have complained that they do not know exactly why they are 
being investigated and Mr Paterson says this confusion is evident from the 
files he has read. At the moment, providers get a factual litany of the alleged 
incident but, Mr Paterson says, there is no information about whether the 
The letters of the second Commissioner have a similar format but give more detail on the impartial and 
inquisitorial nature of the investigation process, asks for a wider range of material and stipulates that 
it should be sent 'in confidence'. The Commissioner now notes with regret that investigation processes 
can be lengthy and recommends that the provider seek collegial support. Information is included on 























') ~ <' 
) 
I ,, 
complaint relates to lack of communication skills, lack of iriformation given to 
the patient, or standards of care. "I don't think the Commissioner is required 
to spell out which part of the Code a provider may have breached, but I think 
it would be fair to give providers some idea about the areas of practice which 
are under review ". 160 
The majority of midwives would forward their reply with copies of the midwifery 
notes to the Commissioner within a month of receiving the complaint, although many 
responded sooner. These responses would not usually be acknowledged and the midwife 
would hear nothing more for some years. Part way through 1998, when concerns about 
process delays were growing, the Commissioner initiated progress letters and these were sent 
out, usually after about a year, simply confirming that the matter was still under 
investigation. 
The Investigation Process - After the Initial Response 
The Commissioner makes a decision whether to investigate the complaint subject 
only to the expectation that the decision would be made in good faith, and be based on 
relevant concerns and valid considerations. After the Commissioner receives the midwife's 
response to the original letter of notification,_ the process of investigation continues. Reports 
are received, hospital notes accessed, people are interviewed - both eyewitnesses and others, 
experts are consulted, guidelines, manuals, standards and policy documents are gathered and 
considered, and throughout this process, the midwife often has no idea what evidence the 
Commissioner is considering, who has given evidence, the nature of that evidence and which 
experts have become involved. Despite numerous common law precedents that approve 
disclosure in disciplinary cases, including those discussed above, the majority of the reports 












and documents collected during the investigation were not disclosed or forwarded to the 
midwife for comment. 161 This was very different to the practice of the Nursing Council of 
New Zealand when exercising its disciplinary jurisdiction or the Accident Compensation 
Commission medical misadventure process where as soon as witnesses statements and expert 
reports were received, they were circulated among all interested parties. 
The High Court of Australia held in 1992 that natural justice included the right to test 
the case [against one] including the evidence called and the right to put a case to the 
contrary. 162 The High Court of New Zealand found that it was a breach of natural justice 
for an Authority to obtain further information without giving this to respondents for 
comment. 163 In Redcliff Estates Ltd v. Enberg & Ano/64 the High Court set side an 
arbitration award because the arbitrator had been requested to take account of evidence and 
"incriminating submissions" that were never disclosed to the plaintiff. Panckhurst J held 
that the failure to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to those submissions was a 
breach of natural justice. 
When concerns were raised at the lack of disclosure, one justification of the 





Forbes (1990): 171. In Freedman v. Petty and Greyhound Racing Control Board [1981] VR 1001: 
1021 The Court found it can be an error to put questions to a defendant and not tell them that the 
questions are based on a document in the [authority's] possession. See also Brinldey v. Brinldey 
[1965] 75: 78 where Scarman J. held that for a court to take into consideration evidence which a party 
to the proceedings has had no opportunity during trial to see or hear ... [strikes] at the very root of the 
judicial process. Also R v. Architects Registration Board ex parte Jaggar [1945] 2 All E.R. 131 and 
Phipps as above. 
Wentworth v. NSW Bar Association, [1992] 176 C.L.R. 239: 255 
Martin v. CEO of the Department of Labour, HC, Auckland, M 113-98-4/11/98, per Cartwright J. 
This was a successful Appeal against a decision of the Residence Appeal Authority. 
Redcliff Estates Ltd v. Enberg & Anor. HC, Christchurch, M 150-99, 22/7/99. Panckhurst J. quoted 
Wilmer J. in R v. Deputy Industria/Inquiries Commissioner ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456: 476 
where the Court of Appeal held that it would not be in accord with natural justice to act on information 













to her information. Even if this reason were valid, it did not justify an outright refusal to 
disclose. It is quite possible to disclose the relevant information without providing a person's 
name or personal details. This type of argument was considered in an unsuccessful appeal 
against a decision of the English Architects Registration Tribunal and it was held that the 
tribunal could receive evidence in confidence if it disclosed to an applicant both the contents 
of the evidence and its source. 165 This has continued to be the view of the New Zealand 
court. In an unsuccessful appeal against a decision of the Building Industry Authority, 
Gallen J nevertheless found that the BIA was wrong to receive and consider reports of third 
parties without disclosing them to parties and allowing time for submissions or for further 
evidence to be presented. 166 
When material collected during the investigation is relied upon to make a decision 
that is adverse to any person, then that information should be disclosed. Professor Galligan 
states that: 
The underlying point, is that no matter how well founded the adverse material 
might be, the party should have the chance to cast doubt on it and, in that 
way, give a fuller and possibly more balanced account of the facts. 167 
A key protection in the collection of any evidence is that it disclosed at some point 
before the ultimate decision, so a party has a right of comment. Disclosure becomes more 
critical if evidence and decision may lead to an adverse finding capable of "damaging a 
person's reputation and economic prospects". It is important before making such a finding 
that a person be given the opportunity to see and make submissions on any evidence that 
could lead to that finding. This is usual practice in the Coroner's jurisdiction. A well 
165 R v. Architect's Registration Tribunal ex parte Jagger [1945] 2 ALLER 131 
166 Auckland City Council v. New Zealand Fire Service & Anor. [1996] 1 NZLR 330 per Gallen J 
















known formulation of the principle comes from the case Mahon v. Air New Zealand. 168 It 
was there said of a Coroner's Court adverse finding, that: 
In practice the principles of natural justice mean that Coroner's cannot make 
findings adverse to the interests of people to whom a right of representation is 
granted without giving the opportunity to be heard in opposition to that 
fi d . 169 n mg. 
The Final Opinion and recommendations of the Commissioner can be akin to an 
adverse finding and yet the failure to disclose key evidence to respondent practitioners was a 
frequent problem at all stages of the investigations. 
Take as an example, where a midwife was interviewed by HDC investigators. These 
encounters often lacked procedural fairness. A difficulty in those early interviews was that 
the investigators had varying degrees of skill and experience. While some were perceived as 
very professional, the practice of other investigators was worrying to midwives. One example 
related to the practice of interviewers interviewing the midwife in her home. When this 
occurred the midwife was forced into a hostess-type situation and the formal, and to some 
intimidating, interview process then impinged on her personal space and family. 170 
In early interviews, investigators would frequently talk first to the complainant, their 
friends and family and medical critics and thereby gain a preliminary view of their version of 





Mahon v. Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808. 
Ibid: 818, 820. (Forbes 1990):97 . 
Midwife's reported feeling the house had to be very tidy, they worried about what to do with 
young children, or that a friend would drop in during the interview and "find out" about the 
complaint and so on. One interviewer went to a midwife's very well-appointed home and 












witnesses. Their fear was that by the time they were interviewed, the investigators may have 
developed a sympathy for the complainant, particularly where a baby had died or had 
suffered a pregnancy or birth injury. The midwives worried that this would make the 
investigators less accepting of a midwife's explanations. It is difficult to know if interviewers 
were affected in this way, and it is probable that an appropriate professional distance to all 
witnesses was maintained. This concern is mentioned because in the early years of the 
Office, several of the midwives who were interviewed, feared that the practice of 
interviewing the majority of witnesses from "one side" first, might lead to a bias against 
their evidence. 
A further difficulty was that the interviewers often had a health background. While 
this had some benefits, it could also led to problems. One interviewer asked the midwife 
why she had not performed a rectal examination on the woman in labour. This particular 
examination was a procedure that had been discredited over twenty years before and the 
midwife tried to explain that it was no longer considered good practice. The question 
remained an issue through to the provisional opinion but was removed once the midwife 
made submissions to the Commissioner on current practice. The example is unusual but it 
demonstrates the danger of investigators mistakenly applying their own clinical experience or 
outdated knowledge to the clinical decision making of the midwife. 
In another case the midwife's support person during the interview was skilled in 
shorthand. Her detailed notes were at complete variance to the notes the investigator later 
presented to the midwife as the summary of what she had said. The midwife refused to sign 
h . . ' . 171 t e mvest1gator s transcnpt. 
A common problem was that the midwife was often uncertain about which aspects of 
her practice or care of the complainant, was giving rise to the complaint. In the interview 











some matters would sometimes be ''puf' to the midwife and she would be asked to comment. 
At such times the midwife might gain a glimpse of the concerns of the Commissioner or 
investigators, and so be able to make explanations or submissions related to these issues. At 
other times the midwife would have no idea why she was being asked certain questions. 
Arguably the procedures of investigators should also take account of the principles of 
natural justice. Investigators need to be skilled at what they do, and fair and unbiased in their 
approach. This is very important, as it is the interviewer who influences key decisions in the 
HDCA process. These include which other witnesses to interview, what information to seek, 
and whose evidence they believe. It is the interviewer who will draw preliminary 
conclusions on the strength of the case against the provider, including a view as to whether 
there has been a breach. When the interviewers report their views, impressions and 
conclusions, this information may greatly affect or inform the ultimate decision of the 
Commissioner. The Commissioner is heavily reliant on the interviewers to furnish full, 
impartial and appropriate evidence in coming to assist him or her in coming to a conclusion 
about whether the Code has been breached. 
The issue of evidence and evidence-taking in cases where health professionals are 
involved, requires patience, skill and an open mind, as there are many factors that may 
challenge the investigator. One of these is the unique context of the clinical relationship. In 
most midwifery cases, the woman, her friends, partner, or other family members are 
frequently present during clinical interactions, while the midwife is often there alone. A 
result of this reality is that when a complaint is initiated, there may be several people giving 
evidence "against" the midwife and it is inevitable that differing recollections and conflict of 
evidence will occur. Matters are complicated when lay witnesses try to recall or interpret 
retrospectively clinical events and clinical decision-making, without ever having talked 
through the reasons for those decisions with their immediate caregivers. The risk of collusion 
or contamination of evidence is increased if the family and close friends recite to each other 
what they recollect as happening. This is an especial risk when witnesses live together or see 
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consciously, or unconsciously, bolster, or slant their evidence to fit the common version of 
events. This danger is greater where the situation has been an emergency and communication 
has been reduced to a minimum, or where the outcome has been traumatic and the 
subsequent grief has been extreme. In these situations the witnesses often care deeply about 
the complainant and his or her concerns, and often share the complainant's passion to 
achieve professional accountability or desire to exact some type of recompense. 
A further concern is the type of situation where there is more than one witness saying 
similar things, is that the accumulating evidence can appear to give extra credence to a claim. 
While corroboration may be quite valid and helpful in establishing the facts, Forbes warned 
that natural justice may require adjudicators to limit the inclusion of evidence where there is 
frequent repetition of essentially similar evidence. 172 This is not to suggest that such 
repetition cannot also occur in hospitals where staff may fall into inadvertent collusion, in an 
effort to protect a practitioner who is well liked or respected. This danger needs to be 
remembered by anyone interviewing a number of witnesses, particularly when their 
evidence does not add anything more to what is already known. 
From a legal defence perspective, a more worrying shortcoming of the investigation 
process was the failure to interview key witnesses. This was a critical concern as a decision-
maker must consider all relevant evidence and the Commissioner is dependent upon his or 
her investigators to amass that evidence. In Prasad v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs173 Wilcox J held that, while it is not the duty of the decision-maker to make the 
appellant's case for him: 
172 
173 
in a case where it is obvious that material is readily available which is 
centrally relevant to the decision being made, it seems to me that to proceed 
to a de.cision without making any attempt to obtain that information may 
Forbes (1990): 106. 


















~ ~~ ~ 
1 ' J 
.. , 
\ y"__... 
j_ ~ I 
\ 
( 
properly be described as an exercise of the decision-making power in a 
manner so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised 
it.l74 
In several of the midwifery cases, there was a failure to interview key witnesses and 
obtain information from them. In another case the second midwife at the birth and attempted 
resuscitation, was not interviewed yet she was there at all relevant times. 175 In another case 
the second midwife, student midwife, the mother and the grandmother who were all present 
at the birth, were not interviewed. 176 It was notable that family members were less likely to 
be interviewed when they did not support the complaint, and yet sometimes witnesses of 
questionable relevance, such as complainant doctor in the same case (who was not present at 
any stage of the birth and resuscitation and so had no direct evidence to give), 177 or the parent 
of the consumer178 (who was not present during the key times), were interviewed . 
In some cases, the midwives themselves were not interviewed and so had no 
opportunity to gain greater detail of the case against them nor to orally answer concerns. 179 
The omissions to interview relevant witnesses became of greater concern when an adverse 








98HDC12370/MR. In this case two midwives were involved and the complaint was 
laid after the stillbirth of the baby. The Coroner had dismissed the case part-way through an 
Inquest finding the babe was effectively stillborn and died of an abnormally short cord. A key 
allegation against the second midwife was a failure to do a blood test at an exact gestational 
date of the pregnancy where the woman's dates had been uncertain and where the blood tests 
had actually been done earlier by the hospital and were normal. (A set of tests later in the 
pregnancy were also normal). The Commissioner investigated and there was a four year 
delay between the stillbirth of the baby and the Commissioner's decision that the timing of the 

























Unfortunately the midwife would often not know who had or had not been 
interviewed until the Commissioner released the Provisional Opinion.180 Even then she 
would not usually be given any details of what that person had said. 
Omitting to interview eye-witnesses can mean that critical evidence, which could 
provide corroboration for the family or the midwife, is unavailable to the Commissioner to 
assist in the deliberations and decision-making. The failure to interview key witnesses had 
the additional adverse effect of making some midwives feel as if the process was not neutral, 
and that finding out what actually happened was secondary to finding evidence to support the 
complaint. 
The Commissioner has a discretion to decide whether to interview any witnesses, and 
there are budgetary considerations when deciding to commit resources to a number of 
interviews. A key consideration should be relevance. The Commissioner must be prepared 
not only to hear both sides, but to be perceived as hearing both sides. Any adjudicator who 
ignores, disregards, or who does not require, the collection of all relevant evidence, arguably 
closes his or her mind to the full facts. 
Considering the Evidence 
The processes of the Office of the Commissioner are not the same as a Tribunal and are 
even less bound by the strict rules of evidence. Once the interviews are completed it is the 
role of the Commissioner to sift all the witness statements and weigh the evidence. Where 
recollections about events differ or conflicts in evidence occur, the Commissioner must 
make a finding of credibility as to which witnesses to believe. The Commissioner is at a 
disadvantage from most adjudicators, as the finding is generally made without the 
180 By way of contrast the investigator for the Preliminary Proceedings Committee ("PPC") of 
the Nursing Council ofNew Zealand has the task of interviewing all those directly involved 
in a complaint, and not just those who support the complaint. This is done to enable the PPC 
to determine whether the midwife has a case to answer before the Nursing Council. This 
investigator considered that her statutory role in those investigations was to attain a record of 














Commissioner ever seeing the witness giving evidence. 
Conflict in evidence is almost inevitable, such as occurred in the following case. 181 
The issue of credibility arose in respect to a discussion between the mother, grandmother and 
the midwife about taking a heel prick sample to test the blood of a baby with jaundice. This 
test is called an SBR ("Serum Bilirubin test"). The midwife initially visited the mother and 
baby regularly after the birth and noted the baby had a faint jaundice. The baby appeared 
well, the mother's milk supply was good and the baby was alert and feeding. On post natal 
day six, while the grandmother was present, the midwife did the routine Guthrie blood test 
(for genetic diseases) and decided to do an SBR to determine the level of jaundice. She 
explained to the family that if the SBR level was high, the baby would need to go the hospital 
for treatment. The midwife went out to the car to get her testing kit and came back and 
began to assemble the equipment. All witnesses agreed to events up until this point. No 
witness denied that the midwife visited and assessed the baby and that at some point during 
the visit, she stated that she wanted to test the baby's level of jaundice. Similarly all 
appeared to accept that she warned the mother that if the test result ("SBR") were high the 
baby would need to go to hospital. 
At that point the evidence diverged. The evidence of the midwife was that the 
grandmother questioned whether given the baby was alert and feeding well, there was any 
need for the test. She said that the mother said to leave the test. The midwife says that after 
these comments, she checked the baby's colour more closely by stripping it down and she 
bare-weighed the baby to ensure it was feeding and getting ample fluids. There was a weight 
gain which the midwife said tends to indicate the fluid intake is satisfactory. The midwife 
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questioned a test on an alert baby who appeared well, and that the baby's mother agreed 
with the grandmother that the test should not be done. 
The mother disagreed with the midwife's evidence. She says that they asked the 
midwife to do the test and she said not to worry. The midwife, denied this and questioned 
why she would stop part-way through assembling her equipment to do the test, unless the 
family had said or done something to stop her going ahead. 
The baby's jaundice worsened and an SBR level done the following day was high and 
the baby was admitted for phototherapy. The family made a complaint against the midwife 
and the Commissioner investigated. In her Final Opinion, the Commissioner found the 
midwife in breach of the Code. She preferred the family evidence about the above 
interaction, over the evidence of the midwife but gave no reasons for this. Of concern to the 
midwife was that the Commissioner, in making this credibility finding, appeared to give no 
weight to the contemporaneous clinical record which supported the midwife's version of 
what had occurred. 
While the requirement to give reasons for preferring the evidence of one witness over 
another, has not been elevated to a legal duty it is a growing component of the need for fair 
procedures. Reasons should be given when there is an adverse finding. 
Expert Reports 
We have seen that there was a failure to disclose key evidence or concerns during 
investigations. Another area where there was poor disclosure of relevant evidence related to 
expert evidence. 
Many of the rights contained within the Code, are linked to a reasonable standard of 
practice in the circumstances. A breach would usually only be found where the provider 




















Practice" the Commissioner is empowered to contract expert witnesses from the different 
health professional groups. The Second Schedule of the HDCA states: 
1. Employment of experts- (I) The Commissioner may, as and when the need 
arises appoint any person who, in the Commissioner's opinion, possesses 
expert knowledge or is otherwise able to assist in connection with the exercise 
by the Commissioner of the Commissioner's functions to make such inquiries 
and conduct such research or to make such reports or to render such other 
services as may be necessary for the efficient performance by the 
Commissioner of the Commissioner's functions. 
The first Commissioner recognized the need to obtain independent expert opinion. 
The opinion of an expert can be an immense help to an adjudicator, as they provide specialist 
knowledge. But, as Professor Galligan warned, while such opinions are in one sense a matter 
of judgement about complex assessments in complex situations, in another sense they are 
1 1 d. . 1s2 H . arge y 1scretwnary. e writes: 
They are reached partly by the straightforward application of knowledge, but 
also partly by a more subjective judgement about the best way of applying 
that knowledge under conditions of uncertainty, where rival judgements might 
be equally justified. 183 
In most forums where an expert is used, there is a right for parties to be given a copy 
of the report, and to cross-examine the expert in order to test whether that person is qualified 
to give expert opinion and the nature of that opinion. A midwife had input into the decision 
about which expert the Commissioner should approach, and had no ability to question or test 
that person's credentials or expertise. In the absence of these protections, it was important 













that the experts used by the Commissioner were appropriately qualified 184 
Unfortunately unlike the practice of the Medical Misadventure Committees in the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, the professional disciplinary Bodies, Coroners and the 
Civil Courts, all of which utilized expert midwifery opinion when considering a midwifery 
case, there were times when the Commissioner received expert opinion from members of 
other professional groups. Those practitioners were not qualified in midwifery and were not 
the appropriate person to an expert opinion on what constituted reasonable midwifery 
practice. 185 
In the early cases, experts were anonymous and midwives often did not even know if: 
an expert or experts had been used; who the expert or experts were; how and by whom they 
had been nominated; whether they were qualified to be an expert; the type of briefing they 
had been given by the Commissioner; the particular realm of their expertise in midwifery; 
what documentation or evidence they had seen and relied on before giving their opinion; 
whether they had given a written opinion, or an oral opinion over the phone; whether they 
had the opportunity to consider the midwife's response to the provisional opinion and 
possibly modify their opinion in light of this; and what the totality of their evidence had 
been. The Commissioner's practice was not to disclose the name of experts, and to quote, in 
her opinions, the portions of the expert's evidence that supported the findings. One case 
where there was a lack of disclosure of expert evidence has already been considered, and 
184 
185 
The NZCOM had established a rigorous method of nominating experts in midwifery. Each region 
would nominate potential candidates on the basis of their experience, qualifications, service, 
commitment to midwifery, and their standing in the professional community. The nominations would 
be forwarded to the National Committee, where there would be a further consideration of the 
appropriateness of candidates and those affirmed would be placed on a list of experts available to 
ACC, Nursing Council, any lawyers prosecuting or defending midwifery cases, and the Commissioner. 
The list contained a broad range of midwives practising in all different areas of maternity to ensure that 
appropriate and wide-ranging advice was available. 
This confusion over appropriate professional expertise was not just a problem for midwives. GP's had 
a similar problem and the Commissioner's case notes disclose that at times, medical specialists 
inappropriately gave expert advice on GP practice. "Peers must judge us, say rural medics". New 
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unfortunately this was the norm in early HDC cases. 186 
The failure to disclose expert opinions, particularly when they are adverse or relied on 
by the decision-maker, has long been held as procedurally unfair. In R v. Westminster 
Assessment Committee Ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd, Du Parcq LJ warned 
that the expert must not be substituted for the ultimate decision-maker and held with respect 
to expert reports: (p.14 3) 
Those whose claim is being considered have a right to question and to test 
every statement [the expert] makes, and any opinion he expresses. If that 
opportunity is denied them, justice is not done. On the ground, therefore, that 
the committee improperly ... considered and gave weight to evidence and, it 
may be, argument, which was never communicated to the parties most 
interested, we are of opinion that the respondents are entitled to have the 
determination of the Committee quashed 187 
The view that parties should be given the right to see and comment on adverse reports 
continues to be the case in New Zealand. was expressed in Auckland Boxing Association Inc 
v New Zealand Boxing Association Inc. 188 This was a case where the ABA successfully 
applied for Judicial Review of a decision that the NZBA would cease to issue permits for 
amateur matches. The High Court held that the NZBA had breached the principles of natural 
justice because it had not told the ABA of the existence of reports recommending this action, 
nor was it given an opportunity to comment, and furthermore the NZBA had not warned the 




One of the first changes of the second Commissioner was to disclose the full expert opinion and to 
name experts. 
R v. Westminster Assessment Committee ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd. [1940] 4 All ER 
132: 143. 
Auckland Boxing Association Inc v. NZ Boxing Association Inc & Anor (HC, 8/5/01). Auckland, M 
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The need for such disclosures was also affirmed in the context of professional 
disciplinary cases in Staite, 189 and Duncan, 190 and Phipps 191 which reaffirmed the need for 
disciplinary committees to disclose documents of significance, and for parties to be given an 
. h . 1 . 192 opportumty to comment on t eir cone usions. 
Although the principle audi alteram partem requires sufficient notice of the case 
against a person to prepare a defense and submit evidence in support of her own case, it also 
includes the right to contradict evidence which forms the basis of the opponent's case. This 
is a key reason why a decision maker should not act on "secret evidence" .193 Hewitt writes 
that evidence should not be given behind the back of a party without proper disclosure and 
cites Ayers v. Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand where Edwards J. held that the 
Pharmacy Board, in arriving at a disciplinary decision, was bound to act according to the 
ordinary principles upon which justice is administered and should have disclosed the 
"d . . d 194 evi ence It receive . 
Undisclosed key evidence was a common factor in early cases. It was not just the 
failure to disclose expert reports, but a failure to disclose standards, guidelines and policies 







Staite v. Psychologists Board 11 PRNZ 1: 4 . 
Duncan v. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] i NZLR 513: 535 (HC) 
Phipps v. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons [1997] 2 NZLR 518. 
Halsbury's Laws of England discusses the need for wide disclosure of expert reports and states that 
the document served must include sufficient details of all the facts, tests, experiments and assumptions 
which underlie any part of the information, to enable the party on whom it is served to make, or to 
obtain, a proper interpretation of the information and an assessment of its significance. Usually the 
failure to disclose the expert's report means it may not be used in a trial. Halsbury's Laws of England 
(4th edition re-issue) 17 (1) (London: Butterworths LexisNexis , 2002), paras 768- 772. 
Flick (1978): 41, Hewitt D.J. Natural Justice. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1992): 313, Forbes, (1990): 73. 
Ayers v. Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand (1901) 20 NZLR, 418 cited in Hewitt (1992): 423. 
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examples include a letter from the hospital confirming a midwife's view that a baby was 
well on discharge, 195 and an obstetrician's letter whose evidence refuted one key allegation 
against the midwife.196 There were other cases where there was either no disclosure or no 
adequate disclosure. Repeated requests for disclosure by counsel, and arguments that the 
rules of natural justice required the Commissioner to provide reasonable discovery, were 
largely ignored. It eventually took a series of legal challenges to bring about change. 
The first challenge arose from Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary Tribunal v. E. 197 
This was a case where the Commissioner found that the doctor, "E" had breached the Code 
and referred the matter to the Director of Proceedings. The Director laid a charge against E 
before the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The doctor's repeated requests for 
access to key documentation had been continually declined. The case note reveals that the 
grounds of refusal had shifted frequently during correspondence between the Commissioner 
and counsel for E. These included the assertion that the Commissioner's files were 
privileged; that disclosure was against "policy"; that providing copies of expert evidence 
would discourage peer reviewers from providing free and frank information; and that the 
role of the Commissioner and Director are separate.198 
Counsel for the doctor sought orders from the Tribunal for the Commissioner and 
Director of Proceedings to give discovery of documents relating to either the investigation of 
the complaint, and/or the prosecution of the case, including a complete copy of the advice of 






97HDC7147/MC. The allegation was that the specialist had asked the midwife to do a blood test 
and she had not done this. There was undisclosed evidence from the doctor that the allegation was not 
true . 
Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary Tribunal v. E, 31-98-18D, 3 April, 7 Aprill998. 















filed within 14 days. The Commissioner and Director claimed privilege and argued that the 
Commissioner had no obligation to provide copies of the investigation file. 
The Tribunal was not convinced and quoted from Gurusinghe v. Medical Council. 
The High Court advised regarding disclosure in disciplinary cases, that: 
Any prosecutor, however, would be wise to allow the defence to see information 
which is of concern to the defence unless there is a good reason for not doing 
so, in order to let counsel for the defendant decide whether the information 
might assist in showing that the defendant may not be guilty of the charges 
. t h" 199 agams zm. 
The Tribunal found that it was reasonable for Dr E to receive the documents and that 
receipt was required to comply with natural justice. It ordered the Commissioner and the 
Director to disclose the documents and for the Commissioner to pay costs of, and incidental 
to, the application. The Commissioner appealed and sought that the Tribunal's Orders be 
quashed. 
Shortly after the Tribunal's ruling, in another medical disciplinary case, the 
MPDT ordered the Director of Proceedings to supply the Tribunal with a copy of a report by 
a peer general practitioner, so that the Tribunal could disclose the report to the respondent 
doctor, in order to fully discharge its own statutory obligation to observe the rules of natural 
justice. The Commissioner by letter dated 12 June 1998, declined to comply with the 
Tribunal's request?00 The Tribunal hearing went ahead without disclosure having been 
made. In its decision to dismiss the charge against the doctor, the MPDT stated that had the 
charge been made out, it would have deferred announcement of its decision pending either 
199 Gurusinghe v. Medical Council [1989] 1 NZLR 139: 160. 





















until compliance with or appeal of the order by the Commissioner.201 
The appeal on both these cases was heard in the High Court in Wellington. Ellis J. 
held that disclosure should have been given. The Commissioner claimed litigation privilege. 
This argument failed because Ellis J. found that the dominant purpose of the Commissioner's 
file was not prosecution. It was compiled to enable the Commissioner to report and refer 
matters on to the Director of Proceedings Ellis J. ordered that the Commissioner's and 
Director's files should "be discovered" unless there was a good reason for refusal.202 He said 
that, even independent of the discovery required as part of a prosecution, disclosure of 
personal information about the doctor could have been ordered under the Privacy Act 1993. 
The Provisional Opinion - A Right of Reply and Opportunity to Controvert Adverse 
Evidence 
Section 43 of the HDCA states that once the decision to commence an investigation is 
made, the Commissioner should conduct the investigation with due expedition, and shall 
inform the parties concerned as soon as reasonably practical after the conclusion of the 
investigation and in such manner as the Commissioner thinks proper, of the result of the 
investigation and of what further action (if any) the Commissioner proposes to take in respect 
of that complaint.Z03 The usual form of this notice is the Provisional Opinion, although in 
cases where there was no breach finding, the Commissioner often simply sends a letter to the 
midwife informing her of the finding and that if she does not want to comment further, the 
case will be closed. 
If there was a provisional finding of a breach of the Code, this represented the first 




MPDTv. Director of Proceedings, 15 June 1998, 43-98-22D: 22. 
Health and Disability Commissioner v. Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary Tribunal, [1999] 2 NZLR 
616, HC Wellington. 
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rights they were alleged to have breached; the witnesses involved; and the possible 
recommendations or actions that the Commissioner intended to take. 
The processes surrounding the Provisional Opinion must also be procedurally fair as 
there is no rule that natural justice is excluded from a preliminary stage.Z04 In Lewis v. 
Heifer, Lane LJ stated: 
In most types of investigation there is in the early stages a point at which 
action of some sort must be taken and must be taken firmly in order to set the 
wheels of investigation in motion . . . but the further the proceedings go and the 
nearer they get to the imposition of a penal sanction or to damaging 
someone 's reputation or to inflicting financial loss on someone, the more 
necessary it becomes to act judicially, and the greater the importance of 
observing the maxim audi alteram partem.205 
In Home Secretary, Ex parte Doody, (PC) Lord Mustill identified several points that 
represented fairness; including the right of a person to make representations on a proposed 




(5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely 
affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on 
his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a 
favorable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; 
or both. 
(6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations 
without knowing what factors weigh against his interests, fairness will very 
often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to 
answer. 206 
Lewis v. Heffer, [1978] 1 WLR 1061; Rees v. Crane [1994] 2 AC 173: 181. (P.C.) 
Lewis v. Heffer [1978] 1 WLR 1061: 1078-79 per Lane LJ. 








It was appropriate and fair for providers to be given an opportunity to respond to the 
Provisional Opinion before the Commissioner's Opinion was made final. The only 
procedural shortcoming in this process was that disclosure of evidence did not accompany 
the Provisional Opinion, even when the evidence obtained during the investigation process 
was referred to in the body of the opinion itself. This meant that the provider was frequently 
still responding in a vacuum, without access to key evidence, or knowing what had been 
relied on by the Commissioner in forming the Opinion. 
While the opportunity to review and comment on the Provisional Opinion is 
important for the provider, such comment is a critical additional safeguard for the 
Commissioner, as it allows errors to be corrected and for additional evidence to be called to 
refute wrong conclusions. This enables the Commissioner to produce more robust and well-
reasoned decisions. Flick wrote of the importance of this type of correction and his 
justifications can be summarized as follows.Z07 Such comment will: 
• provide considerable assurance that the decision will be better as a result 
of its being properly thought out 
• encourage public confidence in the process 
• provide guidance to those who advise parties as to their future conduct 
• disclose correctable [practice] deficiencies for the education of others 
• prevent arbitrary and abusive exercise of broad disciplinary powers. 
The format of the early Provisional Opinions ranged from a short letter stating no 
breach had been found, through to a lengthy and detailed opinion about multiple providers. 
Commonly the opinion would list the original complaint by way of bullet points, even where 
they had been disproved or bore no relationship to the eventual finding. There would be 
disclosure of the date that the complaint was received by the Commissioner and generally at 





... ) ; 
this point the complainant was disclosed if this had not already been done. The 
Commissioner would then list persons who had provided information during the 
investigation and summarize the information that had been gathered. As has already been 
pointed out this was often the first time that the midwife would become aware that key 
witnesses had not given evidence or that extraneous witnesses had been interviewed. Where 
witnesses were quoted it would not be clear whether the quotes came from a written or oral 
statement, or from an interview transcript. It was entirely at the discretion of the 
Commissioner what evidence was included in the body of the Provisional Opinion. 
In the Provisional Opinion the Commissioner sometimes referred to independent 
expert advice that she had received. After summarizing selected aspects of that advice, the 
Provisional Opinion would list the Rights that were relevant to the complaint and any other 
standards such as the NZCOM Standards for Midwifery Practice which the Commissioner 
had taken into account when forming her conclusions. The Commissioner would then 
consider each Right individually and give her opinion as to whether or not there had been a 
breach of the Code. 
The Provisional Opinion concluded with the Commissioner listing her proposed 
recommendations and explaining that the midwife had a right to make submissions on those 
recommendations. The Commissioner would also identify the organizations or individuals to 
whom she intended to circulate the Final Opinion. In serious cases the Commissioner 
advised the midwife of her intention to forward the opinion to the Director of Proceedings 
for a determination whether the complaint should be taken further (Section 45(1)(f)). 
Under the HDCA, the midwife's right to be heard before the Opinion is finalized does 
not include a right to an oral hearing. With so many cases and with often large numbers of 
parties, a routine right to be heard in person by the Commissioner would be an intolerable 
burden. The refusal of an oral hearing, is not necessarily a denial of natural justice, provided 
a party is given a fair and adequate opportunity to present his or her case. The Commissioner 















to the Provisional Opinion. 
A Final Right of Response 
After receiving the Provisional Opinion the provider usually needed to rapidly 
respond to a considerable amount of new evidence, and possibly new allegations, with no 
further disclosure. This was a considerable burden; particularly where there was a previously 
unseen adverse expert opinion. Sometimes such expert advice would come as quite a shock 
for the midwife. The burden was compounded where the expert appeared to be unaware of 
key or relevant evidence in the case, or where the midwife considered that the expert had 
given advice that did not reflect accurate research or reasonable practice. In these cases the 
midwife had a very short time-frame to find and instruct her own expert to try to controvert 
the evidence of the Commissioner's expert. This had to be done in a short time frame before 
the Preliminary Opinion was finalized. With the first Commissioner a midwifery provider 
was given an average of three weeks to reply to the Provisional Opinion, even where the 
investigation had been delayed for two to three years. On some occasions, short extensions 
would be granted for the midwife to compile and adduce further evidence. 
The principles of natural justice establish the right for respondents to persuade the 
decision- maker as to their 'guilt or innocence' but additionally they give a right for an 
affected person to address the question of an appropriate penalty208 . Part of the provider's 
response to the Provisional Opinion needs to address the recommendations of the 
Commissioner and whether they are reasonable, or even possible, in the circumstances. An 
additional point for practitioners is that, where the finding of Breach is accepted, it is helpful 
for the provider to inform the Commissioner what they have learned as a result of the 
complaint and investigation. This may include any education or up-skilling they have 
208 Malone v Marr [1981] 2 NSWLR 894, was a case where the plaintiff sought a declaration that his 
suspension from the Rugby League Club was null and void, and to overturn an injunction in order to 
continue to enjoy the benefits of membership. The Club's failure to allow the plaintiff to make 
submissions on penalty was a breach of natural justice. . R v. Thames Magistrate's Court, ex parte 
Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371: 1375, the Court held that the right to notice extends to giving a person a 






















undertaken, any changes they have made to their practice, or processes they have put in 
place, to try to avoid a recurrence of the breach. This information can be reassuring to the 
Commissioner and also to the complainants, who may find some solace in knowing a lesson 
has been learned or practice changed as a result of their complaint. 
A good example of a midwife proactively trying to 'put things right' was 
97HDC7147.209 The background was that a GP and the midwife (Midwife F) provided 
shared-care. This was another 'jaundiced baby" case. The labour was induced and closely 
monitored and an instrumental hospital birth occurred. The baby had a large haematoma on 
its head from the difficult forceps delivery. The baby developed jaundice but was discharged 
home after a medical assessment. The jaundice persisted and the midwife wanted to do a 
blood test, but she was aware that the laboratory did not do these over the weekend. She 
rang and discussed the jaundice with the paediatrician and told him that, apart from the 
jaundice, the baby appeared well. He recommended a test on the Monday morning and said 
that if the result was elevated the baby could be admitted. The midwife discussed this advice 
with the parents. That afternoon the baby did not wake for feeds but the midwife was not 
contacted. On the Monday the baby was tested and the jaundice level was high. The baby 
was admitted for phototherapy. The jaundice rapidly improved but the midwife received a 
message from the parents that they no longer wanted her to provide care. 
In this case the parents contacted an Health Advocate about the midwife. A meeting 
was held which the parents did not attend. After the meeting, having been told of the 
parents' complaints, Midwife F wrote to the parents acknowledging their dissatisfaction and 
explaining the actions she had taken to try to address their concerns. They remained unhappy 
and formulated a new set of complaints which were forwarded to the Commissioner. An 
investigation was commenced eight months after the birth. 
209 There were a number of mixed fact/allegations about the labour including that the consumer's 
membranes were ruptured for 30 hours, which was a fact and she was in labour for 36 hours which 
was a fact. Another fact was that the baby developed foetal distress and had a CTG baseline of 80 for 
several minutes. When the drop in the baby's heart beat occurred, medical assistance was promptly 

















The grounds of the complaint shifted but the Commissioner investigated and 
eventually found that while the midwife had acted appropriately and promptly during the 
labour and difficult birth, she had breached Right 4(2) because she failed to take a blood test 
on the Sunday and failed to ensure breast-feeding was established. (The midwife stated at all 
times that the clinical condition of the baby indicated that feeding was established.) The 
midwife was also found to have breached Right 6 (1) (b), because although she noted the 
baby's jaundice and discussed this with the parents, the Commissioner found that she did not 
discuss testing options. The Commissioner said she found no evidence of the midwife's 
advice to give the baby adequate fluids (although this was documented), but she eventually 
accepted that the midwife had asked the mother to keep a feeding diary for the baby, and she 
had documented this. 
The midwife took the complaint very seriously and immediately began extensive 
attempts to change both her own practice and that of the local laboratory and hospital, to 
ensure this did not happen again. By the time of the Provisional Opinion she had attempted 
to negotiate weekend testing with local laboratories; had found an alternative after-hours 
laboratory service for blood tests and informed local midwives about this; she was producing 
a diary of community contacts for midwives; was lobbying the hospital for weekend access 
to the hospital laboratory so that babies did not need to be admitted to hospital before they 
could have a blood test; she had been active in developing resources and requesting the 
development of guidelines to ensure wider hospital and laboratory support for midwives 
caring for jaundiced babies in the community; and she was educating other midwives locally 
about jaundice. 
The Commissioner did not refer to any of the midwife's initiatives to effect change in 
the Final Opinion. This was unfortunate, as the midwife's determination to tum a complaint 
into better services could have been a positive example for other practitioners facing a 
complaint. Furthermore the midwife's attempts to avoid a similar thing happening again 
could have been instructive to other practitioners who were seeking to improve their own 












The Final Opinion 
The Final Opinion was usually released a very short time after the midwife's response 
was received. Sometimes there were alterations to the Provisional Opinion as a result of the 
new evidence provided by the midwife, but at other times wrong facts were not corrected. 
An example was in the case discussed above where the case note persists in saying the 
Commissioner found no evidence of the midwife's request that the mother keep a feeding 
diary. This was despite the midwife having clearly documented the advice and the 
Commissioner accepting this evidence when it was given in response to the Provisional 
Opinion. Other examples of where inaccurate evidence remained unchanged were 
97HDC7147/MC where there was a persisting allegation that the midwife did not take a test 
requested by a consultant, despite the midwife's denial and undisclosed evidence from the 
consultant that she did not request the midwife to take this test. In HDC5342 the opinion 
states that the woman's 'waters were broken' for 56 hours when they were broken for 46 
hours. This was an important factor as 48 hours is a key cut off point in decision making. In 
HDC 8623/ AD there was a statement that the midwife did not visit the woman for the first 
few days after the birth but the woman was in hospital hundreds of miles away under 
secondary care. In 98HDC11321A/VC the opinion wrongly stated that the midwife 
prescribed a repeat prescription despite the documentation on the script itself, the midwife's 
denial, and the pharmacist's admission that she dispensed this unauthorized three month 
repeat?10 
Recommendations 
Where there is a finding of breach of the Code, the Commissioner is empowered to 
make wide-ranging recommendations. These are usually aimed at providing some 
acknowledgement and redress for the consumer and preventing similar breach situations 




















happening in the future. Under s 46 of the HDCA the Commissioner may request a provider 
found in breach, to inform the Commissioner how she or he proposes to give effect to a 
recommendation. The recommendations are not legally enforceable but failure to comply 
with recommendations can have adverse consequences for the provider. If no action is taken 
by the provider within a reasonable time, the Commissioner shall do several things: 
a) Consider (if any) the person's comments. 
b) Inform the complainant ofthe recommendations. 
c) Make such comments on the matter as the Commissioner sees fit. 
d) Report to the Minister [ofHealth]. 
The Commissioner might also threaten to go public with the complaint. 
Most recommendations of the Commissioner in the midwifery opinions were 
reasonable and commonly included such things as a request for an apology, a 
recommendation that the practitioner up-skill in some areas, improve communication, 
undergo mentoring, upgrade equipment, or keep better records. There was however one 
midwifery case where the recommendations seemed excessive. 211 In that case, against 
Midwife C (See Appendix A) the Commissioner made a raft of recommendations. She 
required the midwife to make an apology and she recommended that the midwife be open 
and honest in addressing of consumers concerns (although there had been no allegation nor 
evidence of a lack of honesty or openness by anyone at any point). Other recommendations 
included the following: 
• [Midwife C) discusses the opinion with the New Zealand College of Midwives 
["NZCOM''] and operates under close supervision until the matter is heard before the 





• {Midwife C) informs all consumers of this opinion and that the matter is pending. 
• A list of her clients should be sent in confidence to the Commissioner monthly as 
evidence that they have been informed. 
The reference to the midwife discussing the opinion with NZCOM in the 
recommendation was inappropriate as NZCOM is a professional not a disciplinary body, and 
the matter was still sub judice. 
The second recommendation being carried out even though the complaint was about a 
single incident and in the two years between the birth and the provisional opinion the 
midwife had been practising in a safe and competent manner. There was also concern with 
the recommendation that the midwife provide the Commissioner with a monthly list of 
clients. The Commissioner was advised that compliance with this recommendation would 
potentially breach Principles 3 and 6 of the Privacy Act 1993, as providing the clients' names 
to the Commissioner could not have been envisaged when the personal information was first 
provided by the women to the midwife. The Commissioner was asked to withdraw the 
recommendation so as not to place the midwife into a potentially unlawful situation.212 
The Commissioner also recommended, two years after the stillbirth in question, that 
the midwife set up a stringent supervision arrangement. (This was something the midwife 
would have to fund herself.) A rationale for this requirement was sought but not given. The 
difficulty in implementing the recommendation came about as follows. Under the law at that 
time such supervision could only be voluntary, as the Nursing Council of New Zealand was 
the only statutory body able to mandate supervision for a nurse or midwife. Supervision was 
a penalty that was to be legally imposed after a full disciplinary hearing, a finding of 
professional misconduct and a decision that supervision was the appropriate penalty in the 
212 The recommendation also raised the question as to whether the Commissioner planned to phone the 
listed clients to follow up on whether they had been told of the pending action, or to perhaps ask other 
information about the care they were receiving. As the prospect of further disciplinary proceedings had 

















circumstances. None of these steps had occurred as no charge of professional misconduct 
had been laid. Arguably the Commissioner was asking the midwife to self-impose a 
restriction on her practice that would normally only occur following professional misconduct 
finding and penalty. 
The midwife, due to fear following the naming of her colleague, and fear that the 
Commissioner would also publicly name her should she not comply with the 
recommendations, decided that she would voluntarily submit to supervision. She attempted 
to give effect to this recommendation but it proved impossible to arrange as most midwives 
were too busy or "scared of}'' by the Commissioner's recent publicity. Midwife C was unable 
to arrange the supervision to the level the Commissioner required. In informing the 
Commissioner of this in her reply to the Provisional Opinion, the midwife advised that she 
would give up midwifery, until the case was finalised. As the midwife was no longer 
practising many of the recommendations then served no purpose. However in the Final 
Opinion the Commissioner retained the recommendations of apology, supervision, discussion 
of the case with NZCOM, and that the midwife inform consumers of the complaint, 
something the midwife had already been doing until she stopped practice. The Commissioner 
withdrew the requirement for Midwife C to provide lists of names of clients but then added a 
completely new unseen recommendation, which was that Midwife C liaise with specialists to 
ensure that her [then non-existent] client's had access to urgent assessment. 
Procedure After Investigation 
Once an investigation is completed, the final consideration as to whether there is a 
breach of the Code is inevitably subjective. It is the Commissioner and only the 
Commissioner who makes the ultimate decision of whether an action [or inaction] amounts 
to a breach. There is no right of appeal for such an Opinion. The only redress for a provider 
or consumer who is unhappy with the Commissioner's decision is, where there are legal 













Under section 45 ofthe HDCA, where after investigation the Commissioner is of the 
opinion there has been a breach of the Code, the Commissioner may: 
a) Report the opinion to the provider with reasons and make such 
recommendations as the Commissioner sees fit, including a 
recommendation that disciplinary actions be taken against any officer or 






Report the opinion to purchasers, any other health professional body, or 
any other person that the Commissioner considers appropriate. 
Report to the Minister of Health. 
Make a complaint to any health professional body about any person. 
Where a person wants to make a complaint, assist them to do so. 
Refer the matter to the Director of Proceedings. 
In most cases the reporting by the Commissioner included distributing copies of the 
opinion to the respondent(s), the consumer or complainant; the Nursing Council of New 
Zealand; the professional associations such as the New Zealand College of Midwives or New 
Zealand Nurses Organisation for educational purposes; the midwife's employer; the Minister 
of Health; and various other parties such as the Maternity Services Consumer Council. In 
almost every case the opinions were anonymized. There was one midwifery case that was an 
extraordinary exception to that practice. The involvement of the Commissioner in the 
unprecedented publicity surrounding that case, was controversial and unexpected. Before 
discussing these events, it is helpful to consider the pressure the Commissioner was facing 



























CHAPTER EIGHT: GROWING PRESSURE ON THE 
COMMISSIONER 
In the first years of the Commissioner's jurisdiction, health consumers, politicians 
and health professionals and some lawyers including this writer, were increasingly concerned 
at the long delays in resolving even apparently minor HDC complaints. Over the 1997-98 
year the Commissioner's Office struggled with its increasing work-load and financial 
constraints. A target had been set that 95% of complaints would be closed within 26 weeks of 
receipt of complaint, but this target was dropped when only 7 4.2% of closures were 
achieved.Z13 As cases lingered, friction grew between provider organizations and the 
Commissioner. Additionally during the years 1997-1998, the Commissioner was facing 
parliamentary pressure about the small numbers of complaints proceeding to disciplinary 
hearings. In 1998 a medical defence lawyer, Gaelene Phipps, reported that while there had 
been an unprecedented increase in complaints against doctors, there had been a decrease in 
the numbers of extensive hearings. She was concerned at the amount of time that doctors 
had to spend on 'specious' complaints such as those directed at "a doctor's manner, tone of 
voice, and demeanour". 214 The Commissioner replied to this criticism writing that 
comments such as "My doctor was rude to me" were valid in the Code environment and 
must be taken seriously.215 She also mentioned what she termed as "grumbles" about the 




concerns about apparently trivial complaints being investigated, to the 
system being too weighted in the consumer's favour, to claims that no right of 
reply is available before an opinion is finalized. On the other hand I am 
The United Kingdom Health Commissioner has a "Quickie Unit' that aims to handle 60% of 
the complaints in two days. In 1986 there was criticism by the Select Committee when the 
time to complete an investigation rose to 47 weeks. They insisted the office speed up. 
Phipps, Gaelene. "Reflecting on the Last Year- the good and the bad" New Zealand 
Doctor, (21 January 1998): 33. 


























) ~­j "\ 




sometimes criticized for not bringing enough cases before disciplinary 
b d . 216 o zes. 
While there was certainly a consumer and parliamentary concern about the lack of 
cases being prosecuted, the Commissioner was also coming under increasing criticism for 
not giving priority to significant complaints. The following are examples of these criticisms, 
although the final example arose after the case we are about to discuss. 
(a) The Northland Amputee Service 
A number of complaints had been received about the services provided to Northland 
amputees by their service provider, Rehabilitation Management Ltd ("RML"). The first 
complaints were made to the Commissioner as early as April 1997, stating that limbs had 
gone missing when sent for repair; that some consumers were allegedly told that repair was 
not possible; that repairs were not done properly or limbs did not fit well, and that there were 
long delays in getting care. The Commissioner promised to conduct an Inquiry into RML on 
behalf of consumers but after two years, nothing had been resolved?17 The complainants 
went to a prominent Member of Parliament, Jim Anderton, who at first attempted to use 
political pressure to effect action. Frustrated with the continuing lack of progress, he made a 
formal complaint to the Ombudsman in June 1999. Mr Anderton later described the 




The complaint was made back in 1997 and now it's the year 2000. This was a 
matter of urgency. You couldn't get a worse case. These people were treated 
terribly. I couldn't believe I could get no action for vulnerable amputees from 
a Health and Disability Commissioner. 218 
Ibid. 
Newth, Kim. "Stent failed to keep promises." Sunday Star Times, (27 February 2000). Stuart, Julia. 
"Anderton unhappy with Stent delays" New Zealand General Practitioner,( 2 June 1999). 
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saying: 
When the Ombudsman's decision was released the Ombudsman was quoted as 
To give an assessment of a completion date and not adhere to it, on the 
grounds that other things are occupying your time is, in my opinion, not a 
valid basis for failing to accord the matter the priority that was promised. I 
have therefore sustained Mr Anderton's complaint. 219 
Mrs Stent's response was: "Where should the Commissioner's priorities lie? Should I 
just drop everything else for a week to work on this file?"220 The Commissioner said that she 
hoped to complete the report that week, her last in office. Unfortunately by that time it was 
too late: the RML had been wound up and the Regional Health Authority abolished. 
(b) A Bogus Psychiatrist 
A further criticism of the Commissioner's priorities came from the Alliance Health 
Spokeswoman, Phillida Bunkie. She was critical of the investigation into "Dr Linda Astor. 
Dr Astor" a male posing as a female psychiatrist, who had worked at Nelson and Hurt 
Valley Health. Patients and their families had become concerned about the type of treatment, 
including shock treatment, which Astor was using. They approached Ms Bunkie m 
September 1997 with their concerns, and the Commissioner's office was requested to 
undertake an investigation into Astor and her treatment of patients. The Commissioner 
apparently refused to do this. Ms Bunkie was later reported as having criticized the 
Commissioner's refusal in Select Committee saying "If that case cannot be investigated by 
219 "Amputee Service Complaint Upheld" The Dominion, (29 January 2000). 



















the Commissioner, then the way the Commissioner's office is run is very seriously 
fl d ,221 awe . 
(c) The Complaint of Mrs Colleen Poutsma 
The Commissioner was also criticized for the low priority, she gave to the complaint 
of Mrs Colleen Poutsma against her obstetrician-gynaecologist. The Commissioner received 
a complaint from Mrs Poutsma who had terminal cancer in April 1998. The investigation 
was still ongoing when the new Commissioner was appointed in March 2000.222 The second 
Commissioner Mr Ron Paterson, investigated the file and referred it to the Director of 
Proceedings?23 Mr Paterson was also obviously concerned about the long delay when the 
complainant was so gravely ilL He described the delays as "inexcusable" and took the 
unusual step of phoning and apologizing both personally and publicly to the Poutsma family. 
He stated that he was committed to ensuring that in future a person in a similar situation to 
Mrs Poutsma would have their case dealt with as a matter ofurgency.224 
The delays did not only concern consumers and their families, and politicians, they also 
greatly concerned health practitioners, who having been the subject of a formal complaint, 





Bunkie, Phillida New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 567 (26 March 1989): 7887, 7889. Boland, 
Mary Jane. ''The Politics of Health" The Evening Post, (10 July 1999) See McLoughlin, David. "In 
Face to Face- Robyn Stent" North & South, (February 2000): 100 where Mrs Stent says that she had 
done more than Ms Bunkle reported and that her Office was planning a big investigation, but it had 
taken too long to progress. See also Chisholm, Donna. "Stent bows out bullied but unbeaten."Sunday 
Star Times (11 July 1999): where the Commissioner spoke of a lengthy inquiry which she made 
leading to a string of suggestions to hospitals and the Medical Council. 
The MPDT got the charge in July 2000 and the chair of the Tribunal Wendy Brandon was interviewed 
and said "/think it is appalling that somebody who had a personal tragedy has to hang in there for two 
or three years for their day in court. " Calder at Large (interviewing Wendy Brandon) ''Matters of Life 
and Death" New Zealand Herald (9 September 2000). 
Phipps, Gaelene. "Lack of Transparency in Doctor's Suspension." New Zealand Doctor, (28 February 
2001): 25. 































Commissioner allocated time to further the investigations. Delays of two, three, or even four 
years occurred. There was a growing concern that people would be unable to recall events, 
that key witnesses would move on or be lost, and that both defense and prosecution would be 
compromised?25 The cases were backlogged, and it appeared to me during that time that this 
was particularly true of cases that were emotionally difficult or more complex. The delays 
b . b hC .. 226 were ecommg an em arrassment to t e omm1ss1oner. 
In my view, a significant reason for the delays was the decision of the Commissioner 
to institute the Canterbury Health Inquiry. The resources committed to this lengthy 
investigation meant it was inevitable that other areas of the Commissioner's work would be 
'd . 1 . . 227 set as1 e or g1ven a ower pnonty. 
The next section will consider the complaint against "Midwife B". At the time of 




Paterson, R. "Notes from the first year." Womens's Health Watch, (September 2000): 8. speaking at 
the 12th Anniversary of the Release of Cartwright Report on 2 August 1998. He said "Some very 
public investigations have taken two or three years. There are still far too many in the system from 
1997 (a few) and 1998 (quite a lot). It is very difficult, particularly in hospital settings where staff 
change anyway, to investigate matters that go back to 1997 or even 1998. Getting the time down 
makes it so much easier, because matters are relatively fresh in people's memories". When Mr 
Paterson took up the position of Commissioner on 4 March 2000 he inherited a backlog of 790 cases 
and by November of2000 had reduced this to under 575. A record 1,303 complaints were closed and 
1,088 new complaints received. This was the first year that the Commissioner cleared more complaints 
than were received. (Paterson, R. "Commissioner Releases Annual Report" HDC Press Release (16 
November 2000). 
The injustice of delay in the criminal context was discussed in Herron v. AG for NSW (1987) 8 
NSWLR 601: 607 where it was held that although there is no constitutional right to speedy trial in 
Australia, England and New Zealand, the common law had repaired the constitutional and statutory 
omission and extended it in particular cases. Reasons to avoid delay include the public interest in the 
due administration of justice and the enforcement ofthe law, and the public and private interests in a 
speedy trial and the avoidance, inter alia, of the kinds of prejudice to persons at risk before Courts and 
tribunals. 
Coney, Sandra. Sunday Star Times, (22 February 1998): 6. Ms Coney was critical of the long delays 
over the Report and contrasted the Commissioner's decision to conduct private hearings with her 
actions in revealing the case of Midwife B. It should be noted that the eventual Canterbury Health 





























number of disciplinary proceedings against health practitioners. The way the complaint was 
dealt with also raises a number of seminal natural justice issues including whether the 
Commissioner should have publicly named the midwife part way through the statutory 
process, prior to charges being laid by the Director of Proceedings. 
"A particularly unfortunate set of circumstances really"?28 
Midwife B was an experienced nurse and midwife. She had never been the subject of 
a complaint and had an excellent professional reputation. Midwife B and a colleague were 
providing care forMs X who was expecting her first baby. Ms X was hoping for a non 
interventionist birth. The relationship was described by all witnesses as mutually warm and 
supportive. Ms X was admitted in early labour to hospital by Midwife B and a tracing of her 
baby's heartbeat was done. There is a wide variation in the length of such tracings and many 
hospitals do not even require a tracing at that stage. However in the hospital to which Ms X 
was admitted it was usual to do a 20 minute trace. Midwife B was unable to trace the baby 
for that long as the mother became uncomfortable. Midwife B assessed the admission tracing 
and considered that, although it was not as reactive as usual, it was satisfactory and possibly 
indicated a sleeping baby. She meant to repeat the tracing once she had dealt with Ms X's 
pain, which was considerable. 
Ms X had a bath, and asked her midwife to leave to give her and her partner privacy. 
Midwife B then arranged forMs X to have Pethidine, hoping to trace the baby. The Pethidine 
was ineffective and so Midwife B recommended the use of gas. She was closely involved, 
coaching and supporting Ms X through her contractions, and attempted to place the monitor 
to trace the baby's heart beat. Midwife B was able to do this for a short time but Ms X' s 
pain increased and her movements would not enable further tracing. The heart beat showed a 
228 McLoughlin, David. "Face to Face- Robyn Stent" North & South, (February 2000): 99. In this 
article the Commissioner was asked about naming the midwife. She replied "That was a particularly 
unfortunate set of circumstances really. The midwives will always blame me for that public naming. 
In fact the media had that story, they came to me with it. When I realized there was the potential for 




























reduced variability which Midwife B considered could be due to the Pethidine but she 
wanted to do a longer tracing and get Ms X sufficiently comfortable to rupture the 
membranes. This would enable her to see the colour of the amniotic fluid. Midwife B 
suggested that Ms X consider an epidural, hoping that this would give Ms X enough relief to 
enable her to lie still so that the membranes could be ruptured. Ms X and her husband took 
time to consider and discuss this option and asked the midwife to first check the cervical 
dilation and progress. Little progress had been made. Ms X asked the midwife to leave 
while they considered an epidural and she eventually agreed to the epidural. The anaesthetist 
was called to the hospital and Ms X was moved to a room where the epidural was placed . 
Initially there was ·Some difficulty in commencing the procedure and this caused a delay. 
Once consent was gained, the anaesthetist sited the epidural. Midwife B assisted getting 
equipment and drugs, assembling infusions and carrying out the close monitoring of the 
maternal blood pressure that always follows the epidural insertion. She attempted to listen 
intermittently to the baby but the epidural was not effective and the distress of Ms X 
continued. It took some time for the anaesthetist to get the epidural working effectively. 
Midwife B assisted and continued to coach Ms X in the interim. Eventually Ms X was able 
to tolerate the midwife rupturing the membranes. The fluid showed worrying signs and the 
midwife immediately called the on-call obstetrician. (There was no 24 hour on site 
obstetrician at that time). There is conflicting evidence on how long he took to arrive but 
during this time the baby's heart tracing deteriorated. Once he arrived, he assessed Ms X and 
discussed whether he would do an instrumental delivery or proceed to caesarean. A 
caesarean was eventually carried out some 40 minutes after his arrival, although later 
evidence was that the hospital should have been able to arrange this sooner. 
The baby was born in a critical condition and although initially seemed to stabilise, 
the baby later deteriorated and was transferred to the base hospital Neonatal Unit. After 
some time the medical team advised that the ventilator would be turned off with the 
expectation that the baby would die. This was done, but the baby did not die. The medical 
team in consultation with the parents, advised that food and fluid should be withheld from the 
baby. The compounding part of this tragedy was that the baby continued to live and he was 

























A complaint against Midwife B was laid by the attending obstetrician immediately 
after the birth. The hospital set in place a careful supervision arrangement negotiated with 
Midwife B, requiring her to be supervised at all times while she was providing midwifery 
care on hospital premises. Midwife B voluntarily told all her clients that she was being 
investigated in a case where a baby had died and gave them the option of changing caregiver. 
Very few did so. 
Midwife B was notified by the Commissioner ofthe complaint on 12 February 1997 
It alleged that Midwife B should have monitored the baby for longer on admission; that she 
did not act soon enough to obtain a longer tracing of the baby's heart; that she delayed for an 
inappropriate time before obtaining an obstetric consultation during the labour and that she 
failed to give Ms X enough information to choose her options.229 The Commissioner advised 
that an investigation had commenced and indicated, that if she found a breach of the Code, 
she might make a report or recommendation on the matter, or might refer the complaint to 
the Director of Proceedings (who would decide whether action before the Complaints 
Review Tribunal or a health professional disciplinary body was warranted). These latter 
options were expressed as alternatives in the notification letter. As requested Midwife B 
provided a statement to the Commissioner and sent copies of the notes. In April of 1997 the 
Commissioner inquired about supervision and the hospital confirmed that a supervisor was 
present at all times during any hospital labour and birth that Midwife B attended. 
During the investigation a large amount of evidence was gathered but the 
Commissioner did not disclose the statements of witnesses, the expert reports, (even though 
unbeknown to Midwife B these were also being shared with the Police230 and ACC for their 
separate investigations), some of the clinical notes, and a number of other documents. The 
229 
230 
There were also complaints about other providers including the hospital but these were later 
dropped. 
Midwife B believed the Police involvement was because of the Coroner's involvement. It 
was only later through the media that Midwife B learned that the Police had considered 
criminal charges for "medical manslaughter". The Police were advised that this was not a 
















Commissioner's Preliminary Opinion was issued on 23 July 1997 and the midwife was given 
a further opportunity to comment. That opinion found that Midwife B had been in breach of 
the Code and the Commissioner indicated that she would send her report to the baby's 
parents, and to various other bodies. The Commissioner requested the midwife to discuss 
with Nursing Council and the New Zealand College of Midwives, whether she should 
continue practicing pending a possible Nursing Council hearing. NZCOM was not the 
appropriate body for the Midwife to be talking with as it had no role in such matters. The 
direction to discuss the case with the Nursing Council was also unusual. The Nursing 
Council had no legal jurisdiction to impose restrictions on a midwife's practice prior to a full 
disciplinary hearing, a finding of professional misconduct and a determination that such 
restrictions were an appropriate penalty. 
The jurisdictional difficulties were confirmed by NZCOM and the Nursing Council 
and the Commissioner was advised of these views. She was also assured that the strict 
supervision arrangements for Midwife B, remained in place. In the Commissioner's response 
regarding this advice, she accepted that there was no power to impel a midwife's suspension 
before hearing and she appeared satisfied with the explanations. The Commissioner wrote to 
Midwife B that, as these matters had been discussed with the recommended bodies, she had 
carried out the recommendations. The Commissioner's Final Opinion was issued on 21 
August 1997. It found Midwife B in breach of four aspects of the Code and advised that a 
case note had been prepared for education purposes. These case notes were always non-
identifying. The Commissioner advised Midwife B that she was referring the complaint case 
to the Director of Proceedings, and that the Director would determine whether disciplinary 
proceedings would be brought before the Nursing Council or whether a claim would be laid 
with the Complaints Review Tribunal. At that stage there appeared to be no urgency from 
the Commissioner. There was certainly no indication that the Commissioner would publicly 
discuss the case or name the midwife. Instead, it seemed that in accordance with her usual 























On 24 September 1997, significant criticism of the Commissioner was expressed in 
Parliament. The question was asked why the Commissioner, having received 1000 
complaints in her first year, had referred none of these to the Medical Council, 231 the 
Nursing Council, the Dental Council or the Pharmaceutical Society. 232 Mr Bill English, then, 
Minister of Health, replied that the Commissioner had advised him that in her opinion all the 
complaints had been dealt with satisfactorily by advocacy and mediation. According to the 
Commissioner, it was up to the Director of Proceedings to decide if further disciplinary 
proceedings were warranted. The question was then asked why no practitioners had been 
taken to the Proceedings Tribunal (the correct name which was then the Complaints Review 
Tribunal). Mr English replied that he had been told by the disciplinary bodies there were 
'some technical problems with the way the legislation allowed for transmission of 
l . ' 233 comp amts. 
The attacks against the Commissioner continued in Select Committee. In October 






The Health and Disability Commissioner's failure to lay any complaint with 
Registration Boards for health professionals - such as the Nursing Council -
in its first year of office was the focus of a strong attack at a parliamentary 
select committee last month ... 234 
"Calder at Large (interviewing Wendy Brandon) "Matters of Life and Death:" New Zealand 
Herald (9 September 2000). Ms Brandon said that the Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary 
Tribunal had previously dealt with about 70 cases a year but in 2000 it dealt with only 5. 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 563 (2- 25 September 1997): 4524, per Ron Bill 
English. Capital Letter 20 TCL 44: 2. 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 563 (2- 25 September 1997): 4524, per Ron Bill 
English. 

























The Commissioner was away from her Office from 6 to 13 October, and was 
reported as saying that during her absence the media approached the office asking about the 
case of Midwife B. The Commissioner later stated that the queries were about the progress of 
the investigation, and that the media wanted a "comment on the case". The Commissioner's 
usual practice was not to comment on individuals. It is important to note that at this point in 
the proceedings, the decision whether the Director of Proceedings was going to lay charges 
against the midwife before the Nursing Council was still pending. The disciplinary process 
was incomplete and arguably the matter was sub-judice. On her return the Commissioner 
apparently reviewed or was advised on the HDCA, and agreed to tape an evening interview 
with National Radio about the case, to be played on National Radio the following morning. 
The Commissioner spoke with the CEO of the hospital where the birth had taken place, 
because she was concerned that following the broadcast, the hospital would be inundated 
with calls. The Commissioner did not speak with Midwife B or inform her that she was 
planning to publicly name her, nor did she give Midwife B an opportunity to make 
submissions on this publicity or to apply for name suppression. 
The taped interview with the Commissioner, was played the next morning at 6am . 
The Commissioner did more than comment on the case: she named the midwife. She also 
retrospectively released the Final Opinion, making it available to everyone. The parents were 
not named and later said that the publicity had taken them by surprise. The Commissioner 
later made several different justifications for the naming of the midwife. These included that 
she was preventing speculation and ensuring the facts were known. 235 The Commissioner 
235 As the debate around the Commissioner's publication of the midwife's name continued, Mrs 
Stent made a number of changing justifications to explain why she had taken this action. 
Among them that other midwives might be under a cloud. Arguably the Commissioner did 
not need to name the midwife and could have just stated that the midwife was practising 
under strict supervision and had told all her clients about the complaint. This possibility was 
noted in a complaint to the Broadcasting Standards Authority, one of four successful 
complaints against the media about the inaccurate reporting about this case. The Authority 
noted the view of the complainant Maternity Consumer Council that that media item 
neglected to mention that all clients from the midwife's practice were informed a case was 
pending against her and that the general public and health professionals did not need the 
protection allegedly provided by the disclosure of her name and identity on national 
























also justified her action on the grounds of public safety. She was said to be concerned that 
Midwife B was still working, although the continuing supervision arrangements were still in 
place, so this concern seemed difficult to justify. Midwife B was also telling the women she 
cared for about the complaint and giving them the choice to have another caregiver. 
During the morning of 15 October 1997 the Commissioner gave a series of interviews 
and made increasingly adverse allegations against Midwife B, among them the untrue and 
extremely damaging statement that the midwife had refused the parents' requests to call a 
doctor for four hours.Z36 Midwife B was unable to respond while proceedings were only 
partially completed.Z37 As the media debate continued commentators challenged the 
236 
237 
Mrs Stent made inaccurate assertions which she did not retract nor publicly correct, despite 
being asked to do so by a lawyer for the midwife. The Commissioner commented that it was 
the most serious midwifery case that she had seen, when in fact it was the only midwifery case 
to have progressed that far through the Commissioner's jurisdiction. A further inaccuracy was 
that the Commissioner blamed the delay in bringing proceedings on the Nursing Council. 
When asked if nothing could be done about the long delay between the Commissioner's 
finding and the Nursing Council sitting in judgement, the Commissioner said on Morning 
Report "Well the Nursing Council sets their own urn times for hearing these things and its 
over to them. You should ask them that question" Morning Report, Item: "Death of a Baby -
Hurt Hospital last year." 15 October 1997. 7.4lam. In fact the Nursing Council was not to 
blame, as it cannot act until the Director of Proceedings actually does lay a charge. At this 
time the midwife had not been notified whether the Director planned to do this and the matter 
was still pending at the Director's office. The Nursing Council had not received a complaint 
and so was unable to do anything. See also National Radio, 15 October 1997, 6am, 9am, 
lOam News Bulletin, where the Nursing Council confirmed that if the Commissioner had 
considered the case to be urgent back in August when the Final Opinion was made, she could 
have asked for it to have been heard. 
Midwife B made a formal complaint to the Privacy Commissioner . Part of her reason for 
doing so was because of the effect of the publicity on the practice for whom the midwife 
worked. The publicity had impacted negatively on the other midwives, who were not 
implicated in the complaint, and on their families. The midwifery practice eventually closed. 
Midwife B considered that the Commissioner acted in bad faith with respect to the 
publication. She argued that the public is never well served by the publication of inaccurate 
and damaging information and that as the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner is 
crucial, both the public and health professionals need to have complete confidence that the 
Commissioner will act fairly and correctly. After an initial reply to the Privacy complaint, 
the Commissioner would not respond to what the Privacy Commissioner described as "valid 
matters". The Commissioner refused to answer any further questions about her actions and 
motivations. The Privacy Commissioner did not accept the Commissioner's argument that 
she was exempt from compliance with Principle 11 of section 7 of the Privacy Act 1993, but 
ultimately without her co-operation in the investigation, the Privacy Commissioner had 
insufficient evidence to conclude the Commissioner had acted in bad faith and he found that 


















Commissioner, arguing that the public naming and condemnation of Midwife B jeopardized 
any possibility of her obtaining a fair hearing should the matter be taken further.238 Despite 
the criticisms, the Commissioner remained defensive, and at least publicly, unrepentant. 
Forbes notes that public knowledge of a serious disciplinary charge often exposes the 
subject to stress, embarrassment and prejudice, if not to immediate professional or financial 
detriment. 239 This was certainly the case for Midwife B.240 The media coverage of Midwife 
B that resulted from the Commissioner's publicity, and the publicity that followed, resulted 
in the midwife being subjected to harassment and unwarranted attention and abuse whenever 
she ventured out from her home.241 
Publicity and the Health and Disabiltity Commissioner Act 
This section will consider whether the Commissioner was entitled to publicly name 





Assignment Programme 34, Cat. No.: Zassi 97-34. 29.10.97. As a result of the publicity the midwife 
voluntarily surrendered her access agreement, after indications that the hospital was coming under 
increasing pressure about her continuing practice. She lost her livelihood and the women she was to 
provide care for, had to find a new midwife. On the morning of the interview, Midwife B described 
herself, her elderly parents and extended family waking to a media furore. As a direct result of the 
Commissioner's publicity, the media laid in wait outside the midwife's home and she was secretly 
filmed. When broadcast, this footage was slowed down and transmitted in a manner that the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority later described as giving "a sinister air" to the footage. They found 
this to be a breach of the midwife's rights. 
Forbes (1990): 99. 
By December 1997 the Commissioner had made an apparent "U turn" and was criticizing doctors who 
went to the media about their dissatisfaction with the Commissioner's process during investigations. 
She lamented their right to ''free speech" while saying she was constrained by fairness and could not 
comment on cases before the outcome is complete. She said "Even at the conclusion [I} have to 
consider the impact on the provider's livelihood, on subsequent proceedings and on the vulnerable 
consumer before making public statements. Stent, R.S. "When the going gets tough." New Zealand 
General Practitioner (16 December 1998). 
In the Annual Report of the Office of the HDC, for the year ending 30 June 1999, the Commissioner 





















Section 14 (d) of the HDCA empowers the Commissioner to publish reports and make 
statements. The relevant subsection states: 
(1) The functions of the Commissioner are as follows: 
(d) To make public statements and publish reports in relation to any 
matter affecting the rights of health consumers or disability services 
consumers or both, including statements and reports that promote an 
understanding of, and compliance, with the Code or the provisions of this 
Act: 
The Commissioner had previously stated that she would not discuss the details of 
individual cases with the media. It had, however, been the practice of the Commissioner to 
publish non-identifying reports and case notes for education purposes. This was in line with 
the practice of the Privacy Commissioner and the Ombudsman. The publishing of such 
reports is a critical and important function of the Commissioner. Such reports provide a 
unique educative opportunity for providers so clinical practice may be improved by taking 
heed of the salient experiences of others. It can also reassure the public that there are 
consequences for poor practice, and that the Office of the Commissioner is fulfilling its 
functions. The issue in this case was not the provision or even the circulation of the report 
about Midwife B and its recommendations. Had that been done at an appropriate time and 
way there would have been no controversy. The issue was that, of all the practitioner's who 
had been subject to the Commissioner's jurisdiction, this one midwife was singled out and 
named. 
Section 45 (b) of the HDCA allowed the Commissioner to report his or her opinion, 
with reasons, together with recommendations (if any) as the Commissioner sees fit, to all or 

















(i) Any purchaser [now repealed] 
(ii) Any health professional body 
(iii) Any other person that the Commissioner considers appropriate 
When the Commissioner sent the Provisional Opinion to Midwife B for comment, the 
Commissioner indicated that a copy of it would be going to the purchaser (Central Regional 
Health Authority), the professional body (the New Zealand College of Midwives), the Chief 
Executive Officer of the hospital, the parents and the Police. Midwife B was able to make 
submissions on this Opinion and the proposed circulation prior to it being finalized in 
August. In the Final Opinion the Commissioner did not state that the Opinion would be sent 
to any other person nor did she state that she at any time intended to publicly name the 
midwife or make adverse comment against her in the media. The possibility of publicity was 
never mentioned. When the Commissioner sent out the Final Opinion to the named bodies, 
she did so with a covering letter stating that the midwife had been advised that a copy of the 
opinion was being sent. The fact that the Commissioner ensured each named body knew the 
midwife had been given notice that they would receive a confidential copy of the Final 
Opinion, makes the lack of notice of the mid October publicity even more surprising. 
In justifying her decision to name Midwife B, the Commissioner at one point cited 
section 65 of the HDCA. This section gives the Commissioner a broad immunity from civil 
or criminal proceedings if it can be proven she acted in good faith. The Commissioner also 
relied heavily on section 59. That latter section states that an investigation under Part IV of 
the HDCA may be conducted in public or private and that: 
( 4) Without limiting any other provision of this Act, the Commissioner may, 
at any time, if the Commissioner considers that it is necessary or desirable in 
the public interest, (whether for reasons of public health or public safety or 
for any other reason), that any matter be brought to the attention of any 
















There are two problems with the Commissioner's reliance on this section. The first is 
that few would consider the media to be an appropriate person or authority in terms of 
addressing any public health or safety issues, if any such issues did exist. The other is that 
section 59 remains subject to section 67. Section 67 states: 
The Commissioner shall not, in any report or recommendation made or published 
under any of [sections}, make any comment that is adverse to any person unless -
(a) That person has been given a reasonable opportunity-
(i) To be heard; and 
(ii) To make a written statement in answer to the adverse comment; and. 
Section 43 of the HDCA also imposes a mandatory requirement on the Commissioner 
to inform the parties of the result of the investigation and what further action (if any) the 
Commissioner proposes to take in respect of that complaint. This section means that before 
making any public comments, the Commissioner was required by law to inform Midwife B 
ofthese further actions. When the Commissioner released her Final Opinion in August 1997, 
she had told Midwife B the names of the bodies to who she would circulate the report and the 
midwife was invited to make submissions, and did so. At that stage the Commissioner had 
clearly identified the proposed recipients of the Final Opinion. The report was sent to them 
and the midwife had been given a right of response. This was appropriate under the Act. 
In mid October, after the conclusion of the Commissioner's investigation and the 
distribution of reports, the Commissioner decided to speak to the media and publicly make 
new, previously unstated adverse comment and to name Midwife B. Under the above two 
sections the Commissioner was required to give Midwife B notice of the further action 
including the reasons why this action was being proposed. Midwife B should also have been 
given the right to make submissions on these decisions and to question why the 
Commissioner was in effect, taking the case back from the Director of Proceedings, and 
taking further action. Failure to give Midwife B notice and failure to provide her with a right 




































The naming and Commissioner's publicity about Midwife B was without precedent. 
The Commissioner could not point to her usual practice or to similar jurisdictions to justify 
what she had done. Many other providers including six general practitioners242 had 
previously been found to have breached the Code and had similarly been referred to the 
Director of Proceedings. Even after some of those providers had been found guilty of 
significant professional misconduct, none were named by the Commissioner or subjected to 
the publicity experienced by this midwife. This is not to say a practitioner found guilty of 
professional misconduct should never be named. Naming by professional bodies can and 
does occur where negligence is significant. The Commissioner should have been aware that 
publication is a frequent accompaniment to a finding of Professional Misconduct under the 
Nurses Act 1977 and has the effect of a further penalty. Nurses and midwives are frequently 
named and a summary of the disciplinary finding is always published in the professional 
journals and often in the media. This is done after a full hearing and after the Council has 
received submissions on publication, without compromising the integrity of the process. 
The shifting grounds of justification for the Commissioner's decision in naming 
Midwife B meant that it was never clear what the Commissioner's motivation had truly 
been. It is possible that Midwife B was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and that 
her case became a critical weapon with which the Commissioner could combat the growing 
criticism of the Office. It is also possible that the Commissioner made a spur of the moment 
decision, which she later regretted but sought to justify. Regardless of the reasons, Midwife 
B paid a high price for this unprecedented and unrepeated publicity by the Commissioner. It 
was as the Commissioner said, all very unfortunate. Fortunately, the Commissioner did not 
h . . . h. 243 treat any ot er practitiOner m t IS manner. 
242 
243 
Stent, R. "Complaints against hospitals itemized by Commissioner" New Zealand Doctor, 
(23 June 1999): 11. 
There was another unfortunate outcome following this action. The Commissioner's treatment 
of this one midwife was perceived as so harsh and so unjust by midwives generally, that the 
Commissioner lost the trust and good will of many within the midwifery profession- a 





























It is notable that when the second Commissioner was asked what he planned to do 
about public naming, Mr Paterson stated that while his investigations are robust, he does not 
have the ability to cross examine so there are not the same protections for practitioners in 
the HDCA process, as in a formal hearing. He stated that he does not believe the 
Commissioner should be "hanging someone out to dry" before they have had a chance to 
put their case to a formal hearing. He believed naming practitioners was a function of the 
disciplinary bodies and the Courts. 244 
244 St, John, Penny. "Power sought over recalcitrant medics." New Zealand Doctor (28 February 2001). In 
New Zealand Doctor (24 May 2000) Ron Paterson is quoted as saying that he would rather not deal 
with complaints in the media and he will be very reluctant to name providers in public. Opinions will 
be published through the normal channels, but Mr Paterson believes that naming providers should be 
a last resort and probably a function of disciplinary bodies or the Courts. He made a similar comment 
in another publication saying "It is not my practice to publicly name registered health professionals 
found in breach of the Code." "Complaints to the Commissioner" New Zealand General Practitioner, 























CHAPTER NINE- CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of publication ends this consideration of the process of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner. The role of the Director of Proceedings is beyond the scope of this 
thesis . 
We have considered that it is unfortunately true that health providers in the past have 
shown themselves to be largely protectionist and self-interested when it comes to 
identification and sanction of practitioners who fall below reasonable standards. This makes 
the need for an independent officer critical. There will always be a need for someone who 
can be both a watchdog and a voice for those who are harmed while accessing health and 
disability services. Following the "Cartwright Inquiry", successive New Zealand 
governments legislated to establish the office of the Health and Disability Commissioner. 
This Commissioner was to develop a Code of Rights, to act as guardian and protector of 
those rights, to provide an independent voice for consumers, and to receive and process 
complaints from health and disability consumers. Under the HDCA the Commissioner was 
required to ensure that complaints were resolved fairly, simply, and efficiently. 
The first Commissioner was hampered by a huge task, a small team, a constant and 
unexpected influx of complaints and a limited understanding of procedural fairness. As a 
result, many of the processes and decisions within the Office were open to criticism. 
Fundamental protections were not in place or were overlooked. This led to serious concerns 
among the health professionals subject to investigations and to those trying to defend them. 
There was a very clear perception that the process was not fair and as a result practitioners 


























This thesis considered in some detail the legal concept of natural justice and the 
importance of fair and just procedures. Under the first Commissioner, these principles were 
often breached and not given effect. We analysed the HDCA and legal precedents and 
determined that the Commissioner was required to act in accord with the principles of 
natural justice. In order to consider what this meant in practice, we followed through each 
section of the HDCA and considered whether in some midwifery cases, the midwife had 
been accorded natural justice. We found that there were substantial and continuing 
shortcomings; such as the failure to give adequate notice; the failure to provide sufficient 
particulars; and the failure to disclose key and adverse reports and evidence, thus hampering 
the midwife's ability to make a defense. These failures caused midwives to lose faith in the 
objectivity of the Commissioner and in the accuracy of the opinions generated. 
At the same time, the number of complaints was escalating, and the staff came under 
increasing pressure to process complaints and in addition to deal with large, time consuming 
Inquiries such as the Canterbury Health Enquiry. Long delays in resolving complaints 
became common and caused further stress to complainants and respondents, and led to 
criticism of the Commissioner by parties to complaints and by parliament. By naming 
Midwife B, the Commissioner appeared to want to assure her critics that she was rigorously 
prosecuting health professionals. This naming gave the Commissioner a great deal of 
publicity as the public debated the rights and wrongs of her decision, but it ultimately led to 
increased fear and anxiety amongst health professionals and a reluctance to co-operate with 
HDCA investigations. 
A number of salutary lessons can be learned from the term of the first Commissioner, 
amongst them the importance of fair procedures- of being fair and being seen as fair. It is 
one thing to call for openness and transparency, and for sanction and redress, but it is another 
to act in a manner that achieves this in a consistently even-handed manner and in accord with 
the principles of natural justice. The underlying tenets of the Office are promotion and 
protection but neither aim can be achieved without respect and "good will" from both 




























The biggest issue facing the Commissioner during these years was the need to attract 
the confidence of the consumers, practitioners and government. Unfortunately much of the 
good work that was being done by hardworking staff was eclipsed because of the lack of 
commitment to open and fair processes. The Royal Commission on Arthur Allen Thomas 
Thomas J. made the following comment and it sums up the important principle. 
It is trite to say, but perhaps it needs to be said again, that to maintain public 
confidence in any kind of adjudication, justice must be seen to be done. While 
we have accepted that inquisitorial tribunals, such as this commission are not 
subject to quite the same strict responsibilities as courts, it is obvious that they 
should be scrupulous to avoid any appearance of real unfairness. 245 
What is particularly notable is the attitude of providers found in breach of the Code. 
There has been a full circle. Originally midwives supported the right of women to complain 
and they were not threatened when such complaints occurred. However the years of delay in 
awaiting a decision, took a huge toll on both the midwives and the complainants. Once 
Midwife B was named, midwives worried that they would also be named. The unfair manner 
in which this was done, caused midwives to fear the Commissioner and to view her processes 
as arbitrary and unjust. Since the appointment of the second Commissioner there has been a 
"coming of age" of the Office and the perception of unfairness has lifted. The mediation, 
investigation and decision making processes have been well tested and can be relied on. 
There has been the development of objectivity and expertise among the staff, and there has 
been frequent and ongoing consultation between the branches of advocacy and investigation 
and the various stake-holders. This has led to a quiet confidence amongst providers and a 
greater willingness to enter fully into the process of investigation and response. Many now 
accept the finding, and try to learn from the complaint and change and improve their 
practice. This is far more positive than having practitioners feeling defensive, aggrieved and 
badly treated due to fundamental procedural shortcomings. 
























There is certainly reason for optimism but the primary reason for this thesis is 
reflection. It is critical that as Commissioners are appointed and serve their term, there is 
constant striving for better processes. Each must learn from the early, difficult years of the 
Office and the mistakes that were made and ensure they are not repeated. If these lessons 
are learned then people will be able to come confidently to the Commissioner with the 
assurance that their fears and concerns will be treated sensitively and their privacy will be 
protected. They will know that during mediation and investigation, interviews and hearings, 
regardless of their individual shortcomings, they will be treated fairly and that at all times 
the principles of natural justice will be honoured and given effect. For it is when individuals 
recognize that the Office is acting in a 'good' way and producing 'good results" that parties 
will be willing to participate in the HDCA's primary objective which is improve the 
standard and delivery ofhealth care. 
By the time I completed this work many of the early difficulties faced by midwives 
had become historical. A great number of improvements have taken place over the 
subsequent years and these came about due to dedicated HDC Office staff who had 
developed skill and expertise in their work, and a new Commissioner committed to fair and 
just procedures. I therefore based my conclusions solely on what had happened in the early 
years and refrained from the recommendations that I might have made, had this work been 
finished earlier. My ultimate finding was that my concerns had been valid and that both the 
HDCA and the common law required the Commissioner to act in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice and that in the early processes of the Office, there had been 





















Acts of Parliament 
NZ 
The Accident Compensation Act 1972 
The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 
The Health and Disability Services Act 1993 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Public Health and Disability Act 2000, 
The Nurses Act 1977 
The Accident Rehabilitation, Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
UK 
The Hospital Complaints Procedures Act 1985. 
The National Health Service Reorganization Act 1973 
The National Health Service Act 1977 























Articles and Newspaper Citations 
"Amputee Services complaint upheld." Dominion, (Wellington) 29 January 2000. 
Barnes, D.B.; Taylor-Brown, S. and Wiener, L. "I Didn't LeaveY' All on Purpose": HIV-
Infected Mothers' Videotaped Legacies for Their Children. Qualitative Sociology, 20, 1, 
(1997): 7. 
Boland, Mary Jane. "The Politics ofHealth." Evening Post, (Wellington) 10 July 1999. 
Campbell, Duncan. "Why medicine needs its M15." British Medical Journal, 315 (1995): 
1677. 
Calder at Large. "Matters of Life and death." New Zealand Herald, (Auckland) 9 September 
2000, p.2. 
Chisholm, Donna. "Stent bows out bullied but unbeaten." Sunday Star Times, (Auckland) 11 
July 1999, C3. 
Coney, Sandra. "Why are we waiting- the fate of the health commissioner?" Paper given at 
the National Medico-Legal Conference, (Auckland) 19August 1992. 
Coney, Sandra and Bunkie, Phillida. "The Unfortunate experiment at National Women's 
Hospital." Metro. (June 1987): 46. 
Ferriman, A. ''NHS Ombudsman will name doctors who don't accept rulings." British 
Medical Journal, 316 (1996): 1646. 
Claire Guyon, "Third mum complains over midwife care" Evening Post, (Wellington) 3 
April 1998. 
Claire Guyan, "Midwife's care not adequate- report." Evening Post, (Wellington) 2 
November 1999. 
Harre' L. "Has the sun gone down on New Zealand Health Reforms?" Paper given at the 
Experience Conference on Health Reforms, (Norway) 8 September 2003. 
Josefson, D. "Patients may gain access to doctor's disciplinary data." British Medical 
Journal, 321 (2001): 587 . 
Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law." 
Public Law, (1987): 368. 
























MacDonald, J. "Judicial Review and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law." McGill 
Law Journal, 26 (1980-81):119. 
McElrea, Richard. "Hospital Deaths in New Zealand - A Coroner's Perspective." Paper 
presented to the Australian Coroner's Society Conference, (Brisbane) 2000. 
McLoughlin, David. "Face to face with Robyn Stent." North & South, (February 2000): 98. 
Medico-Political Digest. British Medical Journal, 313 (1996): 23. 
Murray, T. "what do we mean by "narrative ethics"? Medical Humanities Review, 11 (2) 
(1997). 
Newth, Kim. "Stent fails to keep promises." Sunday Star Times, (Wellington) 27 February 
2000. 
Oswald, Richard. "A job for strife." Health Service Journal, (8 October 1998). 
Paterson, Ron. HDC Media Release, "Commissioner apologies for investigation delays." (13 
September 2000). 
Paterson, Ron. "Notes from the first year." Women's Health Watch, (September 2000): 8. 
Paterson, Ron. "Complaints to the Commissioner." New Zealand General Practitioner, (7 
March 2001). 
Paterson, Ron. "The Health and Disability Commissioner." Paper presented to the IIR 9th 
Annual Medico-Legal Conference, New Zealand Law Journal, (July 2001): 224. 
Phipps, Gaelene. "Reflecting on the last year the good and the bad." New Zealand Doctor, 
( 21 January 1998) : 28. 
Phipps, Gaelene. "Lack of transparency in doctor's suspension." New Zealand Doctor, (28 
February 2001): 25. 
Mcintyre, K.R. and Popper, W:N. "The Critical Attitude in Medicine: the need for a new 
ethic." British Medical Journal, 287: 1919. 
Rankine, Jenny. "Experimenting on women." Broadsheet, (1987) 152: 9. 
Roach, Jason. "Management blamed over consultant's malpractice." British Medical Journal, 
320 (2000): 1517 . 
Rosier, P. "Screening the doctors." Broadsheet, 152 (1987) :6. 




























St, John, Penny. "Power sought over recalcitrant medics." New Zealand Doctor, (28 
February 2001). 
Safriet, Barbara. "Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health Care Providers' Scopes 
ofPractice: A Primer for Policymakers." Yale Journal on Regulation, 19 (2002): 301-333 
Skegg, P.D.G. "Criminal Prosecutions ofHealth Professionals" Medical Law Review, 6, 
(Summer 1998): 220-246. 
Stent, R.S. "Justice Tipping's judgement -the first major test of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner." Paper presented to the Health and Disability Commissioner Issues 
Conference, (23 March 1998). 
Stent, R.S. "When the going gets tough." New Zealand General Practitioner, (16 December 
1998) 
Stent, R.S. "Complaints against hospital itemised by the Commissioner." New Zealand 
Doctor (23 June 1999). 
Stent, ~.S. "The Perils of Simple Assumption." New Zealand General Practitioner, ( 25 
August 1999): 13. 
Stuart, Julia. "Anderton unhappy about Stent delays." New Zealand General Practitioner. (2 
June 1999) 
Symon,Andrew. "Litigation and changes in professional behaviour: a qualitative appraisal." 
Midwifery, 16 (2000):15. 
Warden, John. "Ombudsman plans to locate blame in complaint cases." British Medical 
Journal, 312 (1996):10. 
Warden, John. "Ombudsman Highlights Confusion Over Long-Term Care." British Medical 
Journal, 313 (1996) 
Wilson, R.M. "The Quality of Australian Health Care Study". Medical Journal of Australia . 
163 (1995): 458-471. 
Wu, Albert. "Medical Error : the second victim - the doctor who makes the mistake needs 
help too." British Medical Journal, 320 (2000): 726. 
Yamey, Gavin. "Report condemns NHS complaints procedure." British Medical Journal, 
319 (1999):1764. 
Y ee, Bevan, Enhancing Security: A Grounded Theory of Chinese Survival in New Zealand, 

























Aronson, M. and Dyer, B. Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Pyrmont: LBC 
Information Services, 2000. 
Beauchamp, T.L. and Childress, J.F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. (4th ed). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Blaxter, L., Hughes, C., and Tight, M. How to research. (2nd ed). Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2001. 
Brazier, M. Medicine, Patients and the Law. (New ed.) London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1992. 
Bunkie, Phillida. Second Opinion -The Politics of Women's Health in New Zealand 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Campbell, A. Charlesworth, M. Gillett, G. and Jones, G. Medical Ethics. (2nd ed) 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Craig, P.P. Administrative Law. (3rd ed) London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994. 
De Smith, Woolf & Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1995. 
Donley, Joan. Save the Midwife. Auckland: New Women's Press, 1986. 
Edwards, Anne and Talbot, Robin. The Hard- pressed Researcher. (2nd ed.) Edinburgh: 
Pearson Education Ltd, 1999. 
Flick, G.A. Natural Justice- Principles and Practical Application. Sydney: Butterworth's 
Practical Law Series, 1978. 
Forbes, I.R.S. Disciplinary Tribunals. Sydney: The Law Book Co., 1990 . 
Forbes, J.R.S Disciplinary Tribunals. (2nd ed) Sydney: The Federation Press, 1996, 
Galligan, D.J. Due Process and Fair Procedure. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997. 
Hewitt, D.J. Natural Justice. Sydney: Butterworths, 1972. 
























Johnstone, Megan. Bioethics: A Nursing Perspective. Marrickville: W.B. Saunders/Balliere 
Tindall, 1989. · 
Jones, B.L. Garner's Administrative Law. (ih ed.) London: Butterworths, 1989. 
Lens, P. and VanDerWal, G. Problem doctors- a conspiracy of silence. Amsterdam: lOS 
Press, 1997. 
Lord MacKay of Clashfem (Editor in Chief) Halsbury 'sLaws of England (4th edition 
Reissue) Vol17 (1) London: Butterworth's LexisNexis, 2002. 
Moore, Nick. How To Do Research. London: The Library Association, 1983. 
Nussbaum, M. "Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical Theory." Chapter in 
Love's Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Oakley, A. Essays on Woman, Medicine and Health. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1993. 
Paterson, D.E. Introduction to Administrative Law. Wellington: Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) 
Ltd, 1967. 
Phillips, Andrew F. Medical Negligence Law: Seeking a Balance. Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishers, 1999. 
Plueckhahn, V., Breen, K., and Corder, S. (eds) Law and Ethics in Medicine for Doctors in 
Victoria. Melbourne: Under the Auspices of the Professional Practice Programme, 1994. 
Shaw, M.A. Due Process and the Administrative State. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994. 
Sproull, Natalie. Handbook of Research Methods. (2nd ed.) Maryland: The Scarecrow Press 
Ltd, 2002. 
StGeorge, Ian (ed.) Cole's Medical Practice in New Zealand. Wellington: The Medical 
Council ofNew Zealand, 2001. 
Strauss, A.L. and Corbin, J. Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory and procedures 
and techniques. London: Sage Publications, 1990. 
Trochim, William. The Research Methods Knowledge Base. (2nd ed). Cincinnati: Atomic 
Dog Publishing, 2001. 

























WDLS Tribunals Committee, Administrative Tribunals Handbook. (2nd ed) Wellington: 
Butterworths, 1996. 
Weinberg, Darin. Qualitative Research Methods. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002. 
Weinrib, E.J. "Towards a Moral Theory ofNegligence Law." In Justice, Rights and Tort 
Law, edited by M. Bayles and B. Chapman. Dordrecht: D. Rreidel Publishing Company, 
1983. 
Whyatt, Sir John. The Citizen and the Administration - the Redress of Grievances. London: 
Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1961. 
Cases 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223. 2 AllER 
680 (CA) 
Auckland Boxing Association v. NZ Boxing Association Inc. HC, Auckland, HC 8 May 2001, 
M 1993-SWOO 
Auckland City Council v. NZ Fire Service. [1996] 1 NZLR 330. 
Ayres v.Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand (1901) 20 NZLR 
Brinkley v. Brinkley [1965] P. 75. 
Byrne v. Kinematograph Renter's Society [1958] 2 AllER 579. 
Cock & Others v Attorney General. (CA)[NZLR] 1909, Vol xxviii, 505. 
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
Director of Proceedings v. Nealie [1999] 3 NZLR 603. 
Duncan v. Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary Tribunal [1986] 1 NZLR, 513.(CA). 
Durayappah v. Fernando. [1967] AC 337. 
Escobar v. Spindaleri (1987) 7 NSWLR 51. 
Ex parte Edelsten v Health Insurance Commission (1990) 96 Admin. LR 673. 
Freedman v. Petty and Greyhound Racing Control Board [1981] V.R. 1001. 
Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board [1973] AC 660. 
Gurusinghe v. Medical Council ofNew Zealand, [1989] 1 NZLR 139. 
Herron v. AGfor NSW(1987) 8 NSWLR 601. 
K v The Psychologists Board (HC) Wellington, CP 59/98, 10 December 1998. 
Kanda v. Government of Malaysia [1962] AC 322 . 
Koai v. West (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
Lewis v. He.ffer [1987] 1 WLR 1061. 
Mcinnes v. Onslow Fare [1978] 1 WLR 1520. 
McCarthy v. Grant (1959) NZLR 1014. 
Macksville District Hospital v. Mayse (1987) 10 NSWLR 700 
Mahon v. ANZ [1984] AC 808. 
Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 15 
Malone v. Marr [1981] 2 NSWLR 894. 
Martin v. CEO of the Department of Labour, (HC) Auckland, 113 - 98, 4 November 1998. 






























Medical Practitioner's Disciplinary Tribunal v. E,. 31-98- 18D, 3- 7 April1998. 
Nealie v. Director of Proceedings of the Health Disability Commissioner, DC, 
Auckland, NP 2653 -98, 12 February 1999. 
NZAirline Pilots Association v T.A.IC. (HC) Wellington, CP 180/96, 23 July1996. 
Nicholls v Health and Disability Commissioner [1997] NZAR, 351: 364. 
Pear/berg v. Varty [1972] 1 WLR 534. 
Phipps v Royal Australasian College of Surgeons [1997] 2 NZLR 518, [2000] 2 NZLR, 513. 
Prasad v. Min. for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155. 
R v. Architect's Registration Tribunal Ex parte Jaggar [1945] 2 AllER, 131. 
R v. Ealing Magistrate's Court, Ex parte Fannerman [1996] 8 Admin. LR 351. 
R v. Eating Magistrate 's Court, Ex parte P olemis. [ 197 4] 1 WLR, 13 7. 
R v Deputy of Industrial Injuries Commission Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456- 490 
R v The War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 28, 228. 
R. v. Westminster Assessment Committee, Ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd, [1940] 
4 AllER, 132. 
Redel iff Estates Ltd v. Enberg and A nor. HC, Christchurch, M 150 -99, 27 July 1999. 
Re: Erebus Royal Commission (No.2) [1981] 1 NZLR 618 
Re: Erebus Royal Commission: ANZv Mahon P.C. [1983] NZLR 662. 
R v Ministry of Defence Ex parte Smith [1995] 4 AllER 427 
Re: Royal Commission on Thomas Case 1 NZLR [1982] 252 
Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex parte Doody. [1994] 1 AC 531. 
Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 1 QB 539. 
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v. Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR, 618, [2000] 2 NZLR 513. 
Rees v. Crane [1994] 2 AC 173. 
Shareefv. Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents [1966] 47. 
Sloan v. General Medical Council [1970] 1 WLR 1130. 
Staite v. Psychologist's Board 11 PRNZ 4. 
Wentworth v. NSW Bar Association [1992]172 CLR, 39. 
































•• . . 
<} 
~ .. 





Bristol :A Report of the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary. 1984-1994. Command Paper CM 5207. Crown Publisher, July 2001 
Buckley, Michael The Annual Report of the Health Service Ombudsman for all England, 
Scotland and Wales, London: Government Printer, 1997-8 . 
Cartwright, Judge S.R. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into allegations concerning 
the treatment of cervical cancer at National Women's Hospital and into 
other related matters. Auckland: Government Printing Office, 1998. 
Christchurch Hospital Medical Staff Association, Systems Failures Threatening Patient 
Safety at Christchurch Hospital. ("Patients Are Dying" Report), December 1996. 
Orr, G.S. Report on Administrative Justice in New Zealand. Wellington, R.E. Owen, 
Government Printer, 1964. 
Paterson, Ron. "Gisborne Hospital: 1999- 2000," A Report by the Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Auckland : March 2000. 
Paterson, Ron. "Southland District Health Board Mental Health Services Report," A Report 
by the Health and Disability Commissioner, Auckland : October 2002 . 
The Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner- Te ToihauHauoraHauatanga, for 
the year ending 30 June 1998, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 
16 ofthe Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
The Report of the Health and Disability Commissioner- Te ToihauHauoraHauatanga, for 
the year ending 30 June 1999, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 
16 ofthe Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
Venn ell, M.A. A Report on the Health Commissioner's Bill and proposed Medical 































APPENDIX A- OTHER CASE EXAMPLES 
In Case 97HDC5326NG it was alleged that the midwife (whom we will refer to as 
Midwife A) did not respond to a patient concern in a timely manner. The situation was one of 
shared-care where Midwife A had worked closely with the general practitioner ("GP") of the 
woman (who we will call Ms Z) and a mentor midwife during the pregnancy. As well as her 
GP and midwife, Ms Z saw an obstetrician because of past difficulties with an earlier 
pregnancy. Ms Z's child was recovering from vomiting and diarrhoea having suffered a 
stomach bug, when Ms Z developed similar symptoms. She left a pager message for 
Midwife A to phone her. While waiting for a reply, Ms Z phoned a GP, at what the 
Commissioner described as an after-hours clinic. (The "GP" was apparently the locum 
covering forMs Z's GP). Ms Z described her symptoms over the phone to this doctor. He is 
reported to have asked Ms Z about vaginal loss and of then telling her to take Panadol. He 
did not seeMs Z nor warn her of the risk of premature labour. Nor is he reported to have 
advised her to phone back if things did not settle, or worsened. 
Soon after this Midwife A phoned, and Ms Z informed her that she had 'phoned the 
doctor' and he had advised taking Panadol. Ms Z asked Midwife A if she thought that it was 
safe to take the Panadol in pregnancy. Upon hearing that Ms Z had spoken to the doctor and 
been advised by him, the midwife reassured her about the safety of Panadol. They then 
discussed the symptoms in some detail. Midwife A concluded from their discussion that Ms 
Z was not in labour, but advised that she should ring back if she was worried or experienced 
regular pain. There was documentation ofthat discussion and of the midwife's advice. 
Ms Z was then able to sleep on and off until the next morning. She experienced 
worsening pain at 9.45am and phoned Midwife A who advised immediate assessment at the 
hospital. On arrival at hospital Ms Z was found to be in premature labour and the baby was 




























A complaint was lodged with the Commissioner although the midwife was unaware 
who had lodged this. An investigation was undertaken and the advice of an expert midwife 
was obtained. The Commissioner accepted that there had been a lengthy telephone 
conversation where Midwife A had carefully questioned Ms Z and established that she was 
not in labour the night before the hospital admission. The Commissioner however found that 
Midwife A had breached of Right 5 (1) of the Code (which deals with effective 
communication) because she had made an assumption that when Ms Z told her she had 
phoned and spoken to the doctor, she had spoken to the shared care GP, (when in fact she had 
spoken with the, GP's locum, who the Commissioner described as an after hours doctor) The 
Commissioner found this was a genuine and understandable mistake but it was still a breach. 
The Commissioner also found the midwife in breach of Right 6 (1) (which provides a 
consumer with the right to receive information about their condition), because although Ms 
Z primary concern was the safety of taking Panadol, Midwife A did not specifically inform 
Ms Z of the possibility of diarrhoea triggering premature labour. The Commissioner 
accepted that Midwife A had instructed Ms Z to ring back if the pains increased or worsened. 
The Commissioner also concluded that she could not determine when the premature labour 
had actually started nor if anything would have changed the outcome.246 
Ms Z had also told the GP about the pain and diarrhoea and he advised her to take 
Panadol. He did not inform her that diarrhoea could trigger a premature labour. Despite his 
making the same omission as Midwife A, there is no record in the decision of the GP being 
investigated or of being found in breach of any of Ms Z's Rights. This failure is surprising 
given under the Code, each practitioner has an individual responsibility to provide accurate 
and appropriate information to health consumers. 
This case may be compared to Case 97HDC6141 where a GP failed to diagnose an 
ectopic pregnancy. This is a pregnancy where implantation occurs in the fallopian tube 
246 The Commissioner then used this midwifery case in an article for GP's where although she was critical 
of the midwife and her advice, was not critical of the GP providing the same or less advice. Stent, R.S. 


























rather than in the uterus and it can be life threatening should the tube rupture. A pregnant 
woman who we will call Ms Y. had a pregnancy history of two abortions and a miscarriage. 
Ms Y went to her GP with a history of old vaginal bleeding. The GP reassured her that this 
was normal but as Ms Y was worried about the blood loss and the status of her pregnancy, 
the GP arranged an ultrasound scan. The radiologist who did the scan said there were no 
signs of pregnancy and that it was likely Ms Y had miscarried. Ms Y asked the radiologist 
about the possibility of an ectopic pregnancy and was advised that the tubes seemed clear but 
that she should have another pregnancy test. Ms Y returned to her GP with the scan results 
and a letter from the radiologist. The GP confirmed that there had been a miscarriage. Six 
days later Ms Y returned to her GP with lower abdominal cramps, sweating, pain and nearly 
fainting when trying to stand. The GP, apparently without a further scan, diagnosed retained 
products of conception. She prescribed antibiotics and queried the need for a dilatation and 
curettage of Ms Y's uterus, if the medicine didn't help. After a further six days, the pain 
recurred. Ms Y attended an Accident and Emergency department where she was diagnosed as 
being pregnant and having internal bleeding from a ruptured fallopian tube. 
A complaint was laid about the GP and the Commissioner investigated. In her Report 
she complimented the GP on the high standard of care at the initial visit and found that 
(despite the radiologist's advice), there was no reason for a pregnancy test after the scan. She 
did consider a pregnancy test should have been done when Ms Y returned 6 days later. As a 
result of that omission the GP was found to have breached Right 4 (2), (which provides the 
right to have services provided that comply with legal, professional, ethical and other 
relevant standards). However the Commissioner, softened her finding against the GP, by 
stating that she had been told by her advisor that ectopic pregnancy is extremely difficult to 
diagnose and manage. 
In defense the GP had stated that the radiologist did not communicate to her the 
possibility of an ectopic pregnancy, the limitations of the ultrasound scan in detecting these 
pregnancies, nor the requirement for a repeat pregnancy test. Despite these allegations of 
poor communication between the GP and radiologist about the scan, and what was described 





























of the Commissioner requiring clearer communication between radiologists, consumers, and 
GPs, the Commissioner advised that radiologists should consider using a disclaimer to 
protect themselves from later criticism. This encouragement to use defensive practice as a 
means of protection - instead of requiring better communication or documentation between 
providers including radiologists - seemed out of step with the underlying philosophy of the 
Code. 
There are fundamental differences in the way that these two cases were dealt with. 
The first was the higher priority given to the GP case. While the midwifery complaint was 
received on 16 April 1997 and completed on 12 October 1998, the GP complaint was 
received on 17 June 1997 and completed by 30 November 1997, almost a year before the 
earlier midwifery complaint. In the both cases the Commissioner relied on the advice of 
independent experts about the reasonableness of the care, but the tenor of the 
Commissioner's opinion was generally far more supportive in the case of the GP. In both 
cases there was arguably poor communication from other providers. But neither the locum 
GP in the first case (who was required by contract to communicate with midwife when 
seeing a pregnant consumer and who did not), nor the radiologist in the second case were 
found in breach of the Code. This was particularly surprising in the midwifery case where 
the GP omitted to advise Ms Z on the possibility of diarrhoea triggering premature labour. 
The same omission, for which Midwife A was found to have breached Right 6(1). The 
Commissioner did not accept the midwife's evidence that the GP was acting as locum for the 
shared care doctor and had taken on a duty of care for that practitioner's maternity clients. 
Instead the opinion persists in describing his role only in terms of an apparently random 
'after-hours clinic' doctor. 
Case 97HDC9767/JW illustrates a number of procedural shortcomings. It was a case 




























minimal involvement but she was subjected to a long, questionable investigation process?47 
Midwife C 
The complainant who we will call Ms Y became pregnant for the third time at 39 
years of age and she requested midwifery care at around 20 weeks of pregnancy. Prior to that 
she was under the care of a GP. Midwife C was the primary midwife caring forMs Y and 
she was supported by two colleagues, Midwife B and Midwife D who were available for 
back up. These latter two midwives had small, superficial roles in the care of Ms C. During 
one visit with Midwife C, Ms Y reported that three days earlier her baby had had a quiet 
movement period for a short time, but that the movements had been normal following that 
time. The baby's movements were discussed and assessed, and the baby's heart-beat was 
heard and all seemed well. 
Later in the pregnancy, Midwife B, had a visit with Ms Y. (It was usual for each 
midwife to visit and give the mother an opportunity to meet them prior to the birth). Midwife 
B also discussed the baby's movements, which were normal, and while palpating Ms Y' s 
abdomen to determine the baby's position, she felt the baby moving beneath her hands. This 
was documented. Midwife B questioned the position of the baby and arranged a scan. Later 
that day she informed the primary caregiver, Midwife C, that she had done this. When Ms Y 
attended the hospital for the scan, it showed the baby was in a head-down position and was 
smaller than average. The scan report gave conflicting advice about the amount of amniotic 
fluid present. It was either normal or slightly reduced. The report was sent to Midwife C 
who spoke to Ms Y about the scan. Midwife C advised that, although there was nothing in 
the scan to indicate the situation was urgent, she felt that Ms Y should see a specialist. 
Midwife C phoned for an appointment with a specialist but he had been away and the earliest 
247 The primary complaint was actually against the Midwife C 97HDC9767/JW and Midwife B had a 
minor role. However Midwife B was being investigated in the case discussed in chapter nine. That 
was to be a critical 'test case' for the Commissioner and part way through those proceedings the 
Commissioner's embarked on an unprecedented publicity campaign related to Midwife B's 


























appointment with him was in 10 days time. Midwife C initially accepted this appointment 
but on reflection rang back and managed to get an earlier appointment with him for the 
Monday, in a week's time. Over the weekend before the appointment, a family member 
asked Ms Y about her baby's movements. Ms Y realized that she had not been feeling her 
baby move for some time. Midwife C was away, so she phoned Midwife B and told her 
about the lack of movements. When Midwife B received this call she was out of the 
immediate area, but was immediately concerned. She knew that the other back up midwife 
was at home and could assess Ms Y sooner than Midwife B could get back to Ms Y' s home. 
Midwife D was contacted and arranged to meet and assess Ms Y at the hospital. Sadly her 
baby was later found to have died in-utero some days before. This occurred in June 1997 but 
no complaint was laid at that stage. 
The Commissioner went public about Midwife B's other case in October 1997. (see 
Chapter Nine) In November 1997 Midwife B received a letter notifying her that a 
complaint had been received from Ms Y.248 The midwife and her colleagues requested 
mediation and resolution. The Commissioner commenced an investigation. A concern for 
the midwives throughout the interviews and in the opinions, was the persistence of the 
Commissioner, against clinical and documented evidence, in describing this as a situation of 
longstanding reduced movements?49 The midwives did not receive the Commissioner's 
Provisional Opinion until around 19 July 1999. (It must be emphasized that a Provisional 
Opinion is always preliminary and is frequently modified when further evidence is adduced). 
This opinion showed that the Commissioner had taken advice from 'an' independent midwife 
and she had made preliminary findings on the basis of this advice. The midwives also wanted 
to know who the expert midwife had been, and what she had said about their care. The 
Commissioner had also had expert advice on the scan arranged by Midwife B. No 
responsibility had been placed on the radiologist for the internal inconsistencies in the report 




The midwives also had to respond to an ACC claim alleging medical error but this was claim 




























When the Provisional Opinion was sent to Midwife C for comment, it contained 
several issues that were completely new to the midwives" It also had extensive 
recommendations, (see 97- 98). Midwife C made an extensive reply. The Final Opinion was 
dated 14 October 1999 and the Commissioner upheld several breaches of the Code against 
Midwife C and referred the matter to the Director of Proceedings. The Final Opinion also 
included new information which the midwives had not seen before nor been given an 
opportunity to comment on. When this occurred in the Provisional Opinion, the midwives 
provided further information and the Commissioner modified her Provisional Opinion.250 
When new information was placed in the Final Opinion, the midwives had no opportunity to 
answer this prior to the Final Opinion being released and circulated" 
In the Final Opinion the Commissioner found that Midwife C had breached Right 4 
(2) because she failed to show sufficient concern about the [ambiguous] scan and that she 
should have sought urgent referral to an obstetrician" There was a finding of a breach of 
Right 4 (5) because the Commissioner considered that the midwife's failure to organize an 
earlier specialist appointment, demonstrated a lack of co-operation to ensure appropriate 
care. She felt that Midwife should have arranged for another specialist to seeMs Y. There 
was also a finding of breach of Right 6(1), and while the Commissioner accepted that 
Midwife C had advised Ms Y to monitor her baby's movements and report any concerns, she 
felt that this advice was insufficient when the baby was small for dates (even though it was 
later disclosed that in at least one expert's opinion the small size was marginal)" The 
Commissioner felt that because of these breaches of the Code, Ms Y had not been able to 
make informed choices. 
The case with respect to Midwife C was referred to the Director of Proceedings. The 
Director quickly recognized that the issue was not one of prolonged reduced movements. 
Midwife C exercised her right to be heard and attended an interview with the Director. The 
250 The Commissioner had held the midwives responsible for not discussing the possibility of 
amniocentesis with Ms C but this test can only be done early in the pregnancy. During that timeframe 





























midwife then discovered that the Commissioner had contracted two expert opinions. The 
second after the midwives had made their final submissions and just before the Final 
Opinion was completed. As indicated in the earlier discussion of the case law surrounding 
disclosure of key documents, the failure to disclose these reports was totally inappropriate 
and a breach of natural justice. The Director acknowledged that the midwives had not been 
given the right to see or comment upon the expert reports, and that other matters had also not 
been properly put to Midwife C. She therefore gave Midwife C an opportunity to make 
submissions on these additional matters and on the contents of both expert opinions. After 
additional expert midwifery advice the Director notified Midwife C on 11 December 2000, 
that she was taking no further action. This was three and a half years after the baby's 
stillbirth. 
Let us now consider this same complaint and investigation as experienced by 
Midwife B. 
Midwife B 
The aspect of the complaint relating to the care provided by Midwife B could have 
been expeditiously resolved. It is difficult to understand why this part of the complaint was 
not referred immediately for mediation, or why the case against her was not quickly closed. 
Following the Commissioner's investigation into the complaint of Ms Y, the Commissioner 
issued a Provisional Opinion about Midwife B's care. Due to the new issues arising in this 
Opinion, Midwife B requested a copy of Ms Y' s letter of complaint. The Commissioner 
advised that there had not actually been a written complaint but that a verbal complaint had 
arisen during a phone conversation between Ms Y and the Commissioner on 7 November 
1997. (This was very soon after the Commissioner's initial publicity against Midwife B). Ms 
Y' s primary complaint had been against Midwife C, but following the call, there were 
apparently a number of complaints against Midwife B. The Commissioner summarized these 


































reported to Midwife B that she was having contractions during the pregnancy, and that 
Midwife B advised her that these were caused by the uterus getting ready for the birth. A 
further allegation was that Midwife B had not told her colleague Midwife C that she had 
arranged a scan. 
Midwife B responded to the Commissioner by saying that it was difficult for her to 
respond specifically to the allegation about the contractions as the Commissioner did not 
provide any particulars about when these comments were allegedly made. She explained to 
the Commissioner that it was normal for women to experience 'Braxton Hicks' contractions' 
in pregnancy and that these tended to increase in frequency in the last month of pregnancy as 
the uterus readied for birth. Midwife B felt that Ms Y' s statement that she said that these can 
indicate that the uterus was getting ready for birth was physiologically correct and that she 
probably had said something like that toMs Y. 
Midwife B also confirmed that she did request a scan but that it was non-urgent. A 
point she later discovered had been recognized by the first expert midwife but this opinion 
was not disclosed. Midwife B also confirmed that she had told Midwife C about the scan, 
when the two midwives saw another client together, soon after Midwife B had seen and 
assessed Ms Y. 
Midwife B received the Commissioner's Provisional Opinion dated 19 July 1999 . 
That finding also included entirely new allegations that had never been put to Midwife B. 
The first was that an expert midwife had apparently noted an increase in Ms Y's blood 
pressure during Midwife B's visit. The expert felt that as a result of this elevation, Midwife 
B should have done certain things such as repeating the blood pressure and doing a urine test. 
This was a bizarre conclusion, as the stated blood pressure sat squarely within Ms Y' s normal 
pregnancy range and was not elevated by any standard criteria. A urine test had been done 
and was documented by Midwife B as normal. 
The Commissioner's Opinion then referred to the Sunday morning when Ms Y had 


























C] was away and [Midwife B] was too busy so [Ms Y] spoke to [MidwifeD]. This was at 
odds with the facts. Midwife B replied that she had not been 'too busy' to assist Ms Y. 
Midwife B reported to the Commissioner that when Ms Y phoned with the report that baby 
had not been moving over the previous day, she was immediately concerned. She was out of 
Ms Y' s immediate area and so knowing that Midwife D was at home and close at hand to 
assess Ms Y, Midwife B suggested that this be done. 
Midwife B repeated that, on the day that she had seen Ms Y, there were no reduced 
movements; normal movements were clearly present and documented, and the scan had been 
arranged to check the baby's position. Midwife B made strong submissions regarding the 
impropriety of the shifting allegations and what she perceived as an apparent bias against her. 
The Commissioner accepted the midwife's submissions that the movements had been normal 
on the day of the assessment and that Midwife B had informed Midwife C about the scan. 
The Commissioner additionally removed her comment about the blood pressure and the 
comment that Midwife B was 'too busy' to respond toMs Y. The Commissioner formed a 
Final Opinion that Midwife B was did not breach the Code. 
The investigation of the complaint, with respect to Midwife B, could have been 
mediated or screened out by the Commissioner. The prolonged and extensive investigation 
and the decision of the family to go to the media about her involvement in the complaint, 
added to the enormous pressure that Midwife B was suffering as a result of the earlier case. 
Although the complaint of Ms Y against Midwife B was eventually not upheld, the 
allegations were never retracted in the media by Ms Y. Unlike the earlier case, the 
Commissioner did not go to the media when Midwife B was found to have provided 
reasonable care. 251 
251 The same reporter who had published earlier damning allegations against Midwife B, and 
named her in conjunction with this complaint, did not retract these and let the public know 
that Midwife B, had been completely exonerated of any wrongdoing. Instead the earlier 
allegations against Midwife B were allowed to remain in the public mind and Midwife D was 
additionally named. The earlier article was by Claire Guyon. "Third mum complains over 
midwife care." Evening Post, 3 April1998, p 1,3. The second woman did not make a formal 
complaint, the third was Ms Y. The later article naming Midwife C was also by Claire 
Guyon, "Midwife's Care Not Adequate- Report" .Evening Post, 2 November 1999. 
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